BEYOND REFORM: BETTER POLICING THROUGH SYSTEMS THINKING by Bagby, Christopher R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2021-03
BEYOND REFORM: BETTER POLICING
THROUGH SYSTEMS THINKING
Bagby, Christopher R.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67098
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.









BETTER POLICING THROUGH SYSTEMS THINKING 
by 
Christopher R. Bagby 
March 2021 
Co-Advisors: Patrick E. Miller (contractor) 
 Shannon A. Brown 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
BEYOND REFORM: BETTER POLICING THROUGH SYSTEMS THINKING
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Christopher R. Bagby












11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Police reform is a long-standing objective in America. In one form or another, the same 
fundamental problem persists: police have never consistently navigated the tension between effectively 
policing society and being a part of it. In part, systems theory helps explain why traditional best-practice 
reforms have not been consistently effective. The solution to these problems may lie not in reform 
but in reframing the approach to police organizations through systems thinking. This thesis seeks to 
answer a key question predicated on the assumption that reform is not enough: How can systems thinking 
improve policing? Using gap analysis, this thesis identifies ways to improve American policing and its 
processes through application of systems theory, specifically systems thinking. This research considers 
some of the problems that face policing from a systems-thinking perspective and finds that managing 
systems structures, building agent capacity, understanding context and goal-setting, and pursuing 
feedback could improve policing in ways that traditional reform strategies have not. Finally, it 
recommends that law enforcement agencies adopt systems-thinking strategies to improve performance. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS
police, police reform, systems, systems thinking, policing, policing management, reflective




















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
BEYOND REFORM:  
BETTER POLICING THROUGH SYSTEMS THINKING 
Christopher R. Bagby 
Sergeant, Bakersfield Police Department 
BS, National University, 2006 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2021 
Approved by: Patrick E. Miller 
Co-Advisor 
Shannon A. Brown 
Co-Advisor 
Erik J. Dahl 
Associate Professor, Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
Police reform is a long-standing objective in America. In one form or another, 
the same fundamental problem persists: police have never consistently navigated the 
tension between effectively policing society and being a part of it. In part, systems 
theory helps explain why traditional best-practice reforms have not been consistently 
effective. The solution to these problems may lie not in reform but in reframing the 
approach to police organizations through systems thinking. This thesis seeks to 
answer a key question predicated on the assumption that reform is not enough: 
How can systems thinking improve policing? Using gap analysis, this thesis 
identifies ways to improve American policing and its processes through application 
of systems theory, specifically systems thinking. This research considers some of 
the problems that face policing from a systems-thinking perspective and finds that 
managing systems structures, building agent capacity, understanding context and goal-
setting, and pursuing feedback could improve policing in ways that traditional reform 
strategies have not. Finally, it recommends that law enforcement agencies adopt 
systems-thinking strategies to improve performance. 
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Police reform is a long-standing tradition in America.1 Nevertheless, in one form 
or another, a fundamental problem persists: police have never consistently navigated the 
tension between effectively policing society and being a part of it.2 Policing failures cost 
human lives, polarize people, have devastating financial and social consequences, and 
erode the institution’s legitimate authority. Perhaps the cure does not lie within the oft-
prescribed medicine of traditional reform but rather in reframing the approach to police 
organizations through systems thinking. 
This thesis seeks to answer a key question: How can systems thinking improve 
policing? Using gap analysis as a research method, it seeks to identify ways to improve 
policing and its processes through systems thinking. Gap analysis is a sound research 
methodology because the ideal state of policing is well documented, as is the current state. 
What lies between them, the gap, is the essence of this research.3 
Systems thinking is a way of thinking about problems, such as policing, that are 
messy, non-linear, and fraught with uncertainty. It provides a way of addressing problems 
that have these characteristics in their own problem space. Thinking about the world as 
systems is a departure from the mechanistic—that is, a linear, simplistic view of problem-
solving that dominates police reform. Instead of viewing the problems plaguing police and 
society from the reductionist approach to “fixing” policing that has dominated the problem 
space since its inception, this work attempts to examine whole systems, their behaviors, 
and their interaction with the world. 
This research explores how thinking differently about law enforcement might 
change its structures and practices to render the need for traditional reform obsolete. It 
 
1 See, for example, Stephen Rushin, “Federal Enforcement of Police Reform,” Fordham Law Review 
82, no. 6 (May 2014): 3189–3248. 
2 Department of Justice, The Civil Rights Division’s Pattern and Practice Police Reform Work: 1994–
Present (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2017). 
3 Gary O. Langford et al., Gap Analysis: Rethinking the Conceptual Foundations, Report No. NPS-
GSBPP-8-008 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 19, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/
10945/609. 
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explores opportunities for law enforcement to repurpose many existing structures and 
practices, along with some innovations to expand its systems’ scope. The goal is to inform 
ways that might help create unbiased, neutral, consistent, legal, and ethical policing and, 
as a result, improve long-term resiliency. 
A systems-based approach might prove more useful than traditional police reform 
in resolving many of the recurring issues that hamper policing in the United States. Much 
of reform focuses on creating high reliability in police systems without addressing the 
issues that create the problems in the first place, and many of the fixes put in place as part 
of reform programs have the effect of constraining the system even further.4 Drawing from 
the extensive literature on reliability, this thesis demonstrates a systems approach that 
incorporates the philosophical framework underpinning total quality management could 
improve police performance by creating monitoring structures to capture and measure 
feedback from inside and outside the system.  
One of the core tenets of traditional police reform is to focus on the training and 
education of police officers.5 Nevertheless, the current approach to improving performance 
through training and education is short-sighted and inadequate for improving policing in 
the long term. Reform scholars struggle to understand police officers’ behavioral 
inconsistencies and how best to capture and replicate positive behaviors while eradicating 
undesirable ones.6 This research demonstrates that a solution to these problems may be in 
building the learning capacity of system agents—police officers. Improved capacity 
improves the agents’ response to the events and behaviors that occur within the system. 
Generative learning, the deep-learning cycle, reflection in action, and tacit knowledge 
improve system performance. Their essential processes are learning and analyzing what is 
learned from past experiences and synthesizing that learning with future behavior. An 
organization’s ability to assess its problem and system spaces, capabilities, strengths, and 
 
4 Samuel Walker and Carol A. Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 2nd ed. (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2014), 5, 182–83; Robert E. Worden and Sarah J. McLean, Mirage of Police 
Reform: Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017), 206. 
5 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing (Washington, DC: Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015). 
6 Worden and McLean, Mirage of Police Reform, 193–96. 
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weaknesses is central to its ability to adapt or change to best suit its environment’s 
complexity or volatility.  
A system’s context—that is, its environment—can confuse the system’s goals and 
prevent them from functioning as designed. Better goal-setting and an awareness of the 
constraints environments will improve system performance. Police organization executives 
and leadership, who aware of their environments, can improve performance and set 
achievable goals. A way forward is to divest from sociological problems while 
acknowledging their impact on several systems. Policing could maintain “tactical agency” 
over the act of policing while developing a “strategic voice” to serve as its influence among 
the many competing influences with which it finds itself often engaged.7 By considering 
goals of policing differently, the system of policing can better serve its needs. A unified 
goal might help establish a standard to measure police conduct across the board and 
standardize expectations of America’s police. 
In most ways, America’s police fail to couple well with communities, social groups, 
and people, limiting their organizational resilience. Better feedback may be the bridge to 
better trust. Feedback is vital to systems, and feedback mechanisms are like sensors in a 
community. One way to increase the feedback response is to open system boundaries and 
pursue feedback from other systems. Feedback is the key to creating resiliency. 
Police organizations are systems but more than that; no matter the size, they are 
connected as a larger system. Each bears an intrinsic responsibility to the others to learn to 
perform in a way that not only serves its own purposes but benefits the larger system as a 
whole. The stakes are huge. One need look no further than the George Floyd incident to 
see that a single call for service can affect every single police organization in the United 
States for years to come. 
There are four significant conclusions drawn from the research in this thesis:  
 
7 David H. Bayley, Michael A. Davis, and Ronald L. Davis, “Race and Policing: An Agenda for 
Action,” in New Perspectives in Policing (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2015), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248624.pdf. 
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1. Creating a platform for managing and sustaining the flow of information 
within and about police systems to connect executives and agents with 
information about the system could improve all aspects of policing.  
2. Improving agents’ competency within a police system will improve the 
system’s behavior and bolster its structure. 
3. Understanding how system context affects police systems and how 
policing impacts its environments can improve policing in the United 
States. 
4. As systems, police organizations must learn to recognize the value of 
feedback. Engaging feedback can create social resilience and connect with 
people to improve relationships. 
The findings and conclusions of this thesis led to the following recommendations: 
1. Implement a systems approach to police organization management. 
2. Explore opportunities to expand agent capacity through police systems 
thinking and systems management training at every practitioner and 
executive level for all police officers in America. 
3. Learn to become more thoughtful in approaching police system 
environments, and set goals accordingly. 
4. Pursue wide-reaching internal and external sensors touching every aspect 
of the system’s performance. 
In the aftermath of the homicide of George Floyd, police organizations worldwide 
are being forced to reimagine the way they think about policing, managing police 
organizations, and policing outcomes. This thesis sought to research whether applying 
systems thinking principles would improve police organizations’ performance and 
resiliency over the currently employed traditional reform strategy. It sought to understand 
why American policing performs as it does and how understanding systems’ behavior, 
especially complex systems, might help explain why policing—as a system—often 
struggles to do what it intends. More than that, it identified points of leverage to improve 
xix 
policing not only in the abstract but in ways that police organizations can utilize to improve 
themselves. Ultimately, it found that systems thinking may be the way forward for policing 
to improve meaningfully—not in the reactive frame of yet another policing disaster, but 
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Police reform is a long-standing tradition in America.1 Since Theodore Roosevelt’s 
first significant police reform efforts at the end of the 19th century, Presidents Hoover, 
Nixon, George H. W. Bush, and Obama all instituted major reform efforts to fix policing.2 
Federal commissions, initiatives, and statutes designed to address failures of American 
policing have been reexamined for more than a century. In one form or another, the same 
fundamental problem persists: police have never consistently navigated the tension 
between effectively policing society and being a part of it.3 Policing failures cost human 
lives, polarize people, have devastating financial and social consequences, and erode the 
institution’s legitimate authority. Whether discussing the unrest caused in the aftermath of 
the Rodney King incident, the tumult following the shooting of Michael Brown, the 
controversy surrounding Eric Garner’s demise, or the global unrest following the homicide 
of George Floyd, these touchstone events and the damage to society they cause represent 
an underlying disease in the way America polices and reforms its police.  
Police reform struggles to make a long-term impact on improving policing or police 
agencies. Like systems thinking as a field of research in its own right does, this research 
represents a departure from the mechanistic view of problem-solving that, by all 
appearances, dominates police reform. Instead of viewing the problems plaguing police 
and society from the reductionist approach to “fixing” policing that has dominated the 
problem space since its inception, this work, through systems thinking, attempts to examine 
whole systems, their behaviors, and their interaction with the world. Reductionism is the 
idea that things can be broken down into individual parts to be understood fully. 
Reductionism helps create a cause-and-effect view of the world by placing the things that 
 
1 See, for example, Stephen Rushin, “Federal Enforcement of Police Reform,” Fordham Law Review 
82, no. 6 (May 2014): 3189–3248. 
2 Samuel Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform: The Emergence of Professionalization 
(Lexington Books, 1977), ProQuest; Rushin, “Federal Enforcement of Police Reform”; Paul Butler, “The 
System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform,” Georgetown Law 
Journal 104, no. 6 (August 2016): 1419–78. 
3 Department of Justice, The Civil Rights Division’s Pattern and Practice Police Reform Work: 1994–
Present (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2017). 
2 
cause problems into categories, and categorizing the world helps it appear predictable and 
controllable.4 
Reductionism analyzes things to find their basic components whereas a systems 
approach examines the whole using what Russell Ackoff has called “synthetic thinking.” 
He writes, “Analysis focuses on structure; it reveals how things work. Synthesis focuses 
on function; it reveals why things operate as they do. Therefore, analysis yields knowledge; 
synthesis yields understanding. The former enables us to describe; the latter, to explain.”5 
Systems thinking came about through the acknowledgment that the world is messy, non-
linear, and fraught with uncertainty. Such an approach provides a way of addressing 
problems that have these characteristics in their own problem space. The research in this 
thesis attempts to do just that—approach policing from a systems-thinking paradigm to 
better understand policing, its problems, and ways to improve it.  
This research explores how applying systems thinking to law enforcement might 
change its structures and practices to render the need for traditional reform obsolete. The 
research determines whether law enforcement can think differently in how it maneuvers 
both internally and externally to develop necessary changes in pattern and practice as needs 
develop—rather than after failures occur. It explores opportunities for law enforcement to 
repurpose many existing structures and practices, along with some innovations, and expand 
the system’s scope to help it function better. This research aims to improve this system’s 
output, using systems thinking and related theories, such as learning organization theory 
and complexity theory. The ultimate goal is to inform ways that might help create unbiased, 
neutral, consistent, legal, and ethical policing and, as a result, improve long-term resiliency.  
Law enforcement organizations are notoriously slow to adapt and challenging to 
change, in part because they are government entities fraught with bureaucratic oversight, 
legal issues, activist pressure, community expectations, and legislative restraints and 
constraints. Leveraging systems thinking and some of its outgrowths, such as 
 
4 Robert C. H. Chia and Robin Holt, Strategy without Design: The Silent Efficacy of Indirect Action 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 20; Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact 
of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2007), xxix–xxx. 
5 Russell L. Ackoff, Ackoff’s Best: His Classic Writings on Management (New York: Wiley, 1999), 18. 
3 
organizational learning and systems management theories, particularly those that 
incorporate agile development and reflection, is worth exploring to improve policing 
practices where traditional thinking has not. This thesis questions how policing can use 
these cooperative concepts to become more agilely responsive to social challenges and 
improve performance. Doing so might eliminate the need for traditional reforms and 
improve the effectiveness of policing overall.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can systems thinking improve policing? 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research question considered for this project asks whether it is possible to 
improve an existing structure and its processes. Modern policing and its challenges, 
processes, and reform methodologies are well documented by academia, professional 
publications, reform experts, activists, and the media, as are the desired outcomes. What 
lies between each is the subject of this inquiry. Langford et al. describe the function of gap 
analyses in their report for the Naval Postgraduate School. They write, “What you desire 
versus what you have is, in essence, a Gap. The Gap is as much the relationship between 
what is perceived to be important and the derived difference between performance and 
expectations” (original emphasis).6 Given this understanding of gap analysis and the 
research question’s scope, it is the appropriate research method of inquiry because the gap 
is the area between what people both inside and outside policing want from their police 
organizations and what their police do.  
People expect policing to perform a certain way, but how police agencies perform 
does not always align. Thus, this research followed a gap analysis process: 1) established 
the ideal future state, 2) analyzed the current state, 3) compared the current state to the 
 
6 Gary O. Langford et al., Gap Analysis: Rethinking the Conceptual Foundations, Report No. NPS-
GSBPP-8-008 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 19, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/
10945/609. 
4 
future state, 4) described the gap and quantified the difference, and 5) made 
recommendations to bridge the gaps.7 
The analysis scope was limited exclusively to municipal policing in the United 
States and the processes, attitudes, and relationships that drive it. Defining the ideal state 
involved identifying how the modern American police department’s operations would 
improve by implementing a reflexive policing system that incorporated systems thinking 
and related strategies. The research overlaid this ideal state with modern reformed  
policing and the constant processes of reform to qualify or quantify whether this reflexive 
system has the potential to bridge the gap between current police organizations and their 
recurrent problems. 
This study examined a broad range of literature on policing, police reform, police 
organizations, systems thinking, systems models, systems thinking applications for 
government and police, learning organizations, and their attributes, applications, models, 
processes, and limitations. The study also involved applying systems thinking principles to 
policing activities, primarily focused on strategic organizational capacities rather than 
operational or tactical applications. The research included examinations of a number of 
police organizations throughout the United States and lessons learned from their 
performance or response to stimuli—and how their application, intentional or otherwise, 
might benefit from systems thinking. 
 
7 Traditional gap analysis involves creating a plan to bridge the gap. However, the complexity of 
policing makes “planning” in the traditional sense something of a fallacy. Instead, for this research, the 
analysis makes recommendations about ways to think or adopt practices that allow complexity and 
complex system adaptation, but no plan is proposed. Joe Weller, “The Complete Guide to Gap Analysis,” 
Smartsheet, October 17, 2018, https://www.smartsheet.com/gap-analysis-method-examples; “5 Gap 
Analysis Tools to Analyze and Bridge the Gaps in Your Business,” Creately (blog), last modified October 
21, 2020, https://creately.com/blog/diagrams/gap-analysis-tools/. 
5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To answer the question of how systems thinking can improving policing, there must 
be an understanding of the history and current state of policing and the efforts to improve 
it. One must also understand the foundational principles of systems and complex systems, 
and their application to law enforcement. This thesis analyzes American policing, generally 
at the organizational level, from a systems perspective. The research design seeks to 
identify and then bridge the gaps between police performance, society’s attempts to reform 
it, and the desired state of policing in America. Thinking about police organizations as 
systems and treating them as such may prove to be that bridge.  
This literature review considers efforts to improve policing in America and the 
current state of those efforts. It explores modern police reform, specifically 
pattern-and-practice reform, its effectiveness, and its future outlook. It also considers the 
literature on performance measurements in policing. Finally, it discusses research on 
systems theory applications, specifically systems thinking, along with the closely related 
field of learning organization theory in law enforcement organizations, and efforts to 
synergize these theories to improve police departments. 
A. POLICE REFORM 
Police reform is a well-documented, long-standing practice in America.8 Theodore 
Roosevelt is often credited with creating the modern police department through reform. 
The injection of his progressive reform idealism into policing created better-trained, 
structured, and professionalized police departments.9 Roosevelt’s reforms, which were 
relatively radical in his era, have been adopted widely; it is hard to imagine policing holding 
any other form. Author Jay Berman, who explores the impact of Roosevelt’s reform efforts, 
writes, “The professional model of police administration served as the ideological 
foundation for progressive police reform. The model may be viewed as the deliverance of 
 
8 Rushin, “Federal Enforcement of Police Reform.” 
9 Jay Berman, Police Administration and Progressive Reform (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 
8, 50, 77, 90, 121–122. 
6 
the gospel of efficiency to urban policing.”10 Despite Roosevelt’s significant reform efforts 
and those of the leaders who followed, some fundamental problems have persisted.  
Historically, police reform suffers from many recurring problems. Among the most 
persistent complaints against America’s police are the disparity in the ways people of color 
and the poor get policed compared to white and upper-class people; violent tactics; and 
inadequate supervision, oversight, and accountability leading to corruption, illegal actions, 
and abuse of power.11 
1. Modern Reform 
In many ways, the police reform of the late 20th and early 21st century introduced 
transparency, oversight, and accountability, along with the ideas of procedural justice, 
police legitimacy, and community trust to modern policing. Federal pattern-and-practice 
reforms, in particular, set an unofficial standard for agencies after which to model 
themselves.12 They created different ways of thinking about police performance and 
mechanisms for measuring the way police officers behave, like early intervention systems. 
They challenged training, policy, and procedures to change policing for the better, creating 
police departments that better served their communities and were accountable to them. 
Much of modern reform has focused on improved organizational accountability, policy 
change, data analysis, and officer behavior.13 At its core, police reform seeks to change 
the behavior of police officers and police departments to improve their performance in 
some way. 
The federal government created the primary tool used to reform policing today. In 
1994, Congress passed the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, 
 
10 Berman, 121. 
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12 Samuel Walker and Carol A. Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 2nd ed. (Thousand 
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13 Walker and Archbold, 21–25. 
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following the Rodney King incident and the national attention it garnered.14 This statute is 
the Department of Justice (DOJ)’s mechanism to intervene when police misconduct is 
rampant in state and local law enforcement agencies.15 Police reform scholars Darrell L. 
Ross and Patricia A. Parke write,  
Section 14141 specifically authorizes the Department of Justice (DOJ) to 
bring a lawsuit against a police organization rather than individual officers 
. . . by granting authority to the DOJ to pursue equitable and declaratory 
relief against police engaged in a “pattern and practice” which deprives 
individuals of their constitutional rights.16 
This law gives the DOJ oversight authority to reign in abuses of the Constitution by state 
and local law enforcement officials. It functions to identify police organizations that use 
illegal, unethical, or unconstitutional patterns and practices and intervene to reform them. 
The term “pattern and practice” is shorthand for the method of reform, which involves 
identifying patterns and practices of unconstitutional behaviors through DOJ 
investigations. Those patterns and practices become the focus of the investigation and the 
foundation of the reform platform.17 Despite the DOJ’s significant authority, the Law 
Enforcement Misconduct Statute does not articulate the mechanism of inquiry, 
investigation, or intervention.18 Relatively few agencies have been investigated under this 
statute, and even fewer have been the subject of DOJ-mandated consent decrees via court 
order.19 Nevertheless, DOJ investigations and subsequent legal actions have emerged as 
the single most significant police reform driver in the United States.20  
 
14 Darrell L. Ross and Patricia A. Parke, “Policing by Consent Decree: An Analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 
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15 Department of Justice, Pattern and Practice, 3. 
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17 Department of Justice, Pattern and Practice. 
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19 Department of Justice, Pattern and Practice, 3. 
20 Walker and Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 48–49; Patrick A. Walsh, “A 
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The DOJ is ill-equipped to conduct wide-reaching investigations of thousands of 
American police departments.21 Instead, as scholars have pointed out, DOJ-forced reforms 
have put agencies across the United States on notice that all police practices are generally 
under review. Thus, federally mandated reforms in police departments across the United 
States have served as the model to follow.22 As Samuel Walker and Carol Archbold, 
renowned police practice scholars and prominent reformers, write in their book, “No police 
department should be in a position where it can be sued by the Justice Department, because 
the past cases make clear what is expected of them to achieve professional, bias-free, and 
accountable policing.”23 Walker and Archbold articulate the accepted role of 
pattern-and-practice reform in American law enforcement, arguing that such reform is the 
best solution for solving many policing problems ranging from the constitutionality of 
policing to legitimacy and community engagement.24 Proponents of these reforms, such 
as lawyer and scholar Stephen Rushin, argue that they are useful and necessary for 
improving American policing and ensuring police legitimacy.25 They argue that police 
agencies require various controls, and by implementing these controls, they will begin to 
develop community trust and legitimacy.26  
Experts agree that police reform has not been successful at fixing the problems of 
policing in America. For example, in examining the DOJ’s 1997 consent decree in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Davis et al. tout some successes in building community trust yet 
note that community leaders believed significant gaps might lead to failure in the long 
term.27 In a statement before the House Judiciary Committee, the American Civil Liberties 
Union acknowledged the value of reform efforts, including pattern-and-practice reforms. 
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However, it implored the committee to adopt more aggressive reform positions.28 Sunita 
Patel, UCLA professor and police reform scholar, discusses the nature of police reforms 
under the DOJ’s supervision, finding that specific reform functions are ill-conceived at best 
and routinely miss the mark regardless of the zeal of their adoption and enforcement.29 
While many of the experts above credit the pattern-and-practice model of reform with 
reshaping policing into the future and holding police departments accountable, many also 
find it lacking in different ways.  
2. Why Modern Reforms Fail 
Detractors of modern police reform fall into various schools of thought. First, some 
argue that police reform is ineffective because it does not go far enough to intervene in the 
criminal justice system, and reforms are ineffective because they are inconsistently 
applied.30 As a result, oversight is insufficient to make the needed changes.31 Some believe 
that pattern-and-practice reform requires consistent reapplication and monitoring to ensure 
it lasts.32 As scholars and DOJ consultants who track reform efforts, Walker and Archbold 
argue that American policing traditionally fails because it represents the biases of local 
leaders and the American people at large, who are traditionally “indifferent to the goals of 
constitutional policing or actively hostile to the requirements of due process and equal 
protection.”33 In their book, Walker and Archbold maintain that police reform successes 
lie in constant monitoring and oversight mechanisms, but not enough agencies are 
employing them.34  
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Walker and Archbold acknowledge that most reform efforts fail.35 They write that 
the threats to the “new police accountability are many and powerful.”36 The scholars claim 
reforms do not endure because of leadership failures, unsustainability, officers’ failure to 
embrace their role in reform, and police organizations’ failure to police their own 
effectively. They also note that changes to leadership make long-term transformations 
difficult.37 Moreover, reforms do not “institutionalize processes for sustaining reforms 
over time.”38 Sustaining reformed policing practices and changing officer behavior are 
difficult at the practitioner level.39  
Rushin argues for monitoring and oversight but in a different way. Specifically, he 
argues that pattern-and-practice reforms are only successful in the DOJ Civil Rights 
Division’s hands. Rushin believes that the DOJ should have its ranks reinforced and its 
actions multiplied to manage all pattern-and-practice reforms. Otherwise, he argues, reform 
efforts fail to scratch the surface.40  
The American Civil Liberties Union argues for legislative oversight. For example, 
it sponsors and advocates federally managed reform programs, such as the PEACE Act, a 
national last-resort, self-defense, and use-of-force policy that federally criminalizes any 
police line-of-duty shooting outside that standard.41 Those in this “old school” of reform 
acknowledge that reform efforts in their current state are ineffective but, generally, the 
pattern-and-practice reform process is a good thing—there is just not enough of it.42 
 
35 Walker and Archbold, 28. 
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Alternatively, author Michael Brown has found that reform bureaucracy makes 
policing harder to do, and strict reforms and policing the public are not necessarily 
congruent. Brown writes, “If there is a lesson to be learned from the most recent generation 
of reformers, it is that simply enveloping policemen in a maze of institutional controls 
without grappling with the grimy realities of police work does not necessarily promote 
accountability and may only exacerbate matters.”43  
Another group of detractors agrees about the necessity of police reform but 
recommends using innovative methodologies. Worden and McLean argue that modern 
reform, mainly procedural justice, a product of pattern-and-practice proponents, is just a 
repackaging of old, failed reforms such as problem-oriented or community policing.44 
They argue that police agencies, politicians, and reformers have an incongruent view of 
what is wrong with the American justice system and how to fix it. Moreover, they argue 
through a study of several reformed police agencies that the pattern-and-practice reform 
platform has little to no long-term impact.45 Measuring the sentiment of a wide range of 
citizen groups, Worden and McLean’s study employed an analysis of six police 
departments to uncover why many post-reform outcomes do not match the desired effect. 
Their study concludes, among other things, that police reform cannot merely show some 
reasonable faith effort on the part of a police agency to be effective. They argue that reform 
needs to find more effective ways to connect police with society to repair their historically 
bad relationships.46  
Patel’s work makes largely this same argument. No matter how rigorous, police 
reform does not challenge the institution’s nature or structure and, therefore, will always 
fail to some degree.47 In an article for the Georgetown Law Review, Butler argues that 
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police reform works perfectly well as designed; the problem is not the construction of 
reform but the system itself. The system is inherently corrupt in its ideals and, therefore, 
fails regardless of the reform effort.48 These scholars claim that accepted reform efforts 
fail over time because they neither directly nor indirectly address the underlying core 
problems. Their argument likens reform to a medical professional’s treating symptoms 
while ignoring the disease. From their perspective, reforms seek to answer the wrong 
questions.  
Worden and McLean argue that reforms fail for different reasons—they fail entirely 
to grasp the problems created by policing, and the solutions are often incomplete or miss 
the mark. The scholars argue that reforms fail to affect outcomes as promised and are often 
recycled, as the past 50 years of police reform, except for the introduction of legitimacy 
and procedural justice, are similar to one another.49 Moreover, police reforms often fail 
because programs are superimposed on existing organizational structures, and many have 
competing goals.50 Worden and McLean summarize the argument nicely: “Such 
prescriptions rest largely on logic and wishful thinking, and certainly not on social 
scientific evidence.”51  
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
Another difficulty with reform is that police managers struggle to quantify law 
enforcement performance. American police agencies gauge success through such methods 
as computer comparison statistics (CompStat), which numerically measure crime and 
enforcement changes throughout their police jurisdictions. Performance is connected to the 
rise and fall of criminal behavior and officers’ productivity—that is, the number of arrests 
or citations issued during a target period. CompStat does not capture the quality of 
organizational performance nor its overall effectiveness.52  
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Worden and McLean argue there is no systemic accountability for the performance 
of police officers in connecting with their communities or measurements of 
challenging-to-capture ideas like procedural justice in numerical-based performance 
metrics. They also argue that intrinsic conflicts exist in the structure of police departments, 
particularly the distance between managers who drive policy reform and practitioners who 
struggle with actual police work’s volatility and danger. Practitioners give little credibility 
to management mandates, especially when they affect their fundamental understanding of 
their roles in policing.53  
Walker and Archbold argue that police performance, particularly in the context of 
reform, focuses on individual bad actors rather than the systems that create them. They 
assert that such focused performance critiques tend to be emotionally and politically driven 
and have little lasting effects while also confusing the actual problems and outcomes. The 
scholars argue that the measurement of policing needs to shift focus from acts of 
misconduct to organizational police culture.54 
Police reform and police performance management in their current states do not 
seem to be achieving the designed outcomes. As Walker and Archbold as well as Worden 
and McLean argue, reform methodology is inconsistent, and effectiveness is fleeting if 
reform is at all successful. Reform scholar Jay Berman captures the situation succinctly: 
“The challenges of improving police management, personnel, and procedures to acceptable 
levels consistent with complex demands of modern law enforcement remain to be 
overcome.”55 Systems thinking may help bridge the gap between police reform, 
performance management expectations, and the failure of performance.  
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C. SYSTEMS AND POLICE SYSTEMS 
The world is a continuum of systems.56 All systems have elements, inputs, 
processes, outputs, and some form of feedback. The people in a system are called “agents” 
and their organizations “agencies.” Systems can have an infinite number of essential parts 
including interdependent or independent combinations of all different kinds. The system’s 
parts make up its structure, its design, and determines how it behaves. Feedback tells the 
system about its behavior and can come in any number of different forms, depending on 
the system.  
Basic systems, such as home air conditioners, make systems easy to understand. In 
such a system, an evaporator, a blower fan, ducting, wiring, and an electricity source work 
together to create a specific temperature in a specific space. The ideal temperature is the 
system’s stock, its designed output. The ducting is its pathways, as is its wiring. The air is 
created by one agent, the evaporator is moved by another agent, and the blower moves the 
air through the ducting to the area where the system intends to control the climate. For the 
system to know if the temperature is ideal—too hot or too cold—requires something to 
report, at least periodically, about its behavior to adjust the air temperature, how much is 
blowing across the system, and whether the entire system is functioning as designed. In 
this example, the thermostat supplies feedback. Specifically, it is a balancing feedback 
mechanism.  
There are two types of feedback mechanisms, those that balance and those that 
reinforce. Meadows calls balancing feedback “goal-seeking,” “regulating,” and 
“stabilizing.” It is feedback designed to ensure the system is doing what it intends to do, 
like a thermostat—balancing feedback, though it is also a source of resistance to change.57 
Balancing feedback is slow to change the closer a system believes it is to its goals.  
The adage about a frog in a pan of water on a stove illustrates how balancing 
feedback can be problematic. The frog believes it is in no danger, and as the temperature 
 
56 Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 
2008), 12. 
57 Meadows, 27–30. 
15 
rises slowly, the frog knows no danger until it boils to death. Thus, the changes in the 
environment were difficult, if not impossible, for the frog to discern. The frog did not sense 
a dramatic change because the changes were slow over time, but the frog’s feedback was 
the same. If the water changed quickly or there was a noticeable threat, the frog would have 
responded more quickly. This is the essence of balancing feedback. The further away the 
system is from its expected output, the faster it reacts. The closer it is, the slower it reacts. 
This is also a common system “trap” called “drifting goals” or “drifting to low 
performance.” Such system traps and their effect on system performance are discussed in 
detail throughout this thesis.58  
Reinforcing feedback amplifies, grows, reinforces, and multiplies a system’s 
output. Meadows calls it a “vicious or virtuous cycle that can cause healthy growth or 
runaway destruction.”59 Commercial sales is a good example of reinforcing feedback. The 
more desirable the product, the more the product sells. More sales made mean more money 
to make a more desirable product, increasing sales to exponential levels, which allow for 
business growth and more products and, therefore, more sales.60 Reinforcing feedback can 
also cause problems when it becomes what Meadows calls “runaway” feedback. Cytokine 
storms are powerful, often deadly human immune responses triggered by the body’s 
recognition of a disease. The body attacks the disease, building and multiplying its attack 
perpetually, ultimately causing more trouble than the underlying disease. The feedback and 
response overcome the body, and the immune system attacks the diseased cells and those 
of its host.61 
Systems theory helps people understand how individual, even seemingly unrelated, 
distant actions, elements, or phenomena work together or against each other to create and 
alter outcomes. Scientists, mathematicians, engineers, and many other fields use systems 
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theory to explain the world’s complexity and the relationships, seen and unseen, between 
cause and effect more deeply. Systems theory also acknowledges and, in some ways, 
celebrates the often unexpected, emergent outcomes in complex adaptive social systems.62 
Complex adaptive social systems are systems involving interactive human agents within a 
social context.  
Like law enforcement agencies and their communities, some social systems include 
the world’s most complex system phenomena—human beings interacting with other 
human beings. Human systems are inherently complex because they involve people as 
individuals and as socially delineated groups, each a system unto its own, but all systems 
interacting and affecting one another.63 Innumerable masses divided into neighborhoods, 
towns, cities, race, gender, sects, religions, and infinite other relationships, across nations 
and globally, are inherently complex to recognize, much less manage. They are prone to 
failure and challenging, in the best of times, to predict.64 System complexity is directly 
proportional to the vulnerability of the system. The more outputs are interdependent on the 
constituent parts of the system, including related micro or macrosystems, the more complex 
the system. The more complex the system, the more difficult it is to understand the inter- 
and intra-system relationships and their effect on its behavior or output.65  
There are many reasons for system faults and failures, and even in the most resilient 
and well-functioning systems, failures occur. Complexity guarantees even in the best of 
systems that failures are possible but also probable. The disparity can cause unexpected 
and usually negative system behaviors known as “normal accidents.”66 Normal accident 
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theory is often applied to technological systems, but it applies to tightly coupled complex 
systems, including social systems like law enforcement. As it is used here, “tightly 
coupled” means the system’s components are held close together or managed carefully. 
Tight coupling closely manages performance to control the outcome better.67 
A competing theory is called high-reliability theory, which attempts first to prevent 
and second to mitigate complex system failures, also called “accidents,” through a series 
of system management apparatuses. For instance, in policing, these apparatuses include 
training, decentralized command, policy and procedures, and the like. As systems develop, 
the correct controls get put in place, and failures and accidents become less frequent over 
time. Systems learn to handle them, and the system agents learn to recognize faults or 
incidents, correcting them before they become chaotic.68 
This thesis focuses on three distinct fields of study: systems theory, complex 
adaptive systems, and systems thinking. Through their research, Dietz and Mink categorize 
law enforcement organizations as complex adaptive systems because they exist “nested” 
within other systems. They elaborate, “Another way of conceptualizing a complex system 
is as a large collection of simple, mutually interacting parts that is capable of exchanging 
stimuli and energy with its environment and capable also of adapting its internal structure 
as a consequence of such interaction.”69 They demonstrate how systems thinking and 
understanding law enforcement as a complex adaptive system can be leveraged to 
understand complexity in law enforcement operations and show how constituent parts in 
policy, operations, and community outreach can be understood as adaptive living 
systems.70 Their primer illustrates how a specific law enforcement agency—the Austin 
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Police Department—operates as a complex adaptive system and how it leverages 
complexity to the agency’s benefit.71  
Dietz and Mink maintain that since the Austin Police Department and effectively 
all of law enforcement are intricate living systems, systems theory is a way of 
understanding their operations and failures and thinking about altering their course. Dietz 
and Mink demonstrate system phenomena such as strange attractors, unpredictable but 
repetitive energy-focusing system nodes within a complex adaptive system that can be 
leveraged to the system’s benefit or, without management, can harm the desired outputs.72 
In layperson’s terms, leveraging relationships in the right way can benefit police systems, 
but mismanaging or ignoring them can have dire consequences. The work also broadly 
discusses how systems thinking can help law enforcement understand some of its 
challenges, including systemic racism, community tensions, and problems with policing 
subcultures.73 
Dietz and Mink admit the limits of their research in studying policing as a complex 
adaptive system. They acknowledge the design of their study as introductory, and there is 
significant room for additional applications of complex adaptive systems to law 
enforcement. Their research starts the conversation but does not delve deeply into 
improperly operated systems or system resiliency. The paper includes an invitation to 
“open the door to solutions to the persistent problems faced by communities and police 
departments.”74 Dietz and Mink suggest that using systems thinking and complexity theory 
approaches for law enforcement’s social system may “create a better future for their 
clients.”75 
Much of the rest of the literature about policing as a complex adaptive system 
discusses the social implications of policing and crime. Understanding “policing” as a 
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complex adaptive system in this context is as much an explanation of “crime” as a complex 
adaptive social system. The research effectively argues that because crime is complex, so 
is the act of interdicting or stopping it. The role of complexity theory and systems theory 
provides the opportunity to see these systems as networks capable of disruption. They focus 
on managing fieldwork and operational considerations relating to crime and the types of 
crime, locales, criminals, and their connections, along with geographical and strategic 
implications.76 Interdicting terror networks with international connections by arresting a 
pivotal character, for instance, has wide-reaching, often unforeseen consequences because 
disrupting cells in London might cause unexpected bolstering of cells in Belgium. The act 
of policing that changes the terror network may create ripples throughout the system that 
change how it behaves, modify the structure or the output, and alter how the police behave 
in response. 
While the research for this thesis has little use for fieldwork applications, 
integrating systems and complexity theory in all walks of policing is notable as an 
understood, emerging way of thinking more academically about policing and its practices. 
The idea that systems analysis can equally inform leadership and administration—both on 
the fundamental and philosophical fronts, as demonstrated in Dietz and Mink’s work—
while servicing operational and strategic needs demonstrates a possible way forward in 
how police systems manage themselves and the way they interact with the communities 
they police.  
D. ORGANIZATIONAL FOCUS OF SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS 
Given the role of police reform in this research, it is appropriate to mention a simple 
systems-thinking concept proposed by Walker and Archbold. Their book details a model 
called the policy, training, supervision, and review (PTSR) framework. It is a systems 
approach to police reform in that it combines individual parts of a police organization’s 
policy, training, and supervision with a “review” process. They frame this feedback in a 
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balancing feedback loop, with agencies working through this process to improve policy, 
training, and supervision in police organizations to inform and create best-practice 
measures. He argues that “best practices” should be initially sourced from other police 
departments’ efforts of the same process. He argues that the best sources for best practices 
are agencies, informed by government-enforced consent decrees under monitors who 
implement the required reforms while supervising their outcomes.77 
Walker and Archbold’s approach is complicated rather than complex. It treats law 
enforcement organizations as simple-but-closed systems, and those internal measurements, 
patterned from other closed systems’ internal measurements, drive specific external 
outcomes. It fails to account for policing’s complex nature in the vast and varied social 
networks that make up society. Moreover, Walker and Archbold’s system does not address 
how complex systems differ, even somewhat, based on regions and social understanding 
or police expectations across the nation. The scholars’ PTSR framework has value within 
complex systems as a measurement tool for guiding internal controls, critical parts of 
manipulating systems. Their conclusions about how it should apply to modern policing is 
not reasonable, however, because it seeks simple linear solutions to complex non-linear 
problems without addressing the complexity that affects policing and its outcomes.  
In their book Police Leadership and Administration, William Walsh and Gennaro 
Vito address the nature of 21st century policing and the ever-developing landscape that 
requires adaptation.78 They address an approach of systems thinking and related features 
of learning organizations as part of a new management strategy to meet the operational 
needs of this environment. While the entire book is not devoted to the topic of systems 
thinking or learning organization practices, the authors claim, “Police departments that use 
strategic management techniques are aligning their external and internal environments 
through decisions based upon intelligence analysis. They are creating open-system 
adaptive learning organizations. Crime and public safety are problems to be analyzed and 
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resolved, not something to which to react.”79 While containing precise language relevant 
to this research, the claim mostly dies there, without further explanation of how to achieve 
such goals. 
Throughout the book, Walsh and Vito discuss different leadership aspects of police 
organizations and the need for becoming learning organizations for strategic development, 
but they supply little evidence for their claims. They fail to address how such a concept 
might look or in what ways it could positively affect police departments. Furthermore, the 
claim is not supported in that the authors employ no examples of police departments that 
have experienced success or ways to achieve success using these ideas. In sum, there is no 
further mention in the entire book about learning organizations or developing the 
“open-system adaptive learning organization” promised. 
The work of Peter Senge serves as inspiration for this and other research.80 Dietz 
and Mink, who draw on Senge’s work, argue that for a policing organization to function as 
a complex adaptive system, it must be agile or adapt quickly to circumstances presented 
that might otherwise prevent the system from performing ideally.81 They note Senge’s 
insight that successfully manipulating systems involves understanding the problem space, 
responding agilely and appropriately, and adjusting within the system in ways most likely 
to have the desired effect.82  
Senge’s seminal academic work, The Fifth Discipline, demonstrates applications of 
systems thinking, reflective practice, and learning organization theory. His work draws on 
other critical research in this thesis, namely Donella Meadows’s Thinking in Systems and 
Donald Schön’s The Reflective Practitioner, to integrate systems thinking and learning 
organization theory, and illustrate the value of reflective practice to create an overarching 
strategy for organizational success. Senge expands on these sources to create a framework 
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for different organizations to diagnose leverage points and interact incisively with both 
their problems and failures to create well-ordered, consistently successful systems.83  
The “fifth discipline” for creating a successful complex adaptive organization, 
according to Senge, is systems thinking.84 The other four disciplines of a learning 
organization include personal mastery, mental models, building shared visions, and team 
learning.85 The four lower disciplines must be in place and foundationally understood to 
achieve success at the fifth discipline, systems thinking. Senge’s traditional audience is the 
corporate structure, free to develop at will across markets and measurements, limited only 
by its finances and the marketplace. Even still, Senge’s work covers numerous applications 
in government service—touching briefly on policing—and examples of applications in 
systems thinking and learning organization theory, combined with reflection in action.  
A key element of Senge’s work relates to reflective practices, their role in systems 
thinking, and more specifically, the process of learning through reflection. He discusses 
how system operators often rely on reflection—an intuitive understanding about how 
constituent system parts interact and can be manipulated instinctively to change the 
outcome desirably. Despite appearances, learning through reflection on experience and 
practical application is a field of research that studies the innate understanding of a system 
by practitioners engaging with it as experts. Senge’s understanding of these phenomena 
draws heavily from the work of Schön.86 
Schön’s work considers the role of implicit knowledge in the practice of expert 
practitioners. He argues that reflective practice exists in the world and describes how a 
practitioner can leverage one’s expertise to react to changing environments in real time 
with success. Reflective practice is the idea of tacit or unspoken intuitive expertise and its 
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origins.87 Schön argues that the reflective practitioner, who thinks about his practice while 
doing it, can build intuitive, creative solutions to problems quickly and correctly by 
leveraging his tacit expertise to be reflective.88 Moreover, a reflective practitioner can test 
hypotheses virtually and discard problematic solutions before undesirable results occur 
because he can anticipate results and compare them against objectives nearly intuitively.89 
This ability helps the practitioner prevent catastrophes and take advantage of opportunities; 
meanwhile, non-reflective operators might hesitate and lose the initiative in either case.  
Dietz and Mink’s research includes elements of Schön’s ideas in their discussion 
about the connection between systems thinking and the concept of tacit knowledge and 
culture as connectors and bonding agents to policing’s success as complex adaptive 
systems.90 They argue that the cultural implications of sound experiential knowledge are 
essential to sustaining system integrity. They also surmise that thinking critically and 
understanding the system’s complexity, often unspoken products of tacit knowledge and 
expertise, are not supported in many police organizations.91  
E. CONCLUSION 
Three critical elements of the reviewed research stand out. First, many experts agree 
that reform in its current construction is flawed, but they disagree about how to correct it. 
There is virtually no literature about why policing requires routine reform or why police 
organizations need constant reform efforts.  
Second, evidence supports the perspective that police organizations are complex 
adaptive systems. They can significantly benefit from combining systems thinking and 
learning organization theory concepts. However, little available research demonstrates how 
such theories might look in application. Walsh and Vito’s explanation of the ideal police 
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department acknowledges exactly what this thesis aims to discover.92 System thinking, 
combined with learning organization strategies, may be the way forward in addressing 
problems in law enforcement. This thesis explores potential applications of a theoretical 
framework guiding the way. Dietz and Mink provide a foundational understanding of a 
police department as a living system, capable of being manipulated to the benefit of the 
agency and its clients, but admit their research leaves many avenues unexplored.  
Last, in law enforcement reform literature, scholars and practitioners have 
integrated learning organization principles and systems thinking ideas without explaining 
what they mean or how they work. This thesis attempts to bridge that gap. Experts seem to 
agree that slow-moving bureaucratic behemoths, whatever the context, are no longer 
serviceable in law enforcement. Whether it be Walker’s internal control manipulation, 
Walsh and Vito’s promises of success through intelligence-led, data-driven policing, or 
Dietz and Mink’s vision of systems thinking to reframe the industry entirely, change and 
adaptation are critical moving forward. Nonetheless, there are few answers for how to 
render that change readily available. 
F. COMING ATTRACTIONS 
The chapters that follow identify how systems thinking and, to an extent, learning 
organization theory and reflective practices can be leveraged to improve law enforcement. 
Chapter III discusses research on systems frameworks for managing police organizations 
while identifying potential applications already used by the law enforcement enterprise  
to improve future outcomes. Chapter IV identifies ways to use systems thinking,  
learning organization theory, and reflective practices to improve police performance at  
the practitioner level and the potential effects on the system’s overall performance.  
Chapter V looks at the many competing contexts that affect how police systems and goal-
setting combine to affect performance. Chapter VI discusses feedback, its importance to 
police systems, and different ways of thinking about leveraging feedback for the system’s 
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good. Chapter VII synthesizes the thesis research into findings, conclusions, and 
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III. A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING 
POLICE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 
This chapter discusses police systems management from the reformed policing 
perspective. Additionally, it examines the nature of police systems as complex living 
systems—a systems thinking–based framework for managing police systems, built on the 
theories of profound knowledge and quality management—and examples of the framework 
used in policing systems. The aim of this chapter is to determine the benefits of applying a 
systems-thinking approach to police systems management. 
A. HIGH RELIABILITY AS A DISABILITY 
In many ways, police reform of the late 20th and early 21st century introduced 
transparency, oversight, and accountability, along with the ideas of procedural justice, 
police legitimacy, and community trust, to modern policing. Federal pattern-and-practice 
reforms, in particular, set an unofficial standard for agencies after which to model 
themselves.93 Much of modern reform focuses on improved organizational accountability, 
policy change, data analysis, and officer behavior.94 At its core, police reform seeks to 
improve police officers’ and police departments’ behavior and performance. 
Whether they understand what it means or not, reformers and executives of police 
agencies know that the most reliable systems are tightly coupled. Tightly coupled means 
closely managed to control system aberrations and emergence as much as possible.95 Out 
of a desire to improve reliability, reforms emphasize closely ordered accountability and 
oversight.96 However, police reform scholars and researchers note common themes in 
police organizations’ failure to improve or meaningfully capture the whole of police 
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performance. First, reforms are difficult to sustain. They offer only a temporary change.97 
Second, police systems do not possess an institutional structure to capture or sustain the 
desired or needed system’s behavioral changes.98 Last, police organizations struggle to 
measure performance.99 Police reforms seek to change the system’s behavior by adding 
reliability features without addressing the system’s structure or fully acknowledging its 
characteristics.  
As systems, police organizations are generally loosely coupled management 
structures. Loose coupling is the idea that supervision of the system, its oversight, is more 
distant, whether philosophically or physically, from the system’s action.100 Police officers 
in the execution of their duties have a great deal of freedom.101 Because of the 
characteristics of policing and the geographical and resource-related constraints of 
management, police officers are, in effect, autonomous agents with incredible practical 
authority, such as the powers to use force and arrest people. Therefore, executive mandates 
are difficult to enforce, and agent activities are challenging to monitor in this system. 
Furthermore, the dichotomy between executive value-making and the in-practice 
challenges and dangers of actual policing makes many reformed policing principles 
challenging to reconcile for practitioners, as management and practitioner priorities are 
often misaligned. Practical supervision and risk management are a struggle. Regardless of 
efforts to develop better management, accountability, and oversight, the volatility and 
ambiguity of the policing environment make it one of the most dangerous and costly 
professions globally, particularly in social and human capital.102  
The death of George Floyd is an excellent example of this concept. Before his 
death, Minnesota had robust laws surrounding police use of force and training. Indeed, the 
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Minneapolis Police Department has boasted progressive use-of-force policy, de-escalation 
tactics, and training, and its leadership has been committed to the principles of modern 
reformed policing, transparency, oversight, and accountability.103 Yet, without 
supervision in the field, individual agents took actions that ended a human life and touched 
off global protests and riots.104 
Police systems are not easy to change, and they are challenging to manage. Because 
they are inherently loosely coupled (or distantly supervised), the police system structure 
does not lend itself to high reliability. Reforms seek to improve that reliability by moving 
supervision closer to the action in the system. Practically, however, improving reliability, 
such as introducing oversight, accountability, and transparency to policing, has had little 
proven success. One reason for this may be that many reforms have an intrinsic conflict 
with police departments’ structure. Distance exists between managers driving policy and 
reform and practitioners who struggle with actual police work’s volatility and danger. 
Practitioners give little credibility to management mandates.105 Another reason, as 
discussed in Chapter II, may be that many police reforms are political or contrived, based 
on emotion or public sentiment about specific incidents. They focus on short-term 
behavioral fixes rather than long-term system performance.106  
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B. A SYSTEMS APPROACH 
A system’s structure dictates how the system behaves. In human systems, system 
structure involves people’s interactions, the rules that dictate behavior, and decision-
making. According to Senge, system behavior is a product of system structure and vice 
versa.107 Donella Meadows calls system behavior a latent property of system structure—
a “central insight of systems theory.”108 A system’s behavior, good or bad, begins to tell a 
story about the system and how it works. Meadows argues that understanding a system’s 
behavior is the first step in understanding how to change it. It is not enough to understand 
that poor system behavior occurred; recognizing why the structure allowed or caused that 
behavior is crucial. Thus, when a system misbehaves, the first place to start searching for 
a culprit is the system’s structure.109 Instead of reforming behavior, it may be better to 
reform the system.  
1. System Constraints  
The theory of constraints describes how a system’s structure limits desirable or 
promotes undesirable behavior.110 Eliyahu Goldratt, an Israeli physicist, has described the 
theory’s central principle: that constraints limit system performance, but effective systems 
manage and limit their constraints. He argues that the weakest link constrains a system, 
like a chain. He argues that in every chain, there may be many weak links, but only one is 
the weakest. In that weakest link lies the system’s most likely point of failure. There are as 
many independent constraints in a system as there are “chains”—system interactions or 
outputs. Goldratt argues a system’s success or failure in achieving its designed goal hinges 
on identifying the weak link.111 In police systems, one could argue that the pursuit of high 
reliability without first addressing a loosely coupled police system structure with poor 
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performance management is a weak systemic link. The incompatible approach to the 
necessary characteristics creates a counterproductive system environment. For instance, in 
Oakland, California, reformed policing practices designed specifically to improve 
reliability and accountability for use of force and transparency of process severely inhibited 
the organization’s ability to function at even basic levels.112  
Constraint management serves as a simple exemplar for starting to evaluate systems 
for problems. It is a way of exploring systems for flaws and opportunities to improve them. 
Goldratt’s theory is foundational to learning in and about systems because no matter how 
well a system performs, it always has a weakest link. It must be functionally cyclical, 
continuously inspecting weak links for opportunities to improve the system or remove a 
constraint. The cyclical process in systems is an important theme. It is a key characteristic 
in understanding the difficulty of managing living systems, due mostly to their complexity. 
It is also key to creating a structure for influencing system behavior in living systems.  
2. Living Systems  
The connectivity of human interaction makes living systems far more complex than 
mechanical ones, such as computers.113 Moreover, systems that serve the public, such as 
police departments, are living systems that serve many other living systems. Racial groups, 
organizations, social groups, neighborhoods, and tribes represent some of the different 
living social systems police organizations interact with on many different levels. Living 
systems are unpredictable—they change quickly, often without warning—so managing 
them is, at best, a difficult proposition. 
Those who manage or desire to alter living systems, working within other complex 
living systems, must understand that because there is no end state or final systemic result, 
the system is constantly evolving. Thus, there is no adequate way to establish fixed 
protocols to serve the system or systems it interacts with for any period. It also means that 
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to best relate to other systems, it needs mechanisms to measure its performance and the 
systems with which it interacts in perpetuity. It must have a reflexive or adaptive 
component. In human systems, the humans within them are the adaptive component of the 
system.114 
Much like the human body, the ability to adapt effectively relies on knowing how 
to adapt. Within the human body are an infinite number of neurological, nervous, and 
cogent sensors that feed information to the living system. Those sensors trigger systemic 
responses, both observed and unobserved by the host, not only to survive but also to thrive. 
Systems that do not adapt are subject to entropic, or disordered, effects. Systems exhibit 
design in how they work together in non-linear, responsive, and reflexive ways, depending 
on the varied internal or external environments they face. For example, a human evolves 
naturally. Similarly, for police systems, there is no guaranteed natural evolutionary end. 
Successful evolution, especially routine evolution, depends on intelligent design.115 Police 
organizations, too, must evolve intelligently, with information at the root of that growth or 
change. Otherwise, disorder or entropy takes hold.  
The nature of living systems represents opportunities rather than constraints in 
several ways. First, living systems, like living organisms, can self-order when managed 
properly because, as in human bodies and living eco-systems, control is distributed 
throughout the system.116 Second, there is an opportunity in the evolutionary properties of 
living systems to develop and function without being wholly formed. Like iterative 
business design, such systems transform while working and learning perpetually.117 Last, 
and perhaps most important, because living systems are the sum of their distributed living 
parts, “sensing and acting locally is exactly how complex living systems work.”118 Senge 
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argues that the ability to function autonomously for the good of the system is based on 
“connecting metrics and target setting with in-depth process knowledge at the front 
lines.”119  
The strong hierarchal ties of leadership and oversight in traditional police 
organizations can be disbursed throughout the system so long as the system—in this case, 
the humans that form it—understands its purpose. It can act without a conscious design to 
do so. This is called flattening the hierarchy. A flat hierarchy is ideal for adaptive, fast 
responsiveness.120 Managed properly, the system, like all living systems, could be a 
virtually autonomous cyclical system holistically optimized to survive and adapt 
simultaneously. 
In 2015, the Seattle Police Department redeployed its organization with what it 
called a micro-community policing plan. Seattle’s police had recognized that “no two 
neighborhoods in Seattle [were] the same. Micro-community policing plans recognize and 
address this. These plans are developed by bringing community engagement and crime 
data together and directing police services to address the individual needs of each 
community.”121 Partnering with Seattle University to measure feedback via a survey of 
residents, the Seattle Police Department created a series of microsystems that acted and 
sensed locally based on community needs, thereby flattening the organizational hierarchy. 
Micro-community policing plans have, by and large, demonstrated positive results, as 
Seattle University survey results from 2015–2019 indicate higher trust in police 
performance than found in national surveys.122 
3. System Optimization 
System optimization prioritizes the system rather than the system’s components in 
developing a management structure that achieves the system’s design. W. Edwards 
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Deming, the father of total quality management and a systems pioneer, wrote that it is the 
purpose of every agent, process, and component to “contribute its best to the system, not 
to maximize its production, profit, or sales, nor any other competitive measure.”123 System 
optimization is like a series of dials that help tune the system to its ideal state.  
Regardless of the structure of a system, optimization sets priorities for the system’s 
goals. Constraints are obstacles to those goals. Aside from setting goals and the priorities 
to achieve them, much of the success of systems management in a living system is about 
identifying constraints and managing them. In practice, optimization is a cyclical process 
of evaluating and analyzing system properties to identify improvement areas. More 
important, it involves connecting that analysis to the system agents with the knowledge to 
correct them.124  
Early intervention systems deployed inside police departments are a kind of system 
optimization. Such systems capture potentially risky practitioner behaviors or 
micro-behaviors and aggregate them into risk categories. The purpose of these systems is 
to identify officers who might present behaviors that cause organizational problems in the 
present or future and provide managers with information about those behaviors to drive 
decision-making about those officers. Many of the behaviors captured in an early 
intervention system are not representative of misconduct or criminal action, nor are they 
necessarily precursors of either. They are behaviors or characteristics typically identified 
in officers whereby small problems have manifested into larger issues over time. Most 
early intervention focuses on training, skill-building, supervision, and performance 
monitoring as techniques to mitigate those risky behaviors. Early warning systems capture 
system faults (constraints) before they become catastrophic system failures.125 
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C. THE THEORY OF PROFOUND KNOWLEDGE 
Like Senge, Deming argues that managing systems begins with acknowledging 
their existence and their characteristics and developing the capacity to manage them. 
Deming based his work on the ‘theory of profound knowledge,’ which explains both the 
evaluative and practitioner capacities necessary for optimally performing systems.  
First, the theory of profound knowledge states that managing systems begins with 
accepting and appreciating that systems exist. Most, if not all, organizational structures are 
systems, complete with system characteristics and behaviors. Structure and behavior 
remain perpetually linked in systems. In the same way, system growth or improved 
performance is not accidental. System growth can be an intentional act. In Deming’s usage, 
system growth involves expanding systemic structures and system agents, as well as the 
infrastructure’s performance capacities.126  
Second, managing systems is in part about accepting system variances and 
understanding how they occur. System variance is another way of thinking about 
complexity in many ways. Because systems change, the ability to manage them lies in 
leveraging changing behaviors to mitigate the unwanted while exploiting the beneficial and 
knowing the difference between them. By embracing that variance—the wide range of 
potential outcomes—the system and its managers can make sense of outcomes—expected 
and unexpected—and learn from them. The key to power in complexity is learning.127 
Third, there is a foundational belief about how a system should perform in any 
system. This means that system managers and executives have expectations of a system’s 
performance. For example, a football coach generally has a game plan and expectations of 
a game’s outcome or, at the very least, his or her team’s performance in the game. Deming 
calls this the “theory of knowledge,” not to be confused with the overarching theory of 
profound knowledge of which the former is but one part. System managers make 
predictions about systems based on their understanding of them, but they cannot be certain 
about those predictions without future evidence. Deming argues that all knowledge is 
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theoretical until tested. This theory-testing process is perpetual, so all knowledge is 
essentially a feedback response to tested theory, and all untested knowledge is theoretical. 
In this way, knowledge is rooted in evidence of performance. All other beliefs are 
theoretical until proven.128 
Finally, the theory of profound knowledge involves psychology. Deming believed 
that good management acknowledges the variances in living systems, including the human 
agents and agents of other systems. The predictability of behavior is directly related to how 
people think, process, and behave. Systems involving people are incredibly volatile, and 
attempting to understand how they might behave is central to developing a strategy for 
system design and improvement. Also crucial in Deming’s work is the idea that joy is 
foundational to human and human-system performance. He understood the power of 
contentment and purpose, and much of his management theory focuses on the practitioner’s 
empowerment, self-improvement, and education. Drawing a correlation between 
practitioner performance and systemic performance, Deming observed that system 
performance is directly linked to the nature of human beings and how they think.129 Their 
health, particularly their mental states, in part drives system performance. It appears 
Deming understood the complexity of living systems.  
1. Total Quality Management 
The theory of profound knowledge is the basis of Deming’s work in quality 
management theory. Deming’s system of management, total quality management, became 
instrumental in the evolution of management strategy.130 More than that, many nuanced 
complex organizations adopted and built on Deming’s work and that of Joseph Juran and 
others to create systems that exemplify the modern learning organization’s essential 
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components.131 It is no surprise, then, that many of the same concepts found in the core of 
quality management theory also exist in systems theory and learning organization theory. 
Deming introduced total quality management (TQM) as a quality-focused 
management strategy that aligns performance and output with organizational vision and 
goals and works both to assure quality in processes and output while building agent 
capacity.132 Toyota famously adopted the TQM philosophy and built its processes to 
educate employees on its principles, empowering them to analyze and improve their own 
system spaces. Deming’s theories in application largely institutionalize systems 
management to eliminate constraints and produce the designed output while also 
standardizing holistic improvements at every level.133  
Pyzdek and Keller argue that TQM as a practice is hard to define because Deming 
and the quality industry never codified its applications.134 Seen as a philosophical 
framework by many and a business practice by others, some of the ideas rooted in the 
theory of profound knowledge and exemplified by TQM as a framework could have value 
in aligning goals with output. Regardless of how it is viewed, TQM has some distinct 
characteristics.  
First, TQM makes organizational output the exclusive responsibility of the 
organization’s upper management. Second, it is firmly rooted in the concepts of the theory 
of profound knowledge. Its components are designed to monitor and manage the system’s 
intrinsic responsibilities while also seeking continuous system improvement from both the 
system and agents. As a result, there are three focus areas in TQM: quality assurance, 
quality control, and quality improvement.135 
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a. Quality Control 
Quality control effectively manages the system in ideation, design, training, supply, 
and production. Quality control oversees the series of processes, or systems, that create the 
organizational output. It is concerned with the finished product and whether that product 
achieves the organizational goals set for production. This phase deals in standardizing and 
stabilizing efficient internal processes to ensure the external perception of quality.136 
Quality control can measure all of the processes, training, expertise, and production efforts 
that go into creating an expected output.137 
A fictional example may demonstrate how quality control, quality assurance, and 
quality improvement make up the trinity of quality management, first in a business setting 
and second in a police setting. Imagine a company sets out to create and sell widgets. As 
the company ideates, designs, and creates its prototype widgets, executive management 
identifies a winner and sets a system goal. The quality control mechanism then sets out to 
ensure everything from the supply chain to the machinery to the personnel is attuned to 
create the best possible representation of that product. The mechanism does this by 
inspecting the products, typically through statistical sampling, and as it provides feedback 
on potential faults and failures, it—theoretically—addresses them to ensure standardized 
output. 
Quality control mechanisms exist already in many police organizations. Audits and 
inspections of adherence to policy and procedure, along with early intervention systems, 
represent a form of quality control. Agencies, such as the Phoenix Police Department, that 
monitor internal performance to ensure standardized performance are exercising, at least 
in spirit, a quality control method.138 
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b. Quality Assurance 
The assurance of quality in the system’s production or output is a measurement to 
determine through various processes whether the system does what it is supposed to do. In 
the private-sector context, quality assurance guarantees the customer is getting the product 
as advertised. Quality assurance focuses on how the system’s output is delivered and 
received, along with the satisfaction and expectations of the output’s target.139 Quality 
assurance measures outcomes of performance rather than the outputs.140  
Continuing the fictional widget manufacturing example, independent of quality 
control but perpetually interconnected, quality assurance mechanisms study the finished 
product and how consumers receive it. They study whether the expectation of the consumer 
matches that understood by the manufacturer. Simply stated, they seek to answer whether 
the product is what the consumer expects and then provide that feedback to the 
organization’s decision-makers to adjust processes or system goals. Whether this occurs at 
the executive or practitioner level is mostly a matter of goals and organizational hierarchy. 
In a policing context, much of the Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) platform is rooted in the idea that adhering to the “gold 
standard” guarantees a level of performance that assures performance quality. In their 2017 
study, Hougland and Wolf maintain, “Agencies that become accredited can benefit from 
improved written policies and directives, improved relationships with the communities 
they serve, and reduced liability and risk for the agency.”141 Their study found that 
accreditation does not ultimately reduce citizen complaints or have a meaningful impact as 
a quality assurance strategy.142 Nonetheless, CALEA and organizations like it represent 
merely a foothold, as externally attuned performance metrics that promote quality 
assurance already exist within law enforcement systems. 
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c. Quality Improvement 
Quality improvement is the systemic practice of improving capacity to provide a 
product that meets the organizational goals as designed. It constantly evaluates processes, 
design, system relationships, agent learning, and evolution to achieve better performance. 
Through this process of quality improvement, organizational growth through learning and 
agent evolution, agent development, and organizational capacity occurs. Quality 
improvement is perpetual, an ideal construction for living systems constantly in flux, and 
it is granular, meaning no role or process is outside the scope of improvement. It is neither 
agent based nor system based; it is a philosophical filter of goals, values, and optimization 
through which the system, its sub-systems, and all of its agents, along with organizational 
outputs, pass.143 
In the widget factory, quality improvement seeks to improve everything from 
production cost and time to delivery to profit margins and employee satisfaction. Quality 
improvement seeks to identify the system’s leverage points to change the system, increase 
its capacity, and meet its managers’ goals. In the widget factory, quality improvement seeks 
to identify ways, probably over time, to create the best, cost-effective, and most desirable 
widget possible. It is important to note that this process is iterative. Quality improvement 
is the responsibility of every agent in this system, and improvement can come from 
anywhere.  
In many ways, police reforms serve as quality improvement mechanisms in modern 
policing. Walker argues that consent decrees force agencies to evaluate themselves, train 
their officers, and adopt new, better ways of doing things.144 Hougland and Wolf express 
much the same thing in that reform movements of the 1970s–1990s sought to promote 
better police performance.145 Moreover, the mission of Obama’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing was to examine policing and recommend practices that promote better 
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ways to relate to communities and foster productive-yet-equitable policing practices to 
improve it.146 These structures are challenging because, by and large, they are slow-
moving, have recurring problems, and go unmeasured for effectiveness.147 They lack the 
agility of quality improvement in the TQM framework. 
2. Quality Management as a Systems Framework 
As much a system management philosophy as it is an industrial application of 
quality management, TQM may conceptualize a systems framework to achieve what 
traditional police reforms do not. Police organizations can improve their output and remain 
focused on internal and external feedback while monitoring performance with an eye to 
perpetual improvement that matches the evolution of environments, expectations, and 
desires of those they serve. They can become functional learning organizations and achieve 
an awareness of their system space and systems around them in ways not previously 
realized. More important, they can perform better and adapt to new problems and 
environmental changes proactively as they become optimized within their systems.  
TQM captures the nature of living systems and the complexity in them created by 
people. It also captures the ability of the system to learn about itself. At the same time, it 
operates and leaves room to adjust the system space depending on the feedback it receives 
and captures opportunities to educate, empower, and optimize systemic components 
(agents) as whole systems or as individual agents. This dynamic optimizes the system to 
learn and adjust its self-awareness based on that learning. This structure can optimize 
system performance while eliminating constraints and allowing for systemic growth in 
idealized behaviors derived from the system’s feedback.  
TQM’s power is its ability to measure every aspect of a system’s performance, 
including its related systems and those the system interacts with, better understanding its 
 
146 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing (Washington, DC: Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015), 1–4, 69–70. 
147 Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Department of Justice’s Efforts 
to Address Patterns or Practices of Police Misconduct and Provide Technical Assistance on Accountability 
Reform to Police Departments (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2018), https://www.oversight.gov/
sites/default/files/oig-reports/a1814.pdf. 
42 
internal or external performance. It is a holistic goal and a performance-based adaptive 
system framework capable of receiving feedback from anywhere that promotes continuous 
improvement in all areas.  
Effectively, TQM is the practical application of the theory of profound knowledge. 
It is a series of mechanisms that attempt to understand, internally and externally, a problem 
and system space while being goal- and adaptation-focused. Thus, combined, quality 
control, quality assurance, and quality improvement are a system for performance 
management. Whether used in a widget factory, a global automobile conglomerate, or a 
police department, these overlapping mechanisms monitor and evaluate systemic 
performance from both the inside and the outside, including feedback from other systems 
challenging the managed system constraints and seeking improvement opportunities.  
In some ways, the idea of TQM as a management philosophy has fallen out of 
favor.148 Many organizations that tried to implement it found the results mixed. However, 
one survey of organizations that implemented TQM processes focused on evaluation and 
improvement, yet all surveyed companies achieved some positive results.149 Pyzdek and 
Keller found that TQM as a practice requires significant commitment from executive 
leadership to be successful. TQM is an organization-wide, top-down, process-focused 
approach to management. It requires time to build a cultural commitment as well as 
executive and management support. Well-defined hierarchies struggle to implement 
TQM.150 Pyzdek and Keller also note that some TQM advocates have found long-term 
commitment to the underlying philosophy by installing a total quality leader (TQL) to work 
alongside chief executives to “function as an extension of the CEO as a change agent.”151 
The TQL functions as both a stabilizing force and focusing agent for the organization, 
continually steering executive leaders to look at the organization’s processes and priorities 
through the lens of the TQM philosophy.  
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The scope of this thesis is crucial in evaluating TQM as a business practice. First, 
profitability and commercial success are less important than the systems management 
philosophy found underlying the execution of TQM. For law enforcement organizations, 
committing to the philosophical implications of the theory of profound knowledge and 
managing systems as systems are more crucial in effectiveness than fixating on corporate 
successes or failures. Building management philosophies by perpetually monitoring, 
measuring, evaluating, and evolving system performance with every metric possible to 
adapt and improve them might have tremendous benefit for law enforcement organizations. 
There are some examples to consider in this evaluation.  
a. TQM Applications in Law Enforcement  
In the late 1990s, Canada, led by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, began 
installing quality assurance units in its police services. According to a 2013 survey by the 
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police’s Quality Assurance in Law Enforcement 
Committee, 23 respondents had quality assurance (QA) units or the equivalent in their 
organizations. A Ryerson University study behind the survey found that Canadian police 
services developed QA programs to improve financial transparency, internal and external 
processes, risk mitigation, policies and practices, and other reform-like measures.152 
Recognizing the need to re-think internal and external command structure and 
organizational processes drove Canada’s QA policing movement.153 
There are many different scaled iterations of the quality assurance model in 
Canadian police services. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada’s largest police 
agency, remains a leader in the QA field. In Ontario, Alberta, Quebec, and Nova Scotia, 
some QA functions are mandatory based on statutory regulations. In Ontario, this includes 
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specific processes detailing regulatory compliance, professional standard upkeep, tracking, 
and training to ensure “adequate and effective police services.”154 
The research suggests that Canadian police services have implemented a fully 
integrated TQM approach to sustain and improve their policing. Despite the moniker of 
quality assurance for their units, the Canadian model largely represents all three elements 
of the systemic measurement, adjustment, and improvement-focused management 
structures of the TQM framework. The application of TQM is linked in some way to most 
organizational outputs in a capacity designed to measure, survey, and watch over to ensure 
that external products match both management and consumers’ expectations. As such, 
Canadian QA units, teams, and organizational values directly connect with leadership’s 
view of priorities. The Canadian TQM process focuses on many administrative areas, 
including improving service delivery, informing on and positively impacting community 
safety, improving officer safety, reducing risk, improving processes and policies, 
overseeing regulatory compliance, and ensuring transparency and oversight functions 
(auditing/inspecting).155 
Much of the literature about the establishment and use of TQM practices in Canada 
focuses on internal measurements of success, meaning executive and practitioner 
confidence that programs have value.156 To date, there has been no research correlated 
directly to the implementation of TQM in Canada to satisfaction with policing there. 
Nevertheless, data from Statistics Canada suggests some effectiveness with the approach, 
as over 60 percent of respondents in Canada reported that police were “doing a good job” 
between 2004 and 2014—roughly the decade following the study on TQM in police 
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services.157 Over the same period, Americans’ confidence in police wavered between 64 
percent in 2004 and 53 percent in 2014.158  
There is nothing in the literature that suggests Canadian police services have built 
the TQM-style programs for any supposed systemic benefits. Regardless of their designers’ 
intent, however, these programs resemble TQM processes to improve performance in 
accountability, oversight, and transparency for the benefit of legal reforms. Any systemic 
benefits that followed the application of this model may have been unintentional. 
Nevertheless, the structure, to a degree, seems to function effectively. It appears that 
regardless of a systems-thinking approach, there may be a benefit to using a QA 
methodology exclusively as a management platform for legal reforms. In this frame, it 
might exist much in the same way that Samuel Walker extols the virtues of the consent 
decree’s monitor-like watchdog structure of police performance metrics.159 
In the United States, oversight, accountability, and transparency are of more 
importance than ever.160 Nevertheless, finding U.S. police units or organizational 
structures as robust or as focused on delivering services and internal and external 
accountability as those in Canada is difficult. The Tampa Police Department tested a QA 
program in 2014, but by 2015, it was effectively inoperable.161 The unit was designed for 
a civilian regulator of sorts to conduct “mini-audits” within the organization after a spate 
of misconduct incidents.162  
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The New York City Police Department (NYPD)’s Quality Assurance Division has 
a broad scope of oversight duties. From tracking the use of toll passes and facility 
inspections to auditing complaint data, this mechanism assures the NYPD’s crime statistics 
are accurate. The unit’s goal is to root out misconduct or abuse of authority.163 Its name is 
a misnomer because it functions like an organizationally focused internal-misconduct 
mechanism rather than an improvement-focused, performance-tracking device. It does not 
focus on the overall institutional review of outcomes or processes for monitoring quality. 
Additionally, although there have been projects in New York to measure outcomes and 
capture sentiment from an assurance framework, the mechanism goes mostly unused.164 
The Phoenix Police Department has a broad-scoped internal audits and inspections 
unit within its Professional Standards Bureau. The unit measures adherence to policies and 
procedures to identify individual failures of performance, policy violations, and acts of 
negligence or misconduct.165 The Professional Standards Bureau’s programs focus on 
internal oversight and review. The department’s application, as described, appears to 
mirror the monitoring aspects of the federal enforcement of police reform. Its unit functions 
as a perpetual, self-imposed, internal monitor in many ways. While the unit is an 
established organizational feature to ensure standardized performance and adherence to 
policies and procedures by officers and managers, it has no outward-facing mechanisms 
that inform the system as a whole. Despite the absence of outward-facing feedback 
measurement mechanisms, Phoenix’s internal controls are noteworthy as some of the most 
robust discovered in this research. Like Canada’s, Phoenix’s structures have TQM-like 
features, but they have no demonstrated systems-thinking approach built into them. More 
than anything, the Phoenix approach presents a robust set of quality control mechanisms, 
while little else resembles the model. Indeed, few if any applications of the theory of 
profound knowledge appears in the program or the philosophy around its structure. 
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This research did not appraise the nearly 18,000 American police departments for 
the nature and make-up of their oversight and accountability mechanisms. Such an inquiry 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Undoubtedly, reform-minded programs throughout the 
United States represent excellent applications of rethinking reform. Nevertheless, when 
this research attempted to identify TQM structures or their equivalent in the United States, 
it uncovered very few. Whether aborted or tightly focused programs or compartmentalized-
but-robust internal controls, there certainly appears to be no widespread application in the 
United States akin to the Canadian example of QA. At least one police unit in the United 
States has committed to a philosophical systems approach similar to the Canadian model—
the name is similar, too.  
Rebranded in October 2019, the Bakersfield Police Department (BPD)’s Quality 
Assurance Unit (QAU) used to look like Phoenix’s internal oversight application. It shared 
that name as well: the Professional Standards Unit.166 The BPD serves the ninth-largest 
city in California and 61st largest city in the United States.167 Embattled by a reputation 
as an aggressive police department, Bakersfield was labeled the “deadliest police in 
America” by a Guardian investigative report.168 The BPD faced two pattern-and-practice 
investigations, from both state and federal DOJ investigative teams, starting in 2003. As a 
result, it entered a self-reflection period and created the QAU as part of its response. The 
research found that the QAU represents a TQM approach rooted in a systems-driven 
philosophy and found in the theory of profound knowledge: monitoring, measuring, 
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evaluating, and evolving system performance.169 Additionally, it appears to function as 
the system’s driving and focusing mechanism within the organization, much like Pyzdek 
and Keller described, making it unique among the researched organizations. 
b. The Bakersfield Quality Assurance Model 
The QAU’s mission is “to create and monitor mechanisms for continuously 
evaluating the performance of the BPD in order to institutionalize continuous improvement 
in accomplishing its mission in serving the City of Bakersfield and its residents.”170 
Further research reveals that the QAU serves as a collection point for internal and external 
feedback while addressing traditionally accepted reform best-practice applications of 
accountability and oversight functions like early intervention, audits, and inspections. The 
BPD’s approach uses traditional reform platform tools and programs to help manage its 
inward- and outward-facing systems. This means that the organization has found ways to 
leverage the components of existing accountability and oversight tools through the filter of 
systems thinking to provide information to managers about the systems themselves. More 
than a shift in practices or processes to adopt systems thinking, it is a shift in philosophy 
and an approach that focus on the existing systems and their opportunities for 
advantage.171  
Figure 1 provides a conceptualization of how the unit fits within the input and 
output of the organization. This image appears in an internal BPD memo describing the 
unit’s functions and processes.172 
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Figure 1. Quality-Focused Management173 
The BPD’s QAU methodology is as much a system of improvement as it is a system 
of maintenance. It is a way to sustain and monitor appropriate and necessary systemic 
behavior and place data about the organization, its performance, and, importantly, its 
perceived performance in its key leaders’ hands to drive adaptations and adjustments to 
behaviors quickly, proactively, and perpetually. One of the most beneficial aspects of 
Bakersfield’s model is the system’s ability to identify, qualify, reward, and then—
theoretically—replicate ideal or positive agent and system behaviors. Unlike traditional 
reforms, which seek to eradicate destructive behaviors by constraining system and agent 
behaviors, this model seeks to reinforce positive behaviors and improve the system as it 
does so. 
Even still, it possesses the ability to capture and mitigate risky or harmful behaviors. 
Because personnel are dedicated to monitoring and driving system data throughout the 
organization about its system and problem spaces, there is a reflective quality naturally lost 
in highly adaptive, volatile environments that can be stored and qualified in this unit.174 
As such, the ability to learn from systemic failures or high-profile, risky events, particularly 
at the executive level, is ever-present within the system’s structure. The QAU, in this way, 
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serves as a kind of memory and knowledge management collection point. Senge points out 
this essential benefit, as many organizations struggle to reflect.175  
For example, the QAU conducted a series of after-action reviews of its pandemic 
response during the COVID-19 pandemic. Captured in the assessment were its 
organizational response, partner agencies, supply chains, and best practices learned from 
around the nation. As a result, the unit created a pandemic response framework along with 
a manual guiding future pandemic response. The manual captures the lessons learned from 
the pandemic’s outbreak, its short- and long-term challenges, and practices to improve 
readiness, response, and ongoing management of similar events into the future.176 Many 
organizations’ after-action processes are lost due to many competing priorities. A system 
structure designed to capture reflection in this way gives a system an edge in resiliency and 
adaptability. Such a structure also imparts the ability to learn and capture learning over 
long periods.177 
Like the Canadian model, the Bakersfield structure based on the TQM framework 
serves to optimize the system’s performance while mitigating risk. By making system-
based and agent-based micro-adjustments—theoretically, in near real-time—the 
organization faces fewer significant systemic failures and limits the impact of “normal 
accidents.” It captures the essence of high reliability and flattens the organizational 
response to it, building competency and making systemic improvements at the same time.  
The QAU’s use-of-force inspection program has shown such benefits as risk 
mitigation and positive reinforcement for agents. This program reviews use-of-force 
reports and subsequent supervisor investigations. Through a combined process of monthly 
random selection, early intervention system alerts, and incident-driven criteria, the QAU 
convenes a panel of use-of-force experts to review incident reports, officer and suspect 
interviews, body-worn camera footage, and investigative photographs. The reviews search 
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for and identify potential deficiencies in officers’ performance, their tactics, indicators of 
potential misconduct, and risky micro-behaviors. As the experts identify problems, leaders 
also identify retraining strategies, tactical considerations, and organizational practices and 
implement them both at the individual and organizational levels. 
Additionally, through this review process, the program captures and amplifies ideal 
and positive behaviors through training, praise, and reinforcement. The QAU manages 
other similar programs for various organizational outputs and outcomes. This series of 
processes or systems of review reflects in many ways the philosophy of the theory of 
profound knowledge in that there is a deliberate, perpetual effort to monitor, measure, 
evaluate, and evolve within the organization.178 
The Bakersfield QAU model strengthens its system because it improves the 
system’s intrinsic responsibility. Meadows describes a system’s intrinsic responsibility as 
that which “is designed to send feedback about the consequences of decision making 
directly and quickly and compellingly to the decision makers.”179 As necessary, the 
system’s ability to maneuver rests on the quality of the feedback. This model grants the 
system manager the ability to know, almost on demand, most if not all aspects of internal 
and external performance. This mechanism informs the ability to make targeted decisions 
for the good of the system and those it serves, much as battlefield intelligence might inform 
a decisive maneuver in combat. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Understanding the difficulty in sustaining reforms and measuring police 
performance, it seems something is missing from the intrinsic responsibility mechanisms 
of American police organizations. Worden and McLean, Walker, and Brown have all 
observed some conflict between desired change and its execution. Perhaps, rather than an 
inability to implement or sustain behavioral change in policing, it is the system structure 
that fails. Reimagining the way police departments think about and manage their systems—
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adopting TQM’s system principles to capture and measure meaningful feedback from all 
parts of the system and those it interacts with—could better inform decision-making and 
drive lasting behavioral change.  
In complex business applications and now policing, the TQM system framework 
represented in Canada and at the BPD is not merely a mechanism of quality control and 
assessment of practice to ensure future capital success. It is a system complete with 
functional, real-time, multi-data, balancing, and reinforcing feedback loops that work as a 
dashboard for leadership to make real-time organizational adjustments. 
The ability to read feedback and make fast, meaningful adjustments to internal 
policies, procedures, training, discipline, and supervision could create and sustain police 
behaviors that reflect the organizational goals and values in ways reforms have not. 
Deployments, organizational strategy, tactics, and social and political responses to 
incidents informed by external feedback could better exemplify and mitigate community 
sentiments about policing in near real-time, preserving important police legitimacy. 
Moreover, learning about both positive and negative system behaviors improves 
organizational output.  
Ideally, a systems approach improves performance in all aspects and creates 
legitimacy and community confidence. Theoretically, such an approach limits future 
systemic failures or at least the scope of their damage, thereby creating resiliency. A 
reflexive, evaluative policing system is a proactive approach that could break the reactivity 
cycle of reform of policy, procedure, and practice in response to significant American 
policing failures.180  
As the system and problem spaces that affect policing activities change, both 
internally and externally, the system can reflexively respond due to its ability to receive, 
read, and interpret feedback effectively. The TQM system framework creates a reflexive 
system structure by design. Given the volatility of the act of policing, along with the varied 
environments in which it occurs and the uncertainty of systemic outcomes, adopting this 
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framework might prove to be the most critical reform undertaken by American policing—
if, following the Canadian framework, it were applied nationally and each police system, 
within its own space, reflexively adapted to its community’s evolution and values. Because 
every community is different, each police system is unlike the other, but ideally, this 
framework will help police better customize their service to the community.  
The premise of this chapter was that system structure dramatically influences 
system behavior. The inverse is also true; system behavior can influence the system 
structure. Without increasing agents’ capacity to become system thinkers and understand 
the system’s purpose and execute it, any system structure is at risk of failing to perform 
optimally. On the flip side, optimally performing agents can create a resilient, 
well-functioning system, even if it is not optimally structured.181 The following chapter 
discusses the relationships between agents and systems. It discusses how agent behavior 
reflects the system’s effectiveness and how optimal systems learn to become learning 
organizations, along with potential applications of these theories in policing.  
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IV. BUILDING AGENT CAPACITY TO IMPROVE 
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
While Chapter III focused on system structure and improving system performance 
by establishing a framework for managing systems and monitoring their behavior, this 
chapter explores systems thinking as a way of improving agent capacity to stabilize and 
improve system performance. It discusses the way police reformers, activists, and police 
administrators view training and education. Additionally, it considers the role capacity 
plays in police systems and police officer performance, as well as the practitioner’s role in 
competent police systems through building learning organizations.  
A. REFORM TRADITIONS 
Training and education of police officers are core tenets of the police reform 
playbook. It is simple to say that when bad things happen or police conduct does not meet 
society’s expectations, some correction, particularly in the context of behavior, is 
necessary. Training and education are easy targets for immediate action. Reformers have a 
long-held belief that officer competency, specifically competency developed through 
training and pre-requisite education, holds the key to improving policing. Former police 
chief and professor August Vollmer’s contributions to the 1931 Wickersham Commission 
report focused, in part, on these areas. Vollmer advocated for traditionally educated police 
officers to prevent poor performance and corruption.182 The Wickersham Commission, 
President Hoover’s commissioned panel of experts, attempted to standardize American 
police performance and root out corruption during the Prohibition era.  
A report issued 36 years later by President Lyndon Johnson’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice indicated much the same—that police officer 
education was essential to good policing. The commission concluded, “The quality of 
police service will not significantly improve until higher educational requirements are 
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established for its personnel.”183 According to Victor Strecher, a criminal justice professor 
at Sam Houston State University, the overall improvement of education within the policing 
community could be considered President Johnson’s “invisible achievement . . . regarded 
as one of his more significant contributions to the quality of life in the United States.”184 
Forty-eight years later, President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 
made training and education of police officers one of its central themes as well.185 Like 
echoes of the reports before it, Obama’s task force stated, “The skills and knowledge 
required to deal with these issues effectively requires a higher level of education as well as 
extensive and ongoing training in specific disciplines.”186 The issues referred to in the 
quote involve the many tasks and roles assigned to police and the varied contextual 
relationships police officers have to the world. A few paragraphs later, the task force deems 
these issues the “complexity of the 21st Century.”187  
Interestingly, it seems that were he alive, Strecher might have argued that policing’s 
complexity is not exclusive to the 21st century. In his comparison of the Wickersham 
Commission’s and Johnson commission’s recommendations for education and their 
outcomes, a distinct factor he considered were the contexts of social institutions, 
technology, education, and other elements that affected police officer and organizational 
value-making. They changed the way society interacted with police and the way police 
interacted with society. Strecher might have called factors that seem inexplicably linked to 
one another “contextual relationships”—known as “complexity” in systems language. To 
clarify, “context” in the way Strecher uses it means the same thing it does in systems 
language: the environment with which a system interacts.188 Context and its related 
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complexity comprise learning, whether that learning is captured with in-service police 
training, traditional education, or other means vital to police performance and systems. 
B. A LINEAR APPROACH 
Obviously, the training of officers plays a central role in police reform. The 
argument made by reformers is that mindset and performance are indicators of police 
training’s capacity and effectiveness. Walker and Archbold devote 46 pages spread 
throughout their book to the idea of training police officers to improve behavioral 
outcomes. The “T” in their aforementioned PTSR framework is training. They write,  
Training, it hardly needs to be said, is a basic element of modern police 
administration, and it represents one of the major achievements of the police 
professionalization movement of the 20th-century. Training, moreover, 
must be a continuous and comprehensive effort, including pre-service 
academy training, mandatory annual in-service training, roll call training, 
and special ad hoc training for certain officers.189  
Walker and Archbold also argue that many of the incidents that create divides between 
people and the police, particularly those involving force, boil down to inadequate police 
officer training.190 
Police reforms deliver training in abundance. As policing failures or, perhaps in 
many cases, social behaviors amplified by the act of policing are identified, reformers offer 
and often mandate police training in those areas. Some examples include anti-bias training, 
community engagement training, procedural justice training, de-escalation training, 
use-of-force recognition training, sensitivity training, racial profiling training, and—the 
most recent training trend, directly tied to the George Floyd incident—use-of-force 
intervention training.191 Use-of-force intervention is the idea that a police officer has a 
“duty to intercede” when other police officers cross a line in a use-of-force incident.192 
 
189 Walker and Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 16–17. 
190 Walker and Archbold, 18. 
191 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report, 51–60; Vasilogambros, “Training 
Police to Step In.”  
192 Minneapolis Police Department, Use of Force. 
58 
The training teaches police officers how to intervene effectively rather than, as traditional 
use-of-force training teaches, how and when it is legal and appropriate to apply different 
force levels.  
The Floyd case is an excellent example of how linear thinking drives policy 
making, officer training, and law enforcement education. George Floyd died while in police 
custody. There is some dispute about whether his death was at Officer Derek Chauvin’s 
hands or from a combination of drug overdose and a preexisting medical condition after 
struggling with officers.193 Most people believe that Chauvin, who crouched on Floyd’s 
neck for over eight minutes, killed Floyd by asphyxiation. The cell-phone video depicts an 
emotionless Chauvin with hands in his pockets as Floyd slowly dies. The video inflamed 
the world—the apparent callousness of it, the unadulterated violence of watching a man 
die at the hands of a Minneapolis police officer with three other officers looking on and 
doing nothing to stop, shook the world.194  
For America’s police, much of the Floyd incident’s aftermath, not including 
widespread protests, riots, and calls to defund police, focused on police practices and 
tactics. Conversations centered on banning actions, such as chokeholds; bolstering training 
for others, such as use-of-force intervention and de-escalation; and reviewing and revising 
use-of-force policies. Notably, these conversations happened on a national scale, rather 
than focusing on Minneapolis, where the incident occurred. Widespread changes in police 
policy and practice happened in some cases, for instance, New York City’s criminalizing 
all forcible body-weight restraint tactics by police officers.195 Acting in the wake of what 
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eventually amounts to a national disaster is appropriate. There is some place for immediate 
training to rectify immediate problems, and certainly, learning from others’ failures is a 
wise and appropriate practice to avoid the same fate. The issue is that this reactive way of 
problem-solving only superficially, if at all, addresses the true problem space. Much of the 
suggested reforms in George Floyd’s aftermath already existed in Minneapolis for some 
time before the incident occurred. 
In the city and agency where this failure of policing occurred, the use-of-force 
policy approved such restraint methods and trained officers to use them.196 Also, the 
department’s use-of-force policy explicitly defines an officer’s duty to intervene, 
incorporates a variety of de-escalation tactics, and requires regular training on the use of 
force.197 The state of Minnesota mandates specific and regular use-of-force training for 
pre-service and in-service applications by statute.198 Minneapolis uses an early 
intervention system to weed out bad behavior and has done so since 2009. Last, and most 
important, through its collaborative reform initiative, the DOJ reviewed Minneapolis’s use-
of-force policy as part of an after-action report on civil unrest related to the Jamar Clark 
shooting in 2015. It made 71 recommendations related to the incident, including some 
about the use-of-force policy itself. The report did not mention the tactics used in that 
incident, nor was the policy criticized.199 Minneapolis had everything in place to prevent 
an incident like Floyd’s death from occurring, including DOJ-vetted policies. Despite all 
of the reformed features of modern policing already in place to control behavior, it still 
happened. 
The Floyd incident represents a long-standing question in policing. It is not a 
question of policy or procedure or changing behavior. The question is understanding how 
a system can affect its agents and how agents affect their system. The question seeks to 
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understand how policing as a system, or the microsystem of the Minneapolis Police 
Department, in this case, could allow the attitudes, beliefs, or, even worse, callousness and 
negligence exemplified by Derek Chauvin and his partners to exist within it. With plenty 
of reformed policing practices aligned with much of the pattern-and-practice platform in 
Minneapolis, all designed to prevent this type of behavior, the search may need to look 
further than adding features or repackaging reforms. The problem may be more profound 
than that. It may be that to attain and sustain resiliency, trust, and legitimacy, the system 
must attempt to understand agent behavior and how to improve it. Better answers may 
come from addressing or studying the organizational affirmation on some level of 
Chauvin’s historical behavior, perhaps long-standing affirmed behaviors, culminating in 
the outcomes on that day.  
C. THINKING DIFFERENTLY 
Worden and McLean’s work explores the inconsistency of officer behavior and 
performance. They demonstrate that some officers perform very well. In contrast, others 
perform very poorly despite having the same background training and organizational 
structures and experiences. As part of their discussion about improving future reforms, 
Worden and McLean identify a need to “learn from these officers what they do and do not 
do and why. The question implies that we need to understand how officers perceive and 
interpret their encounters with citizens—the perceptual and cognitive processes that yield 
different reactions to different stimuli.”200  
The question of cognitive processes may be the crux of improvement. Perhaps the 
argument is that training and attempts to control or understand behavior by these agents 
are less about the agents and more about the system. At the close of their book, Worden 
and McLean admit, 
While we believe that steps to better prepare officers to exercise their 
authority—including especially searches and the use of force—are the most 
promising avenues of police reform, extant research offers little evidence 
about how police organizations can effectively perform these functions. 
Training and supervision are often mentioned. Such prescriptions rest 
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largely on logic and wishful thinking, and certainly not on social scientific 
evidence.201 
Peter Senge observes that when efforts to improve performance within a system do not 
acknowledge their system’s existence at the outset, they can prevent progress and create 
more problems. He describes this phenomenon in the context of systems dynamics pioneer 
Jay Forrester’s work on problems in social systems: “These problems were ‘systems’ that 
lured policymakers into interventions that focused on obvious symptoms, not underlying 
causes, which produced short-term benefit but long-term malaise, and fostered the need for 
still more symptomatic interventions.”202 Training gets used to address symptomology, 
much like the interventions after the Floyd incident, not the mindsets, values, or education 
that creates those symptoms. 
Dietz and Mink address the same question asked by Worden and McLean but from 
a systems perspective. They observe that system agents’ skills and abilities to apply their 
“tacit knowledge” with and within the system greatly influence system function.203 The 
Floyd incident, and countless other tragedies, demonstrates the opposite to be accurate as 
well: poorly functioning agents cause systems to perform poorly. 
The problem of “bad agent behavior” and how to avoid it in the frame of Worden 
and McLean’s question—whose line of inquiry contrasts with most of the concepts of 
modern police reform—are of the same problem space used by Walker and those like him. 
They espouse the values of training and reinforcing good or necessary behaviors in police 
work. From the systems-thinking perspective, what they are searching for is the system 
agents’ short-term view to balance the system. It falls far short of developing “reflective” 
agents or learning to apply their tacit knowledge to perpetuate the system, values, and 
organizational success.204 
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D. A SHIFTED PERSPECTIVE 
Dietz and Mink identify learning as a core component of police system 
performance. They argue, “The learning process is a nested system within the context of 
other systems, such as the family, industry, politics (government) and history. New 
knowledge is nested in, added to, existing knowledge.”205 They contend that much of the 
thinking about police organizations tends to work from a “standard (tradition)” that treats 
them as independent systems. As complex adaptive systems, learning is a way of 
aggregating and adapting to many contextual and historical relationships. Thus, Dietz and 
Mink argue that learning is a “way of informing [the complex adaptive system’s] future. 
Learning and knowledge transfer are important to the processes of co-evolution and 
emergent patterns.”206 
It may be that reformers for nearly the past 100 years have attempted to capture the 
essence of Dietz and Mink’s assessment of learning in police systems. The push for better 
training and education in police reform may be a conflated argument for better learning 
practices in law enforcement. One difference may be that reformers think of education as 
a way of improving or controlling agent behavior to improve system performance, a 
cause-and-effect relationship. Instead, Dietz and Mink’s way of thinking is that learning 
builds behavior on experience in lockstep with varied contexts as they evolve and emerge 
anew. Learning, in their frame, is a part of the complex system that is policing. Learning 
and the means of learning are system properties.  
Dietz and Mink discuss the Austin Police Department (APD)’s interactions with 
illegal immigrants from Mexico in its jurisdiction to highlight the idea. The APD 
recognized that due to their unwillingness to cooperate with law enforcement out of fear of 
deportation and arrest, the Mexican residents found themselves subject to significant 
predatory crime and little effective law enforcement intervention. In recognizing the 
problem, the APD instituted some programs to better connect to the people it struggled to 
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reach, ultimately improving the relationship with that population and law enforcement 
outcomes.  
This simple example captures the idea of learning as it exists in systems and how it 
exists as complexity within systems.207 First, the APD recognized the desired state and the 
current state’s falling short of meeting it. Second, it created agent capabilities to adapt to 
the problem. This ability to recognize problems and address them, whether at the agent or 
system level, is the essence of systems learning.208 Because living systems are made up of 
people—by and large, systems are groups of people—teaching the system to learn is 
effectively teaching the people in the system to learn.209 The APD agents’ collective 
understanding of the system’s problem made up the system’s response. In this example, 
learning existed in multiple contexts, and its interactions affected the rest of the system and 
vice versa. Rather than controlling or “fixing” behavior, this approach exemplifies Dietz 
and Mink’s advocacy for learning as a philosophical system foundation to “allow the 
policing system to anticipate better the needs of the citizens they serve.”210 In their systems 
frame, learning is an ongoing cooperative process that allows agent behavior to adapt based 
on the system’s needs.  
E. A BETTER WAY OF THINKING ABOUT PROBLEMS 
Senge describes three basic ways of thinking about problem spaces: reactive, 
responsive, and generative. Reactive or event-based explanations are the lowest order; they 
focus on moments in time, or single-slice issues. Responsive explanations consider 
“patterns of behavior.” They consider the actions and attitudes that create issues within the 
system. They consider more than basic reactivity but still do not understand what causes 
the patterns; they seek to address them within their own space. Generative explanations 
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are, as Senge describes, “the most powerful.”211 They seek to identify what causes 
“patterns of behavior,” which change the course of events. Generative problem-space 
explanations address the entire system inside and out. They are relevant to policing because 
“the structure in human systems includes the ‘operating policies’ of the decision-makers in 
the system, [so] redesigning [their] own decision-making redesigns the system 
structure.”212 
System structure influences system behavior. Senge calls learning organizations the 
products of the “theory of enacted systems.” This means that in action, the leverage to 
change systems does not focus on behaviors or events. Instead, it focuses on underlying 
structures made up of pieces he calls the deep-learning cycle: “beliefs and assumptions, 
established practices, skills and capabilities, networks of relationships, and awareness and 
sensibilities.”213 Additionally, the cyclical dependence on system structure and behaviors, 
each influencing the other, is intentional. It is vital for a system of people acting within it, 
a social system, to become an environment that generatively learns from its interactions 
while shaping the system’s structures in the process.214 As much as anything, this means 
that the system must be built, trained, and attuned to learning about itself, not just 
structurally but culturally and administratively. The system has to become evaluative of 
itself as a priority, as do the system’s agents, because the relationships between system 
structure and system behavior are proportional.215  
Donald Schön would call this same process “reflection in action.” He argues that a 
reflective practitioner’s development occurs in part through experience, a kind of patterned 
sense-making of uncertain causal relationships and volatile complex situations. He argues 
that reflection in action gives practitioners insight that cannot be gained in other ways. 
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Reflection in action is the process of assessing while doing.216 This idea of assessment 
within and about a system’s structure by its agents converges Senge’s and Schön’s ideas 
on generative problem-solving.217 Self-assessment is the central element to learning 
organization theory as it applies to policing systems. The easiest way to think about deep 
learning and reflection in action is that they are essentially teaching agents how to assess 
fundamentally and perpetually feedback from various sources and learn from them in real 
time. It is a process of acting on that assessment while making it, thereby influencing their 
behavior, the system’s behavior, and potentially the system’s structures.218 
If system behavior can dictate system structure and vice versa, system structures 
and behavior include value behavior and culture. Therefore, in a sense, emphasizing the 
philosophical values of a learning organization can create a mirrored emergent value-based 
structure that interweaves the philosophy into the elements of the problem and solution 
spaces, thereby aligning philosophy and solution. Rather than merely suggesting that police 
departments learn to be learning organizations, emphasizing practitioner learning as a 
philosophy might allow the learning organization concepts to take root and grow 
organically within the philosophy and practitioner competency level.219  
F. THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE 
In The Fifth Discipline, Senge highlights the Singapore Police Force (SPF) and its 
commissioner, Khoo Boon Hui, as part of a national movement to become a “learning 
nation.” This police force changed its culture and developed practitioner capacity while 
having dramatic effects on the quality of the organization and its effectiveness.220 
Commissioner Khoo realized that his organization had not been designed to meet the 
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world’s uncertain, complex, and emerging threats, recognizing that the SPF was not attuned 
to adaptation, growth, or generative problem-solving. Khoo had trouble recruiting high-
quality officers because the work was menial and unrewarding, and he noticed that his 
officers had not been trained as thinkers, as they relied on strict policy adherence and tightly 
coupled management. The SPF was unprepared to meet the challenges of modern 
policing.221  
Recognizing that his organization was foundering, Commissioner Khoo began 
changing the culture toward “one of trust and openness through investing in organizational 
development.”222 The organization, like many in the United States, had previously 
developed its community-policing programs and integrated, on some level, its officers into 
the communities they policed. They built on that philosophical foundation and “enlarged 
their job scopes” while simultaneously increasing their foundational knowledge of 
generative problem-solving and systems thinking. The officers learned to network and 
communicate with others in their agencies and communities and were empowered by the 
management. They took ownership of their problem and solution spaces by being 
proactive, collaborative, and adaptive to new ideas and diverse partnerships.223  
Intentionally, and as part of the outgrowth of the learning organization principles 
in action, the SPF focused on developing leadership capacity at every rank to amplify its 
abilities. It incorporated value training and increased responsibility as part of the training 
to ensure that as the agents were empowered, they were knowledgeable about the 
organizational goals and values and capable of achieving them without strict oversight. As 
the SPF began morphing into a learning organization, it focused on capturing and sharing 
its collective knowledge and incorporated training and after-action reports. It made 
deliberate efforts to create reflection opportunities throughout to “broaden awareness 
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across the system.”224 Commissioner Khoo refocused the SPF’s policies and procedures 
“to stress principles rather than prescriptive instructions, to facilitate the exercise of 
discretion based on best practices.”225 
The last meaningful change Commissioner Khoo made to his system was to 
incorporate networks of relationships to increase his organization’s capacity for 
knowledge. He did not rely on his own agency’s experience or solely on law enforcement 
agencies; he sought out people, including community members and academics, from other 
areas to advise his organization on policing. His stated goal was to gain a wide range of 
perspectives from which his organization could learn to approach its problem spaces 
generatively.226 
Under Commissioner Khoo’s leadership, the SPF became a more effective, 
responsive police organization. By leveraging the power of the learning organization built 
through investing in agent capacity, Commissioner Khoo’s SPF saw significant reductions 
in crime, improved employee performance, and relationships with its communities that had 
not existed before. Speaking in 1994, he observed an added benefit: “Today, the police 
force recruits more than its fair share of highly educated job seekers.”227 
The SPF is illustrative of an organization that transformed itself into a learning 
organization by investing in its practitioners and improving its ability to interact with the 
system. Providing support for Senge and Schön’s synthesized theories, as the organization 
invested as a system in its agents, their behavior changed its structure. Creating better 
capacity in agents resulted in better performance and better system responsiveness, growth, 
emergence, and even recruiting of higher capacity agents in the long run. The SPF example 
also demonstrates how agent capacity and generative thinking about problem spaces can 
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create better employee satisfaction, creativity, personal investment of agents in the system, 
and organizational pride. 
U.S. policing systems can learn much from how the SPF improved its performance 
and interaction with other systems. The following details the key takeaways: 
• Commissioner Khoo assessed his organization and identified practitioner 
capacity as a point of deficiency in the system space effectiveness. 
• As an organization, the SPF built on its already sound philosophy. It 
started from a place of existent capacity and improved upon it. 
• The SPF undertook a deliberate effort to modify its culture to become a 
“practicing while practicing” environment. 
• The organization invested in practitioner capacity and engaged with its 
internal management systems to improve external output while integrating 
systems thinking principles. 
• It developed and integrated collaborative learning and built out 
collaboration capacities. 
• SPF employees were entrusted with the system’s values and empowered to 
act upon them. 
• Understanding collective thinking power, the SPF branched out into 
academia and other sectors to collaborate on innovative and creative 
solutions.  
As an aside, Singapore’s performance as a police organization consistently 
outperforms most of the world. Admittedly, its naturally flat government—as all police 
functions exist at the federal level, as do all related bureaucracies—harsh criminal 
penalties, and relatively small size as an island nation help Singapore succeed in ways 
many others cannot. All the same, Singapore regularly ranks as one of the least corrupt 
police organizations and safest cities globally. In a 2019 study conducted by the Economist, 
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Singapore ranked second overall for safety and first for personal safety. It has held similar 
rankings since the early 1990s.228 
G. CAPTURING SUCCESS IN DIFFERENT SYSTEM SPACES 
An example like the SPF shows that regardless of its success, it does not compare 
with any other law enforcement agency in the United States. The SPF is a state agency, 
meaning it is the principal law enforcement agency for Singapore’s entire nation.229 There 
are more than 18,000 separate police agencies in the United States, each within its own 
problem spaces and system spaces. In Singapore, the macrosystem and microsystem are 
the same. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in later chapters, microsystems can affect 
macrosystems dramatically and vice versa. Therefore, the opportunity to leverage the 
Singapore example still exists. Similarly, Commissioner Khoo assessed his organization 
and found his own problem space to approach generatively. 
Because every system is different and relates differently within its environment, its 
competencies and vulnerabilities, values and philosophies, and challenges will vary. This 
approach, the marriage of practitioner competency to system ability, should provide access 
and leverage points throughout to deal in problem spaces and solution spaces generatively 
and perpetually if appropriately approached, as demonstrated in the Singapore example. 
There is one caveat to this assertion. For every Singapore, there must be a Commander 
Khoo. The framework was sound because the executive’s vision was sound, and the 
cultural creation that he oversaw established the environment for capacity growth and 
system capacity-building.  
H. FOUNDATIONAL CAPACITY-BUILDING FOR SYSTEMS AND 
PRACTITIONERS 
The idea of practitioner capacity-building synthesizes Dietz and Mink’s research 
on contextual learning, Senge’s generative problem-solving, and Schön’s reflection in 
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action.230 As illustrated by the example of the SPF, competent system agents can 
dramatically improve the system’s performance while both stabilizing and reinforcing it. 
Given that each agency in the United States has different challenges, the research has 
identified two areas where practitioner capacity-building might best start: shared visions 
and learning. In these areas, a shift in thinking, both culturally and structurally, might 
benefit the various American police systems regardless of their problem and system spaces. 
Building shared visions and better learning are universal to learning organizations. 
Additionally, they improve agent capacity and have limitless applications. Improved agent 
capacity sets the stage for improved system performance and helps build learning 
organizations.231  
I. SHARED VISIONS 
Peter Senge argues that a shared vision is important to the learning organization 
because generative learning occurs only when people are passionate about achieving the 
goal. He argues that an “extrinsic vision,” that is, outwardly focused—an increased profit 
margin for a corporation or police legitimacy in American policing—is mostly transitory. 
There is a limitation to extrinsic vision-making. Senge argues that the goal changes once it 
is achieved, and the posture shifts to not losing the initial success. Senge suggests that 
intrinsic goals are more attuned to an abstract state of being—“excellence” is the example 
he uses.232 A problem with an extrinsic goal for policing is that no global, static end-state 
is achievable. There is no end-game success. So long as the world is a malleable place, 
fraught with surprise, evil, and disorder, policing cannot achieve a static end-state. This is 
the nature of complexity.233  
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In the example of the SPF’s leadership, led by Commander Khoo, it set intrinsic 
goals of self-assessing and deliberately seeking improvement. It developed a culture that 
valued challenging the system, becoming reflective about its practices, and collaboratively 
solving problems by knowing or seeking those who could help achieve that end state. The 
SPF was intentional about improvement in every facet of the organization. The results were 
improved output, performance, workplace satisfaction, and hiring and retention.  
Shared visions are vital to sustaining the success of organizational change. They 
provide meaning in the cause of an undertaking. Philosopher Viktor Frankl reflected that 
“the will to meaning,” a desire to find meaning as a human being, is the single greatest 
pursuit of existence. He maintained that once a person finds meaning, she will endure 
anything so long as the purpose of that meaning remains intact. The highs and lows of 
creating a culture, the victories and failures, along with any derived emotional responses, 
have less effect on those to whom the vision’s meaning is exact. Frankl’s work 
demonstrates a distinct resiliency in finding a meaning of value and holding fast to it.234 
A shared vision can also help create a culture of self-regulation and a collective 
sense of responsibility. Tamler Sommer’s studies of honor cultures found that in the Navy 
SEAL culture, the process of indoctrination and togetherness of purpose in training and 
operating together create a culture in which a “sense of collective responsibility . . . further 
strengthens the bonds within the group.”235 Additionally, Sommers observed a sense of 
shared responsibility for individuals’ failures within the group and a balancing effect of 
participant behavior. The opposite is true, as well. A shared sense of responsibility rooted 
in a healthy honor culture can create a sense of pride when members act “virtuously or 
honorably.”236 
In some aspects, a shared vision or a collective goal surpasses expertise or skill 
when increasing capacity. Willink and Babin, Navy SEAL commanders and leadership 
experts, write, “Far more important than training or equipment, a resolute belief in the 
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mission is critical for any team or organization to win and achieve big results.”237 General 
Jim “Mad Dog” Mattis echoes this assertion in stating that harmonious, effective units are 
teams in which everyone involved understands and supports the mission.238 Finally, 
General Stanley McCrystal writes that expertise is essential, but so too is understanding 
the system’s design, goals, and nuances. General McCrystal calls this process “shared 
consciousness.”239 
Military commanders’ observations are particularly poignant because the 
environment in which they draw their expertise is similar to the problem spaces understood 
by Commander Khoo of the SPF. Volatility, uncertainty, and complexity are fundamental 
elements of the modern battlefield, and tightly coupled command structures are not ideal 
for meeting those challenges. By virtue of its mission spaces and basic structures, the 
military has much to impart about teaching and learning. In his research on building 
learning organizations, Senge points out that military organizations, notably the United 
States Army, are among the most consistent cultures to promote learning and do so 
effectively.240 
Distinguishing between military leadership structures and those of the police is 
essential because they are fundamentally different. Military commanders are easily fireable 
without cause at their commanders’ whim based on an “on-the-spot” assessment of their 
performance or a failure to reach milestones. In police organizations, firing a leader or 
subordinate is fraught with all kinds of difficulty ranging from basic employment laws to 
union protections and interference. What is more, military commanders have a seemingly 
infinite supply of subordinate commanders from which to draw while police organizations 
do not. This does not invalidate their observations about leading, commanding, or creating 
a healthy capacity-building culture, especially in volatile, ambiguous environments. It does 
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mean that nurturing shared visions organically over time is vital to their success. For police 
organizations, collaboration, empowerment, and value-based priority-making that 
emphasize participation and organizationally minded succession-planning might offset 
some of the differences, as it has in Singapore.  
J. LEARNING 
Oscar Wilde said, “Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from 
time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught.”241 This quote sums up in 
many ways the dichotomy between the role of training, inclusive of experience, and 
formalized education in policing. Education has fundamental value to all of society, but in 
policing as a profession, there is less emphasis placed on it than tenure, experience, and 
formalized police training. In 2020, the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
published its support for higher education standards.242 Education is essential, but so too 
is operator knowledge. There is no need to favor one over the other, but there should be a 
balance. Commander Khoo and his organization sought to create collective knowledge by 
integrating resources, experience, and education.  
Surprisingly, despite the emphasis placed on training by reformers and police 
administrations, there is little emphasis on learning and foundational training. For instance, 
California requires a high school diploma; 664 police academy hours, including more than 
60 hours of testing on laws and procedures; and 560 field training hours, for a total of 1,224 
total hours of training to earn the necessary peace officer certification in that state.243 Also, 
every peace officer must complete 24 hours of training every two years, 14 of which are 
required for “perishable skills training” such as firearms training, arrest control, driving, 
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and interpersonal communication.244 By contrast, California requires cosmetologists to 
have a 10th-grade education and train 1,600 hours, plus take a certification exam to obtain 
a cosmetology license. That means after achieving the basic level of certification necessary 
in the state, a police officer would have to serve an additional 31+ years to receive the same 
level of mandated training as a brand-new hairdresser in California.245  
This disparity does not account for other non-mandated professional training or 
specialized training. To be fair, many, if not most, agencies require additional training for 
career development or specialization. However, it is surprising—given the authority and 
the routine tasking of police officers to make sense of life-or-death situations in a matter 
of moments with limited information—that there is not a higher emphasis placed on the 
concept of expertise. Most other professions in which such decisions occur, emergency 
room physicians, for instance, require 11–12 years of training, both formal and 
experiential, before certification in their field. Additionally, they are required to pass an 
exam and apply annually for licensure.246 In addition to their formal police training, only 
about 30 percent of police officers have bachelor’s degrees, and fewer than 6 percent have 
graduate degrees.247  
Even in the realm of vocational training as competent operators in volatile, complex 
environments, the American investment in training police officers does not approach 
creating expertise. Consider the inverse with the military’s elite operators. The lives of U.S. 
Army Green Berets are “mostly filled with training. It is the key to any expertise and, thus, 
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it follows that the most skilled soldiers have the most training.”248 In contrast, police 
officers spend almost all their time in an operational posture with very little devoted to 
training. One of the reasons for this may be that police training has historically focused on 
interactional expertise. This practice’s idea is that formalized education does not prepare 
one for an ambiguous environment like crime fighting. Only experience will suffice. 
Soldiers, particularly elite soldiers, must have long periods of insular training to ensure 
their survival long enough to achieve elite status. Police officers, on the other hand, can 
only become elite through experience in policing situations. This idea evokes Schön’s 
description of practitioner expertise:  
As practitioners experience many variations of a small number of types of 
experiences many variations of a small number of types of cases, he is able 
to “practice” his practice. He develops a repertoire of expectations, images, 
and techniques. He learns what to look for and how to respond to what he 
finds. As long as his practice is stable in the sense that it brings him the 
same types of cases, he becomes less and less subject to surprise. His 
knowing-in-practice tends to become increasingly tacit, spontaneous and 
automatic, thereby conferring upon him and his clients the benefits of 
specialization.249 
Experience is an invaluable teaching tool. It allows for reflection in action. 
However, experience alone as a teaching method fails to teach people how to learn, assess, 
evaluate, and challenge their problem spaces. Without understanding how to learn, Dietz 
and Mink argue, experience does not have contextual depth. Without learning how to 
capture learning both as individuals and as systems, exposure to new problems and solution 
spaces not directly contained in that environment’s past experiences have little value in 
informing the future.250 
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Colloquially, the size of the craftsman’s toolbox limits the number of his tools, and 
his inability to learn limits how he can use the tools available. In that environment, there is 
little room for creation, innovation, and agility. This is not to diminish the value of 
experience. Schön’s work unequivocally demonstrates that experience has intrinsic value 
in any complex environment like policing. The problem here is not that experience is 
irrelevant or invalid, but experience alone without understanding how to think and learn 
alongside it is insufficient. 
General McChrystal, in his book Team of Teams, writes about the value of 
education to a practitioner: “Education requires fundamental understanding which can be 
used to grasp and respond to a nearly infinite variety of threats; training involves singular 
actions, which are only useful against anticipated challenges. Education is resilient, 
training is robust.”251 One could argue that learning happens through education. Often 
thought of as traditional formalized study of material, such as at a university or college, 
education has many more applications. Indeed, a formal education teaches one to learn 
better, but it is not the only way to learn nor, in some applications, the best way to learn. 
Schön’s life’s work toward understanding the innately honed skills of practitioners and the 
high esteem held by Dietz and Mink of the tacit knowledge of skilled police practitioners 
demonstrate that anything thought about correctly and learned deeply through practice and 
reflection can become an education.  
Through deep learning, exploration, and reflection of both problem and system 
spaces, education provides a larger toolbox, access to more tools, and permission to explore 
how to use them differently. It does not detract from the reflection in action available to an 
experienced expert practitioner. It enhances it to include the world around it. General 
Mattis observed that his experiences as a leader taught him that his education was 
important, and that of his subordinates was as well. He wrote that educating practitioners 
by making them read and reflect on that reading by quizzing them on their thoughts about 
what they had read provided them with mental models to frame the command’s goals and 
objectives to carry them out with their designed intent. He argued that the Marine Corps’ 
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experience was not enough to sustain mission readiness or the ability to carry it out 
effectively.252 At the same time, the reflection about reading through quizzes made the 
Marines more thoughtful about the things they learned through reading. This partnership 
of learned thought and practicality in the application seems important. It is another way of 
managing and perpetuating essential knowledge in an organization while creating a culture 
that values those things.253 
The foundational importance of the ability to learn helps build not only better 
operators but better leaders. The targeted expertise of police officers does not equate 
automatically with command. Mattis argues that commanders must exemplify that which 
they wish to instill in their subordinates, leading back to the idea of shared visions. He 
argues much as Schön does that expertise is gained from practicing practice and learning 
how to transform experiences into knowledge learned from them. Mattis articulates that it 
is crucial to practice practicing everything from values to education. Educated leaders who 
exemplify and value education, initiative, and maverick thinking—or risk-taking—will 
create the same in their subordinates.254 
Mattis argues that a leader who does not add value to the organization is akin to a 
decorative plant in a hotel lobby: a decoration of no real use. He argues that leaders who 
“haven’t read hundreds of books, learning from others who went before you, . . . are 
functionally illiterate—you can’t coach and you can’t lead.”255 Mattis’s point here is much 
like Commander Khoo’s from a different perspective. Building learning capacity improves 
the organization. Commander Khoo’s concern was his operators’ capacity while General 
Mattis is speaking of leadership’s capacity to create environments in which all other 
operations can thrive. Leaders require not only the competency of the craftsman but the 
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confidence and self-mastery of the artisan.256 Mattis’s experience in this area is crucial 
because he has a background in systems thinking. He equates this eloquent comparison of 
the craftsman, tactician, artisan, and reflective thinker to systems and leading them. He 
explains that feedback from the people within his living systems of command was integral 
in his development as a commander and in subordinate leaders’ growth.257 Systems as 
structures for learning work both up and down the chain of command. 
In the end, it may be that policing can no longer be considered a vocation where 
experience and vocational training make up much of its foundational skill-building. Nor is 
it sufficient to call it a profession akin to those in which higher education alone captures 
the essential skills needed to mitigate a high degree of societal risk of failure. It may be 
that society at large, individual cities, and counties invest in educating and training police 
officers to a level of elite practitioner status. If the ability to be critical and reflective is the 
product of increased capacity, it certainly bears strong consideration. Given budgetary and 
hiring difficulties for police agencies across the United States, that sort of investment seems 
unlikely and unrealistic. In the long term, there seems to be a credible argument to 
formalize the need for undergraduate education for entry into the police service in the 
United States and graduate-level education for executive-level managers. 
In the short-term, there is potential for a hybrid knowledge-based solution that 
leverages the expertise of policing, along with the foundational understanding of traditional 
or formal education, to create agents capable of discerning in real time. Figure 2, adapted 
from David Kolb’s learning style inventory, might best represent the approach both to 
identify ways to increase the capacity for learning and to understand the different 
approaches to learning in practice. 
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Figure 2. Learning Style Inventory258 
Kolb argues that varying approaches to teaching and capturing learning has benefits 
for organizations because people learn different things in different ways. Moreover, 
different types of learning leave room for cross-pollination of learning across many 
different sub-learning types. Additionally, Kolb has found that learning sophistication, a 
robust ability to learn from different stimuli, comes from “the dual dialects of the learning 
process, conceptualizing and acting.”259 In other words, learning best occurs when it 
involves both a theoretical and practical experience frame.260  
Based on this research, it seems a combined approach of increased in-service 
training hours and foundational academic topics introduced in a sort of “in-service 
university” setting could serve that purpose. Increasing opportunities to learn to capture 
individual expertise and share it across the organization while promoting practices of 
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reflection and sharing of tacit knowledge, through both experiential and theoretical 
applications, would improve learning throughout the organization.  
In the same way that Commander Khoo expanded his organization’s collective 
knowledge, so too could American agencies introduce relevant and current academic topics 
and forge partnerships with universities and scholars. Additionally, robust after-action 
review procedures, expert lectures, and information-sharing platforms could share 
experiences and increase agent awareness and wisdom, in a sense, by proxy. Additionally, 
professional expert educators could play a central role in teaching police personnel how to 
think in systems and learn about learning. 
Akin to the medical and education industries, another option involves establishing 
industry practices to hire officers conditionally upon completing their requisite education 
levels during preset time frames. Another is to heavily incentivize and promote tuition 
reimbursement for employees to improve their foundations. Additionally, federally funded 
programs like the Center for Homeland Defense and Security offer tuition-free educational 
experiences to homeland security leaders, including police officers, at no cost to the officer 
or the agency. 
K. CONCLUSION 
Police reformers, activists, and police administrators want police departments to 
train “bad behavior” out of police officers to prevent the recurrence of previously exhibited 
destructive behaviors. Instead of thinking about what caused that behavior or even what 
made it possible in the first place, they choose a reactive solution and address the problem 
in its most spartan space. This way of thinking fails to capture the complexities of the 
problem space that causes the behaviors in the first place. Little if any energy is expended 
in teaching them how to think or, more importantly, providing them with the tools to think 
about the system, their role within it, or how it and they as agents of the system affect other 
systems. 
Alternatively, leveraging the living system to improve agents’ capacity will 
improve their competency and ability to think better in real time and improve the system 
critically. Like that of the SPF, an effort to self-assess and identify deficiencies will reduce 
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the number of future deficiencies or failures and have a reinforcing effect. Generative 
thinking is an opportunity to improve the system and agent behavior intentionally and 
create functional learning organizations. Focusing on shared visions in goals and values 
and improving officers’ education, specifically the ability to learn from their experiences 
and those of their colleagues, could increase, albeit proportionally, depending on the 
microsystem’s problem and the system space’s capacity for growth. It could aid in 
developing not only competency but also better, more resilient systems.  
As shown in the SPF example, the ability to intentionally and deliberately 
understand a system’s state is an integral concept in capacity-building and system 
improvement. An organization’s ability to assess its problem and system spaces, 
capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses is central to its ability to adapt or change to suit its 
environment’s complexity or volatility.  
Police agencies, as microsystems, within their value structures, could determine 
how reflective, competent, and beneficial their systems and system agents are and work 
toward identifying points of leverage for improvement. The process of self-assessment is 
foundational to any version of competency, both as organizations and as practitioners. Each 
is related to the other. Therefore, for systems and agents, this process of improvement, 
evaluation, and assessment must remain effective to grow healthy systems and competent 
practitioners.  
The next chapter considers the goals set for policing and how systems work together 
to achieve their goals. It considers the difficulty of goal-setting in police systems; the 
environments, or “contexts,” in which they do so; and potential solutions to managing goals 
within difficult or conflicted contexts. 
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V. SYSTEM CONTEXT AND GOAL-SETTING 
The research in this chapter demonstrates, in part, that the goals set for police by 
police reform experts do not deliver the promised outcomes. Compounding the problem, 
the complexities of system environments—called system contexts—with which police 
organizations must exist may prevent them from achieving their goals. In systems, goals 
are vital as they steer the system’s focus. A new approach that bifurcates police 
organizations’ “strategic voice” and “tactical agency” may improve the way policing 
interacts with conflicting system contexts. This approach may be a path forward by setting 
the stage for a central goal-setting philosophy rooted in policing’s ideal system state. Clear 
universal goals could improve system performance, not only stabilizing America’s police 
service but allowing it to influence its system and problem spaces in ways unheard of 
previously. 
No matter how one chooses to think about modern reforms and their effectiveness, 
whether in a systems or sociological context, one truth exists. People want better policing 
than they have had in the past. A 2020 Gallup poll reported a vast majority of Americans 
support police reform.261 In the wake of the national and local conversations about 
American policing following the George Floyd incident, Americans recognize a need to 
reevaluate how the United States polices and how it reforms departments.  
A. SEATTLE’S REFORM AGENDA 
The research in this chapter centers on the example of Seattle, Washington, as a 
microcosm for modern reformed policing and the many problems that influence it. Seattle’s 
unique experiences and the unique time and place make it an excellent exemplar for modern 
policing research. The research could easily focus on most major reformed cities in 
America. However, Seattle’s experiences are distinctive, yet the problems created for 
policing there are not exclusive to that city. 
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From a reform perspective, the Seattle Police Department (SPD) is a deluxe model. 
President Obama honored the department as a model reformed police agency in his 2016 
State of the Union Address.262 The SPD entered into a consent decree with the DOJ in 
2012. While the federal court overseeing Seattle’s police reforms declared the department 
in compliance with the consent decree agreement for the first time in 2018, it ordered an 
additional two years of monitoring to study the sustainment of police reforms there.263 
The agency boasts one of the most liberal use-of-force policies in the nation, near 
real-time data transparency, community oversight, and outreach. It has robust crisis 
intervention, homeless support teams, crime prevention, and citizen-concern working 
groups. Seattle’s reforms sought to alter the perception of disparate policing, specifically 
racial profiling, and the use of force. Designed as an answer to disparate policing, 
procedural justice made its public debut as part of President Obama’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing in 2015 but was already a key feature of modern reformed policing.264 
For instance, police legitimacy was a prominent feature of required reforms in Seattle in 
2012. 
The term police legitimacy was first used to describe effective, community-
conscious, and fair policing with the advent of procedural justice.265 Academics, 
sociologists, and police reformers created procedural justice in the early 2000s as an answer 
to the continued failures of policing.266 “Creating” legitimacy meant finding meaningful 
ways of relating to underserved communities, particularly those in impoverished, over-
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policed areas, often communities of color in metropolitan neighborhoods.267 Sociological 
studies, specifically those of Lorraine Mazerolle, Elise Sargent, and others, demonstrated 
that community trust was an inherent quality of people’s attitudes toward and about the 
police. They found that police performance is tied closely to that trust, and the exercise of 
accepting police authority, on the whole, has been collectively termed police legitimacy.268  
Reformers thought that increasing engagement throughout communities while 
improving oversight, accountability, and transparency would improve police performance, 
community interaction, and citizen involvement in the criminal justice process, creating 
trust and, thus, improving police legitimacy.269 The Obama administration focused on a 
police reform platform, popularizing police legitimacy as a law enforcement organizational 
priority.270 In this framing, a law enforcement agency gains full legitimacy by exercising 
effective procedural justice.  
Procedural justice is the name given to policing that resolves the long-standing 
separation between police and the disenfranchised communities historically targeted and 
abused by police.271 In this way of thinking, trust begets legitimacy, but these concepts are 
often used together in this context; there cannot fully be one without the other. Sociologists 
in the field often differ on the distinction between trust and legitimacy as social constructs. 
However, they characterize them as having overlapping properties, necessarily intertwined, 
particularly in the policing context.272 Procedural justice is an interactive process designed 
to partner with communities in different ways to create a theoretically trusting partnership. 
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The effectiveness of the partnership is proportional to the amount of trust the relationship 
creates. 
Legitimacy in this framework acknowledges the inherent, fundamental, legal 
legitimacy of America’s police. Under the law of the land, police have powers of arrest and 
legal authority to enforce the law, and are duty-bound to do so. However, social legitimacy, 
wherein citizens actively consent to be policed and willingly participate in the policing 
process, can only be granted by policed people. Procedural justice focuses almost 
exclusively on the sociological relationship.273  
The City of Seattle has devoted six years and millions of dollars to become the 
model partnership between a police department and a community.274 It even went beyond 
the consent decree guidance by implementing multiple nodes it calls micro-community 
policing plans (MCPPs), essentially mini-neighborhood police precincts, complete with 
mini-taskforces and focus groups. According to systems theory, this effort should improve 
system resiliency, feedback response, and long-term system efficacy.275 Seattle has done 
an excellent job of creating the ability to receive diverse feedback from its system. 
The city works with Seattle University to measure the effectiveness of the MCPPs 
over time, including metrics of citizen sentiment about the police department’s 
performance, police legitimacy, community trust, police capacity, and crime concerns. 
Police legitimacy measurements fell slightly year over year from a high of approximately 
62 percent city-wide, but remained relatively stable every year across the board.276 The 
surveys of Seattle’s citizens from 2015 through 2019 measured a high feeling of police 
legitimacy.277 By all appearances, Seattle has been a model of reformed policing. This 
agency leaned into the task of building trust and legitimacy as an institutional mandate, 
taking every step possible to be successful, and it seemed to be working. Nevertheless, 
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after George Floyd’s death and the nationwide protests that resulted, Seattle, for all its 
progress, found itself not only embattled, like many other police departments across the 
nation, but the center of the national conversation.  
B. INGREDIENTS FOR THE CAPITOL HILL ORGANIZED PROTEST 
The Capitol Hill neighborhood of Seattle, Washington, was reminiscent of a 
post-apocalyptic film set for the next installment of Snake Plissken’s franchise. The police 
fled, abandoning their east district precinct to angry mask-wearing mobs carrying 
proverbial torches. Protesters erected barricades and established borders. The Capital Hill 
Autonomous Zone was born.278 Later renamed the Capitol Hill Organized Protest 
(CHOP), the event by either name was characterized by anarchy, an awakening in the 
media, and self-appointed armed security forces patrolling the streets.279 Stemming from 
the unrest surrounding George Floyd’s death, CHOP was an unprecedented statement 
about the reality of the state of policing in Seattle, Washington, and the United States for 
the better part of a month. If it were not for violence, shootings, and murders around the 
area, it is unclear how long the experiment might have lasted.280 
Given a failure of policing 1,656 miles away from Seattle caused such vehement 
social hemorrhaging, it would be easy to declare the consent decree–driven police reforms 
in Seattle a categorical failure. That label does not tell the story. In Seattle, based on 
sentiment in the Seattle University surveys, the fixes seemed to work. Police legitimacy 
measured high throughout the city, as did social cohesion, a separate metric used to 
determine the cooperative nature of the city’s citizens and their satisfaction.281 In fact, in 
the Capitol Hill neighborhood, both legitimacy and social cohesion measured high every 
year of the survey.  
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The people of Capitol Hill were less worried about the legitimacy of its police 
officers than they were about car burglars and not having enough police officers in their 
neighborhoods every year from 2015 to 2019.282 The year-over-year trends that 
demonstrated success of the hard work of reform seemed to have little effect on the anger 
stirred by the Floyd incident in a city thousands of miles away from where it occurred. That 
may be true in the final analysis, but Seattle’s problems are more complex than failed 
reforms.  
First, social scientists have demonstrated that despite police brutality as a 
touchpoint for many race riots, the government’s overall effectiveness and a national 
silence on social issues contribute to these outcomes more than the effectiveness of 
policing.283 This is important because for complex systems with complex relationships, 
correlation and causation are not always linked. It is also evidence of what this research 
has discovered: policing exists as a system within systems. It is as much a reflection of the 
values of society as it is its own entity. Riots are, in part, an extension of that truth.  
Second, Seattle is a stronghold of liberal politics, and social progressivism 
dominated the local elections in 2019.284 Seattle’s history lends itself to protesting, and 
some suggest that it is part of the community’s identity. Seattle was active in the Occupy 
movement, and the Capitol Hill area is widely known as one of the prominent 
counterculture areas in a city known for its counterculture. Its City Council representative, 
Kshama Sawant, openly supported the CHOP experiment, and Seattle Mayor Jenny 
Durkan celebrated its counterculture reputation to reporters during a press conference amid 
the crisis.285 In a city whose identity is to protest, led by leaders who celebrate the act, in 
a neighborhood that celebrates radicalism, with a history of Occupy-style protests, it seems 
CHOP may have been inevitable at some point, regardless of the cause.  
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Last, police legitimacy is framed by the idea that people are more willing to be 
policed or interact with and rely on the police if they have a sense of trust in the police’s 
ability to be fair and impartial. The idea of trust in this sense is relative. Jackson and Gau 
call it the “subjective probability of value behavior,” based on the individual and collective 
sense of the holder.286 Trust is the product of one party’s meeting another’s subjective 
expectations of behavior, and any value given to that effort depends entirely on the feelings 
of those whose trust is sought.287 The overlapping dimension in the relationship between 
legitimacy, in this sense, and trust is problematic. It essentially forces police to meet 
expectations or satisfy the trustor to retain legitimacy. 
On the one hand, police have a duty to protect lives and property while maintaining 
law and order—and most agree with this premise. On the other hand, when satisfaction 
about how, when, where, and why that happens bears so much weight in the conduct of 
policing, the juxtaposition is unmistakable. The police’s performance in their duties does 
not factor fairly into how they are perceived. Legitimacy in this frame does not speak to 
police performance but to how people think about the police.288 Therein lies the problem 
with pursuing legitimacy as a goal. The act and idea of policing are often at odds with the 
sentiment about policing. It is possible for appropriate police actions to be unpopular or 
perceived negatively by some, or even many people. 
There is another problem with the outgrowth of sentiment-based legitimacy in 
Seattle, particularly in its multiple systems. Modern reforms and their outgrowths may 
erode institutional legitimacy. CHOP does not represent all of Seattle’s citizens; it is a 
small community representing four blocks of the city, a fraction of the city’s nearly 750,000 
people, not its whole.289 The CHOP incident and its desertion by police are unlikely to 
positively affect sentiment about the policing institution’s reliability in Seattle, 
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Washington, when crisis strikes. Research suggests that the reform-based pursuit of 
legitimacy is doomed from the start. 
Worden and McLean predicted much of what has come to pass in cities like Seattle 
in their book Mirage of Police Reform. They conducted a study of six cities using the 
procedural justice model and concluded that police legitimacy through procedural justice 
is mostly a fallacy.290 Their study demonstrates that this mirage of police reform is simply 
a repackaging of community-policing ideas that have had little effect on policing’s 
legitimacy in communities where the police are already perceived as corrupt. They argue 
that people develop sentiments about police at a young age, so trust-building mechanisms 
have little effect—because social relationships and personal experiences have already 
reinforced their distrust of the police. Worden and McLean’s findings demonstrate 
contextual relationships that seemingly render futile the pursuit of sentiment-based 
legitimacy. Simply stated, procedural justice–created legitimacy is the wrong goal for 
policing to pursue for its system, in either the micro or macro context.291 This does not 
mean legitimacy is an invalid aim altogether, but as the primary focus driving police 
operations at the administrative level, it can cause problems. 
C. THE CONTEXT OF PROBLEMS AND THE PROBLEM WITH 
CONTEXT 
The sociological and political conditions that contributed to the nation’s most 
unique George Floyd protest are specific to Seattle. These conditions contribute to the 
system’s context, the environment in which the system operates. It is the space in which 
unique overlapping system relationships create unique system responses. Context matters 
to all systems, but it creates special challenges like politics, reputation, socioeconomic 
history, expectations, and emotional responses in human systems. All of these create 
contextual nuances in which a system must operate. Portland, Oregon, with social and 
political conditions similar to Seattle, Washington, struggled in the aftermath of the Floyd 
protests. However, the nuanced contexts of Portland’s issues, no matter how damaging, are 
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not those of Seattle, nor are they those of Albuquerque, New Mexico, another city where 
Floyd-related protests went on for months. They are microsystem contexts whereas 
generalized sociological discord as a touchstone of rioting is a macrosystem context, 
meaning it is not geographically or locally bounded. It is near universal in all human 
systems in the United States.  
As discussed in Chapter III, America’s police organizations are human systems. As 
human systems, they too have different environments that affect the performances of their 
systems. Broadly, in a macrosystem context, policing is both a political and institutional 
construct. Granularly, police organizations exist in individual states, counties, cities, 
jurisdictions, and precincts. These are its microsystems. They are communities, vacuums 
of history, sociology, geography, race, and economic vectors, each unlike the next. Like in 
Seattle, they interact with many other systems with their contexts and create unique 
policing environments. Some issues exist persistently in the macrosystem of generalized 
policing, such as police brutality, racial profiling, and corruption. For such issues as 
systemic racism or poverty in the overall macrosystem of American experience, they exist 
more like ideas than they do reality. However, in microsystems, where corruption and 
poverty are authentic, tangible environments in which people live and work, they are 
palpable realities. Figure 3 depicts the contextual relationships of policing as they exist 
inside one another, all of them nested within the overarching institution of society. 
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Figure 3. Contextual Relationships of Policing 
It is essential to understand the dichotomy between the relationships in 
microsystems and macrosystems because each microsystem can meaningfully affect the 
others. However, thinking of them in terms of size and leverage helps to explain, albeit not 
entirely, the subtleties of the space between them and how volatile it might be.292 It makes 
minute yet potentially explosive events—such as George Floyd’s death, broadcast on every 
screen in America for weeks on end—impossible to reconcile in the microsystems of 
American police departments like Seattle, where reforms are featured prominently. 
However, they are held to account because all police systems exist together in the 
macrosystem. The opposite, of course, is true as well. Microsystem events can alter the 
macrosystem. In the aftermath of the Floyd incident, police agencies across the United 
States banned chokeholds, not because the tactics used in Minneapolis featured a 
chokehold but because in the macrosystem, which includes the politics and sentiments 
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about policing, “banning chokeholds became part of the effort to reassure stressed 
communities.”293 
Understanding the dichotomy of context helps reconcile how, in 2017, public 
satisfaction with the police in the United States, as captured by a Gallup poll, was at 57 
percent. Its lowest was at 52 percent in 2015. The poll seems to demonstrate that the 
majority of Americans were satisfied with the police.294 A separate survey conducted by 
the American Civil Liberties Union found that 91 percent of Americans in 2017, the same 
year as the Gallup poll, believed policing in America required significant reforms.295 
Somehow, in the national conversation about policing, there coexists police satisfaction 
and an overwhelming need to reform. 
In these coexisting environments that comprise policing in America, the idea that 
people could agree about how to—or even the functional ability to—obtain trust and 
legitimacy, particularly as a relative sentiment-based idea, is difficult to conceive. 
Complexity promises that in every complex system, accidents, or normal accidents, and 
anomalies occur.296 A coexisting microsystem–macrosystem legitimacy that depends on 
trust in a complex system that will eventually, and certainly, prove its unpredictability will 
continue to fail both systems, as it has in the past. Thus, neither system can acquire 
legitimacy entirely or independently. The entire understanding of what makes meaningful 
police legitimacy is built exclusively on a relativist sociological frame that does not account 
for the systemic dichotomy in application contexts. As addressed previously in the Worden 
and McLean study, even sociologists disagree on the merits of trying to create police 
legitimacy in America.297  
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Moreover, there appears to be another flaw, or indeed a warning, in the frame of 
police legitimacy found in Seattle’s sociological application. While acknowledging the 
legal legitimacy inherent in policing, the concept fails to acknowledge the institution’s need 
to retain its foundational legitimacy throughout. When police flee their responsibilities for 
whatever reason and leave order discarded, by definition, there can be no institutional 
legitimacy, regardless of the sentiments about it.298 In that time and place, the police cease 
to exist for all intents and purposes. An exciting topic of research for future consideration, 
beyond the scope of this thesis, might be to study the potential for erosion of institutional 
legitimacy in the procedural justice movement. 
D. SEATTLE AS A CAUTIONARY TALE 
The SPD’s struggle with modern reforms, framed by a national conversation about 
policing in crisis, through the lens of its own local and political microsystem environment, 
demonstrates how conflicted contexts can cause problems not only in reforming police 
departments or setting their goals but also in affirming their existence. The SPD’s consent 
decree monitor, Merrick Bobb, the chosen observer and manager of the mandated police 
reform process, quit in the aftermath of the protests. In his resignation letter, Bobb said, 
“The SPD is at its nadir.”299 Using the word nadir, meaning “lowest point,” was the 
essence of Bobb’s criticism. He reported that the SPD needed better leadership and 
criticized the tactics of the department and resistance from police unions in undermining 
the reform process. Bobb felt the City Council’s meddling and pledge to defund the SPD 
by 50 percent were overreaching and unnecessary.300 
Countering Bobb’s criticisms, retired Seattle Mayor Mike McGinn argued, “If it’s 
a nadir like said Merrick Bobb, he’s the one who built the luge run to it.”301 McGinn 
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argued that during the protests, the department’s officers had been following escalation and 
use-of-force policies that had been overseen by Bobb. He argued that Bobb was the only 
consistent force of leadership in the department in the eight years he oversaw the consent 
decree. All of the department’s failures in that time were as much Bobb’s as anyone’s. 
McGinn said, “Since he was appointed, we have had five different mayors, the City 
Council’s nine members have completely turned over, and there have been seven police 
chiefs. And police reform is not succeeding.”302  
In the aftermath of CHOP, Seattle slashed its police department’s budget by 20 
percent, a fraction of the originally proposed 50 percent.303Regardless, Seattle’s city 
leadership cut command staff salaries in June 2020, prompting the resignation of its chief, 
Carmen Best, one of only seven black female police chiefs in America’s 100 largest 
cities.304 The department has been losing officers at historical rates as well. Meanwhile, 
its new consent decree monitor, Dr. Antonio Oftelie, a Harvard academic, praised the 
department as one of the country’s most progressive but promised to focus on more 
progressive reforms focusing on accountability, transparency, and oversight.305  
Seattle’s government’s goals are not aligned with those of its citizens or with its 
consent decree. As stated previously, the citizens, surveyed every year for the past five 
years, provided feedback on what they cared about when it came to policing. Every year 
of the survey, the top two concerns of Seattle’s people were “car prowls” and a “lack of 
police capacity.”306 In a city where mandated reforms have focused on procedural justice 
agendas and sentiment-based legitimacy, the political framing of its goals all but guarantees 
that its citizens’ concerns will not be addressed and sentiments about police will further 
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erode. It may already be evident. Satisfaction in Seattle’s police has fallen from 62.9 
percent in 2016 to 54.4 percent in 2019.307  
E. SETTING THE WRONG GOAL 
Donella Meadows identified a series of system archetypes she calls system traps 
that can prevent optimal operation.308 She would likely argue, based on the Seattle 
example, that modern reformed policing’s attempts to “create” legitimacy or achieve 
incongruent politically motivated goals, as in Seattle, fit the system archetype of “seeking 
the wrong goal.”309 Meadows argues that setting the correct goals is vital because goal-
setting is the most powerful way to influence a system.310 The pursuit of the wrong goal 
will assure results congruent with that wrong goal—creating wrong, incomplete, or 
undesirable results. System managers often confuse the effort of reaching wrong-headed 
goals with ideal resultant outputs. As a result, systems break down because of strict 
adherence to rules or processes that lead them to their goals.311 In many ways, Seattle 
exemplifies this idea. Reforms that pressure the systems to achieve their goals of creating 
legitimacy and counterproductive political agendas combine to confound policing’s actual 
act, creating a crisis of institutional legitimacy in the process. These conflicting goals create 
an environment where the focus on process surpasses the desired end state: fair but 
effective policing with conflicted contextual influences. It is arguable that the focus on 
trust-building and legitimacy obscures the desired output and fails to create either in the 
process. Senge warns of precisely this problem in the Fifth Discipline, arguing that this 
phenomenon creates limits to the system’s ability to grow and limits its operators’ ability 
to adjust it. In other words, a self-limiting system cannot learn about itself.312 
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Despite the problems that system traps create, Meadows is enthusiastic about their 
discovery. She argues that the discovery of a system trap represents not only the recognition 
of a failure of performance but an opportunity for system improvement. She suggests there 
is power in understanding a system’s manipulability and recognizing archetypes, and 
applying systems thinking is a powerful tool for changing a system’s course.313 The most 
vital aspect of systemic influence is understanding a system’s ideal state and the actions 
needed to achieve it. This process infers a desired objective understanding of both the ideal 
and current state as well as the desire and ability to change the system.314 Senge, too, 
argues that system archetypes are bilateral mechanisms. In other words, they demonstrate 
how systems can fail and how leveraging the correct mechanisms can correct and improve 
them.315  
F. A WAY FORWARD 
David Bayley, Michael Davis, and Ronald Davis argue for a dichotomous 
relationship between strategic goals of policing and technical applications in a 2015 paper 
for the Harvard Kennedy School in partnership with the National Institute of Justice.316 
They argue that policing needs to learn to divest itself from sociological problems while 
learning to function within society, performing intentionally and equitably for all 
concerned.  
Bayley, Davis, and Davis essentially acknowledge policing’s existence in multiple 
systems and divide it into macro and microsystem contexts. They advocate police having 
a “strategic voice” about policing and on behalf of the disenfranchised while maintaining 
“tactical agency,” that is, inherent institutional legitimacy. For police to make a relevant 
difference in a series of complex systems and contexts, they must discover how to engage 
meaningfully within their role in the daily reality of policing while also divesting from 
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problems that they cannot solve. Institutional racism, systemic poverty, and social inequity 
are not problems America’s police are equipped to solve. However, they should be 
prepared to address them openly within the discourse of American society.317  
The combined strategic voice and tactical agency approach extolls the virtues of 
idealized ethical policing. As the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics’ first stanza reads,  
As a law enforcement officer, my fundamental duty is to serve the 
community; to safeguard lives and property; to protect the innocent against 
deception, the weak against oppression or intimidation and the peaceful 
against violence or disorder; and to respect the constitutional rights of all to 
liberty, equality, and justice.318  
Adopting this approach may help police organizations navigate the contextual and system 
dichotomies that create conflicting goals and limit their effectiveness. There may be a 
significant power in building a new way of thinking about the role of American policing 
as a virtuous ideal bounded to all its systems in the macro and microsystem contexts 
regardless of context or system space. Doing so could have a focusing effect on both the 
macro and microsystems that make up policing in America. 
Notably, perhaps most importantly, a philosophical macrosystem goal that guides 
policing’s role in its strategic voice and tactical agency in the macrosystem of American 
policing translates as a practice to the microsystem context—the act of policing, as well. 
This is important because it gives police organizations the power and duty to use their 
voices to combat the noise of dynamic and unique context, whatever the source, while 
matching their agencies to citizens’ needs. A virtue-ethics national policing ideal that is 
simple for the public and police to understand, equitable for all, defensible in all contexts, 
and applicable in all police systems creates a unified philosophical exemplar against which 
to measure all police performance, leadership, and political priorities. The goal frames the 
ideal state and allows the macrosystem and microsystems to function in context to achieve 
the same goal. From a systems perspective, systems with clear goals, a known ideal system 
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state, relevant feedback, and competent practitioners who understand both the goals and 
the system are highly functioning systems.  
Consider whether, under the macro idea of policing, the United States defined the 
ideal state of policing as something like the following: Any innocent person can expect to 
be able to live and work in their community regardless of age vulnerably, race, orientation, 
or social or economic status and feel safe from crime and persecution.319 A fixed, 
concerted ethical ideal might begin to create the framework against which to measure 
America’s police against an unbiased, neutral, consistent, legal, and ethical standard in both 
the macro and microsystems it occupies. One could argue that all policing that meets the 
standard would be as legitimate as the standard to which it is held, thereby achieving 
legitimacy. Instead of a sentiment-based legitimacy, subject to a high degree of volatility, 
where failure is all but guaranteed, a new way of thinking might clear the path to reframe 
the way people think about what constitutes police legitimacy.320 Full or absolute 
legitimacy—which encompasses the legal authority granted to policing, the institution’s 
reliability to perform its essential functions, and the trust to do so equitably, effectively, 
and consistently—is possible when the standards by which policing gets judged become 
fixed for all police agencies. 
Rather than an effort to create legitimacy by gaining trust, this framing allows 
legitimacy to grow organically, over time. Full legitimacy takes shape, framed in the 
macrosystem ideal, translated by reality, into police officers’ day-to-day practices within 
their contextual microsystem environments. Each experience would be potentially as 
unique in its discovery as the next. In this way, legitimacy is an emergent property of 
optimally functioning microsystem environments.321  
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While, at first, this proposition seems to be a departure from the concept of 
procedural justice and police legitimacy, it is not. It combines liberty and the uniqueness 
of policing environments by creating a social precept about policing and an absolute 
standard to which America’s police, without exception, are to be held. It asserts the need 
for the police’s virtue to transcend inequality by treating all people the same within that 
framework. This concept gives America’s police a voice and a responsibility in helping to 
right society’s wrongs. It does not deny the history policing has in creating or perpetuating 
some of them. Instead, it acknowledges the role policing can play in addressing them and 
a different kind of ownership over its system and problem spaces. It creates a moral identity 
for policing to adhere to and be accountable for its benefit and societal expectations  
about policing.  
G. CONCLUSION 
Changing the goal to this fixed standard of policing could begin to shift Americans’ 
thinking about policing, including changes in its scope and mission. In the wake of the 
Floyd incident, America’s conversation about police focused on how to make policing 
better, how to re-think its applications in our society.322 Adopting goals that exemplify the 
ideal state’s virtues creates a template against which to weigh police responsibilities, 
strategies, and tactics. Legislation regulating policing, policing executive management, 
policies, and procedures should begin to reflect the ideal.  
Setting a standard for policing to follow allows it to use its strategic voice to better 
manage the contextual encroachments that cause it problems. It also provides the 
opportunity to partner with those who align with that view, for whatever reason, to 
challenge the sociological and political problems that inhibit the system’s ability to be 
equitable and effective. Whether it includes some unbundling of police services or even 
defunding, society may need new solutions and new non-policing systems to manage them, 
and America’s police could be the leaders in those tough conversations. The application of 
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this virtuous policing philosophy also means police will have to learn to evaluate how or 
whether to enforce laws and statutes that do not fall within the ideal framework. Police will 
have to learn how to use their voices to socially and publicly support those whose civil 
rights within that ideal are threatened.  
In some ways, policing could become the apolitical and ethical center of the United 
States by operating exclusively within their institutional mandate and bolstering their 
stockpiled legitimacy in doing so. Police possess the ability to enforce with discretion the 
spirit of the law rather than the letter of it in nearly all statutory constructs. The purpose of 
this power could be to inform upon and affect sociological change by using it judiciously, 
constantly comparing itself and its actions against the desired state to affect meaningful 
policing outcomes. This change in thinking allows the system to become reflexive, giving 
it the power to adjust the micro and macrosystems based on society’s subtly changing 
ideals of virtue.323  
Detractors from this shift in framing the system’s desired output and goals might 
argue that a shift away from attaining trust and legitimacy with segments of society, 
particularly poor communities and communities of color, is a divestment of purpose. They 
might argue that there is no special provision in this way of thinking about the system’s 
goals that accounts for the discrepancy in how it addresses race and related issues. That is 
true. Instead, in this way of thinking, the system’s goal accounts for everyone, regardless 
of how society finds them divided.  
As systems, police organizations, much like Seattle, will always struggle to perform 
optimally until, from systems framing, they understand the many contexts with which they 
contend. Policing needs to find better ways to relate to people at the outer reaches of 
idealized policing. Policing as a system’s ability to meaningfully couple with communities 
of color within cities, neighborhoods, sects, and tribes was always and remains a struggle. 
Reframing the system’s goals around an absolute ideal creates a moral center for America’s 
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police as both macro and microsystems. Police can begin to understand how to better 
couple with society as a system and improve its interactions.  
Enthusiastically, Meadows explains how systems are poised to pivot and describes 
a new goal’s power. She argues that these changes occur at leverage points that seem 
counterintuitive and that new system goals in established systems have the power to enact 
dramatic change in system performance.324 The current age appears to be such an 
opportunity. 
The next chapter considers coupling and its importance to policing. It evaluates 
how police systems obtain feedback and why feedback is imperative to long-term 
resiliency. Finally, it discusses a possible way forward for police systems to perpetuate 
strong, reliable, and meaningful feedback to improve the resiliency of America’s police. 
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VI. SEEKING FEEDBACK AND FINDING RESILIENCE 
In most meaningful ways, policing fails to create harmonious relationships with 
many of the people it serves. It is a well-cataloged historical failure of policing as well and 
one that many reforms attempt to address. Failing to connect with people in real concrete 
and continuous ways compromises police systems’ resiliency, particularly the resiliency of 
relationships between the police and people. The lack of consistent, reliable, and relevant 
feedback from external sources may share some responsibility for the historical failures of 
policing in the United States.325  
Better coupling with systems of people, such as communities and social groups, to 
assimilate them as part of the law enforcement process can transform the behavior of 
policing as a complex system and the systems with which it interacts. Improved system 
coupling creates broad pathways to improve feedback. Even better, more reliable feedback 
builds relationships, trust, and, most important, shared responsibility, which lead to a social 
resiliency traditional reforms fail to deliver. To put it simply, connecting with people in 
meaningful, lasting dialogue and creating partnerships with communication pathways 
outside the police organization’s internal systems may help police organizations better 
understand how to serve people and help society better understand its police. Quality, 
lasting relationships between people and their police may lead to less volatility in policing 
outcomes. 
This chapter reviews, in part, how policing struggles to engage with people. It 
demonstrates why, from a systems perspective, coupling with other systems and feedback 
is imperative for future success. Finally, it suggests potential solutions to improve coupling, 
expanding systems’ boundaries and system feedback, ultimately improving the resiliency 
of the relationships between police organizations and the people they serve. 
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A. WHY COUPLING IS TOUGH 
Coupling is the idea of connecting two things. In systems, coupling has two 
meanings. As in plumbing, the first connects various system parts, like pipes, to improve 
or expand the system.326 The more coupled parts there are, particularly if there are 
interdependent connections, the more complexity exists. The dual-system meaning of 
coupling connects multiple systems, like a house’s plumbing connecting to a city water 
system. Space where the systems connect is called a boundary. In the plumbing example, 
a boundary might be the space between a water main and a home. Complexity is greatest 
where boundaries meet.327  
The complexity that occurs at the system boundaries is one of three reasons policing 
struggles to relate to people. The second reason is that the inherent act of policing betrays 
people’s expectations and makes trust a problematic proposition. The last reason police 
struggle to connect to people is bounded rationality, limiting how police systems see the 
world and make decisions about themselves. Each of these reasons has some overlapping 
effect on the others, which is the nature of complexity. 
B. THE TRUST GAP  
As explained in Chapter V, police departments are subject to many environmental 
influences that affect how they perform. The same is true in the concept of coupling. Police 
organizations couple to the area or region they police generally, meaning in a geographical 
sense, they are responsible for a jurisdiction. Within that jurisdiction, there are different 
communities, neighborhoods, regions, sects, cultural centers, and ethnicities. For instance, 
New York City comprises five boroughs, 59 distinct community districts, and hundreds of 
different neighborhoods.328 Some estimate there are over 800 different languages spoken 
in New York.329 Coupling between New York’s police and its citizens occurs in each of 
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these different environments by virtue of the systems interacting on some level every day. 
Each community, neighborhood, sect, or ethnicity exists in its own context with its own 
history and expectations of how policing does and should perform.  
Social scientists commonly account for the way people and the police relate to one 
another through the procedural justice doctrine, which frames these relationships in the 
concept of trust. While there is no academic agreement on the meaning of the word trust, 
the most consistently used definitions capture the idea that one can expect a specific 
outcome when something happens. The actual outcome largely confirms that 
expectation.330 When people do not deliver on expectations, the distance between 
expectation and outcome is a “trust gap.” Over time, the failure to meet expectations 
increases that gap.  
For a police organization, trust gaps are more complex because effective policing 
is a subjective measurement to different stakeholders, and the objective role of police in 
society is poorly defined in the modern context. Interestingly, attitudes about police 
performance, particularly in communities generally distrusting of police, are less tied to 
crime-fighting performance than the perception of satisfaction in the police. Additionally, 
research shows the “global attitudes” of urban, mostly black and Hispanic survey 
respondents remain less trusting of police than of white respondents of all categories, 
despite reform efforts. The research similarly ties those respondents to more negative 
feelings about government in general and to more involuntary police contacts. Last, 
historical over-policing, racial profiling, and inconsistent (or perceived) unfair policing 
tactics amplify reactions and negative expectations with black respondents.331  
Jill Leovy’s book Ghettoside demonstrates how historically lousy race relations in 
inner-city Los Angeles set the stage for the existing culture of distrust in Los Angeles’ 
police departments that has remained for generations. This affects the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s ability to solve murders due to citizens’ inherent mistrust of the police in 
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those communities.332 Leovy’s example exemplifies the research that modern police 
performance remains hampered by global attitudes about the police in communities where 
trust gaps exist. 
C. BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
Boundaries are constructs people create to understand systems better. Boundaries 
help define the different system spaces and create understandable bite-size systems, a way 
of grasping complexity.333 System boundaries are mainly about perspective because they 
help people understand the parts of systems and how they begin to fit together, but with a 
limited perspective, they can also confuse problem-solving in systems. For example, 
thinking about failures or undesirable outcomes in complex adaptive systems by 
considering only some of the available information can become problematic.334 Senge 
likens this problem to three blind men grabbing different parts of an elephant and each 
declaring to understand the elephant fully, thus demonstrating how understanding parts of 
a system can provide some but never all of the information needed to understand the system 
as a whole.335 
Bounded rationality, in a sense, limits systems to their environments. The system’s 
function ties directly to its feedback, but system operators make decisions about the system 
from a limited portion of the potential feedback when bounded rationality is present. It 
does not have access to or ignores some available, often veiled, distant, or unmeasured 
information about the system. Often disastrous consequences occur when decisions about 
the system consider only limited data or fail to acknowledge that all systems suffer from 
imperfect information.336 In Senge’s elephant metaphor, imagine the blind elephant 
handlers’ deciding to feed the creature on the information provided solely by the back 
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third’s handler. Good-faith and relatively rational decisions made without all available 
information do not achieve the desired results. Even in the best-case scenario, as 
complications go, they result in a rather irate and still hungry elephant. 
The police reform industry’s implementing expensive reform programs under 
federal consent decrees without measuring their outcomes effectively or consistently is an 
example of bounded rationality with costly outcomes.337 The situation in Seattle, 
Washington, described in Chapter V, is a notable example of bounded rationality with real 
consequences. Decision-makers and reformers often treat law enforcement as a closed 
system because they desire to keep it highly reliable.338 It interacts with other systems, but 
it is independent of them, and decisions made about its performance are measured 
internally. By measuring internal processes about external outputs, law enforcement has 
been blindly making decisions about its systems’ effectiveness without accounting for 
output, consumers, or all available feedback for at least the better part of 40 years.339 
Bounded rationality can cause many problems, including alienating external 
feedback mechanisms, such as communities, social groups, and individual people. Many 
policing failures result from failing to understand the external environments, read feedback 
correctly, or adjust to it accordingly. Theodore Roosevelt’s tenure as police commissioner 
of New York City is an excellent example of how bounded rationality creates problems 
between the police and the policed people. 
Theodore Roosevelt was instated on the New York City Police Commission by 
Mayor William Strong in 1895 in response to widespread corruption and embraced by the 
press as an “able reformer.”340 Roosevelt’s politics were “socially progressive,” and in the 
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same spirit he did with police corruption, Roosevelt attacked moral corruption.341 He 
aggressively enforced morality statutes, those that closed brothels, gambling halls, and 
drinking houses. The working class and poor who were some of Roosevelt’s ardent 
supporters in implementing police professionalization reforms found themselves 
disproportionately targeted by the police and disenchanted with progressive reform.342 
Roosevelt’s popularity among the poor and immigrants, whose livelihood and social 
relationships his social programs most affected, fell dramatically. Ultimately, the 
unpopularity of Roosevelt’s desire to stamp out “vice” crimes was his political undoing in 
New York City, and his rivals, supported by the promise to end the unwanted programs, 
ousted him.343  
Roosevelt’s enforcement of “morality statutes” and the results foreshadowed the 
next 120 years of policing. Notably, it may be the first instance of organized policing 
disproportionately targeting its poor, ethnic citizens. It certainly exemplifies the problem 
with the idea that politically or legislatively motivated ideations to dictate how 
communities get policed without regard for its effects on those communities. Invariably, 
legislative zero-tolerance law enforcement practices affect the poor and minorities more 
than the social elite.344  
The Roosevelt NYPD was a demonstration of how bounded rationality by or about 
policing in the modern era can often be at odds while serving the duty of its offices with 
communities. It demonstrates a social system tension between the desires of “social order” 
and the stark realities enforcement creates in communities. Drug crime, gang crime, 
violence, and property crime occur most frequently in poor communities.345 The more 
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efficient policing is at enforcing the law, the more it affects those communities and their 
people. There is conflict in the space between the mandate of its office and the damage that 
mandate can cause. Most important, the decision-making processes that drive law 
enforcement from within police organizations and without do not account for available 
feedback about the system’s performance. As a result of this bounded rationality, the trust 
gap that creates difficulty for police in coupling with communities is as much a societal 
problem as it is a policing problem. 
Recent history is fraught with examples of technical law violations and horrible 
outcomes for police and people of color, thus widening the trust gap. The names are known 
in every American household: Eric Garner, Michael Brown, George Floyd, and Sandra 
Bland, to name a few. Each of these people was a black American. All are dead at the hands 
of police, except for Sandra Bland, who committed suicide after her arrest. All were 
unarmed and died while resisting arrest, except Bland. Each of them committed a technical 
violation of the law at the time of his or her arrest. Each of them refused to cooperate with 
the police—and in the case of Brown, violently, by any definition, resisted arrest. The 
police officers were doing their jobs and making sense of their training and the legal 
mandate dictating their professional responsibilities, and in most cases, they were sworn 
by oath to uphold the law of the land. In each case, their duty involved engaging suspects 
based on a technical violation of the law that did not directly affect the life, liberty, or safety 
of any other person who precipitated the incident.346 
In Bland’s case, the officer issued a citation for violating a traffic law, a violation 
the officer had caused. It was not safety related in the real sense of the word.347 Officers 
attempted to arrest Garner for illegally selling individual cigarettes, as New York State 
taxes cigarettes, and the laws on individual cigarette sales prevent paying that tax on a 
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per-cigarette basis.348 Brown and his friends were walking in the street, albeit after 
allegedly shoplifting from a nearby store, an act the officer was unaware of at the time.349 
Floyd passed suspected counterfeit currency for cigarettes at his local convenience store 
while under the influence of illegal drugs.350 Each of these crimes was minor. They were 
statutory violations of laws designed to protect ideas, commercial profit, regulatory 
revenue, and tax income. They were hardly worth the exchange of life for the debt owed 
to society. 
The national conversation about police reform does not consider the federal, state, 
and local government’s responsibility in these incidents. The enforcement of any criminal 
law includes death as a potential outcome in any arrest situation. The discussion about the 
cost of life versus the benefit of enforcing the law, however trivial, is non-existent. A trivial 
law, a suspect who refuses arrest, and police officers duty-bound to execute the office of 
their oath can be a deadly and regrettable combination. However, in the modern reform 
context, police are exclusively responsible for engaging with communities despite the 
multiplicity of actors and systems at play. There is no shared responsibility in repairing 
these relationships. Society and its police need to find a way to receive, share, and read 
feedback more meaningfully. 
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF FEEDBACK 
The relationships between coupling, its difficulties, and bounded rationality are 
essential because system boundaries, coupling, and feedback depend on one another. The 
power of systems thinking is in feedback. Everything in the system should improve the 
way it reads, thinks about, or augments current feedback. Similarly, everything within the 
system and its agents and clients is a form of feedback.351 Where feedback is unclear, non-
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existent, or challenging to receive, the system’s status is unknown. That is the essence of 
bounded rationality. The way to end or limit the effects of bounded rationality is to improve 
feedback.  
The more feedback a system receives that it can make sense of, the more likely the 
system will be immune to failure—as it is more responsive to incidental, accidental, and 
intentional inputs over time. By broadly programming layers of internal and external 
feedback mechanisms, both balancing and reinforcing, with multiple interconnecting 
pathways and frequency response, the system becomes more resilient. Not only does the 
system become more clearly focused on its performance, but it can become more attuned 
to its system space and the internal and external problems that affect it.  
Feedback mechanisms can be thought of as “sensors” providing information that 
allows the system to adapt and maneuver more quickly within its problem space to create 
customizable and impermanent outputs to the system space’s varied and non-linear 
problems. Think about the evolution of the automobile, for example. Cars before the late 
1990s were virtually mechanical machines, complex systems within systems designed to 
move people and things from one place to another. As car sensors became more advanced 
in their ability to receive feedback and different types of sensors were introduced to 
vehicles, their ability to know more about themselves improved. The ability to inform 
operators about their system space improves their reliability in doing what they are 
supposed to do. Also, they inform operators about faulty performance, the status of 
everything under the sensor, and potential problems. Most recently, vehicle developers 
have introduced more complex external sensors that provide real-time, active monitoring 
of the vehicle’s external environment as it is in motion to inform the driver about potential 
threats and needed adjustments. All of this monitoring, sensing, and informing makes the 
driving experience better, more reliable, and consistent with the expectations of driving—
ultimately, to arrive somewhere.352  
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The same evolution is the ideal future scenario for policing. As much as reform 
applications have focused on improving internal feedback sensors, much of what is 
discussed in Chapter III of this thesis falls into this category. Reform has struggled to 
improve external sensors at the same rate. The system’s ability to know and react to things 
outside the system in adapting, changing, or adeptly maneuvering is slow, inconsistent, and 
constrained by the system’s self-established boundaries. Figure 4 is a visual model that 
demonstrates the ideal flow of external feedback into and out of a police organization and 
the pathways along which it can and should travel into the areas where liability often occurs 
and where policing as a practice is created, codified, trained, supervised, and executed. In 
this visual model, all feedback travels into and out of the organization through monitoring 
and processing mechanisms. The framework in Chapter III would serve well in this 
capacity. 
 
Figure 4. Policing in Practice 
Theorists argue that in complex systems, broad, open, and interchangeable 
boundaries are essential to growth, agent interaction, and agency information, particularly 
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in dynamic systems.353 By incorporating multiple system pathways internally and 
externally, broadening the system’s scope or boundary as a holistic mechanism, law 
enforcement can begin to innovate about the problems it faces, along with those faced by 
its communities. Doing so might make the necessary system adjustments to successfully 
achieve Samuel Walker’s aim of achieving “legitimacy in the community’s eyes.”354 
Research in the medical field and military has shown that “social institutions, as 
emergent structures created by the interaction of complex human agents, are successful 
because they shift complexity and therefore uncertainty to different scales.”355 This means 
that by opening the system boundaries to partner with multiple societal layers, not only will 
internal and external feedback be more easily accessible, but it can help the system achieve 
more efficient and emergent operation, along with a marked improvement in resiliency.  
Stockton, California, in seeking to reduce its violent crime rate, implemented 
partnerships between its city government, police department, social services organizations, 
and community leaders to create an officer of violence prevention (OVP). Staffed by 
“peacekeepers,” social workers, gang advocates, and community leaders, the OVP 
combines community resources and social systems to interact with those likely to be 
involved in violent crime in the preventative frame. They also respond to areas where 
homicides occur in real time, and police resources interact with communities in responding 
to gang or violent crime, attempting to prevent retributive gang violence by engaging the 
communities in those volatile moments they are most vulnerable. The OVP’s success is 
undeniable, seeing a reduction of 40 percent in homicides and 34 percent in non-fatal 
shootings in Stockton in 2018 and a similar decrease in 2017.356 In shifting complexity by 
opening the boundaries of multiple systems to create this effective partnership, Stockton 
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received feedback that enabled all stakeholders to partner in better managing, at least for a 
time, a severe societal problem.  
Understanding the concepts of open boundaries and feedback response is not 
enough to pinpoint where policing fails in these areas. As Meadows contends in discussing 
archetypal system failures, achieving system resiliency is only possible by implementing 
reliable and robust feedback mechanisms.357 The reliability of the feedback is paramount; 
so, too, is its efficacy. Rather than merely acknowledging the need to engage the 
communities they serve, police systems must consider feedback mission-critical to future 
success, particularly in achieving a sense of resiliency. 
E. INTELLIGENT RESILIENCE 
Resilience is an organization’s ability to recover from or limit the damage of 
accidents, failures, and mistakes. Research in organizational resilience finds several 
essential characteristics of a resilient organization. Summarized, there are three features 
important to policing. First, seemingly obvious is that the organization can comprehend 
changing circumstances and adapt to them quickly. Second, resilient organizations have 
strong communication lines both within the organization and with its clients or partners. 
Third, resilient organizations have a proactive posture in understanding and mitigating 
potential risks.358  
Resilient organizations are adaptive, communicative, and proactive. In this sense, 
resilient organizations should think about feedback as a type of intelligence. There is an 
aspect of proactive, programmatic information-gathering akin to traditional intelligence-
gathering in seeking feedback. Rather than the traditional application in law enforcement 
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for crime fighting, analysis, and prevention purposes, including the concept of intelligence-
led policing, this model represents an intelligence-like mechanism designed to inform 
organizational performance.359 By definition, intelligence as a process is “an organized 
method of gathering and analyzing information, then disseminating it to the entities 
concerned. It also provides the opportunity to forecast changes, positive and negative, in 
time to do something about them.”360 Feedback-focused “intelligence” is effectively 
opportunity-analysis that develops into “actors, not reactors,” in emergent trends, patterns, 
and events.361 Feedback, through the filter of systemic goals and their inherent purpose, 
informs system adjustments, behavioral changes, strategic maneuvering, and any number 
of different actions designed to align purpose with performance. Like intelligence-
gathering, engaging proactively with feedback gives a system the ability to prepare for 
future operations, strategize on defenses, and mitigate potential threats. 
F. A WAY FORWARD 
Systems theory states that boundaries define systems but that boundaries are only 
definable based on the problem space, not the system space.362 To this end, as Figure 4 
demonstrates, law enforcement can begin to think about how to meaningfully open its 
boundaries and incorporate multiple, new, reliable, redundant, or overlapping external 
feedback mechanisms to improve the way it relates to communities, especially traditionally 
marginalized communities. To receive the kind of feedback it is missing to achieve 
resiliency, policing must begin to think about where to look for it. The answer almost 
certainly does not lie inside its internal systems, not in this case. It must engage the entire 
problem space rather than just those elements it creates or exacerbates. Resiliency requires 
that police organizations proactively pursue mutually beneficial balancing and reinforcing 
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feedback loops within the communities they police.363 To become resilient, they must 
pursue more consistent, relevant, and reliable feedback processes that engage everyone 
with responsibility in the systems.  
There is almost an infinite number of potential applications for seeking feedback 
from external sources. Three reviewed here acknowledge the broader-spectrum social 
systems that interact with policing on some normal level and observe some lasting 
institutional benefits that improve feedback and reinforce resiliency over time. They 
involve policing to better society, to engage with the education system more meaningfully, 
and to collaborate with communities to police themselves. 
1. Policing for the Betterment of Society 
Policing of all types does not occur in a vacuum. It is the assurance that people will 
adhere to the agreed-upon set of rules that society values. It is the product of governmental 
decisions, legislative mandates, and the execution of the social contract. Any problems 
within policing as a system exist within society as a system, too. Ghettos, barrios, and other 
areas with similar names do not exist because the police created them. The socioeconomic 
or educational disadvantage of minorities is not the result of aggressive policing, nor is the 
endemic poverty that plagues most urban inner-cities in America. 
The act of policing affects society, but the entire problem set requires considering 
its problems’ broader truth. As a macrosystem, policing should then expand its reach to 
become a social activist for the betterment of society. Police agencies could effect real 
social change by leveraging their roles as systems within society as a system. Policing 
people, social groups, and communities is a system that helps to sustain order in society, a 
complementary system within a system. By acting on the feedback society provides, 
policing may affect both systems for the better.364 
Perhaps it is possible that policing, as a complex adaptive system within society as 
a system, aware of its feedback and held to account for that of society, could adjust on 
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behalf of the more extensive system. Police organization administrations, their system 
agents, and resources could become advocates for social change. In other words, police 
officers could learn to understand their role in upholding the law but also their mechanism 
for controlling how the laws are applied for the greater good of society, protecting the 
marginalized, and making sense of the risk/reward relationships in how policing is 
executed as a practice, adjusted for the feedback it receives. 
To do this, police organizations would need to expand their system boundaries to 
absorb feedback about how policing affects people and learn to tell the truth about 
themselves within the context of the broader social frame as a tool of government. They 
would need to learn to understand the narratives from and about policing and respond 
promptly and truthfully to them. There is power in police organizations taking ownership 
of their role in society and how they exist within and affect society. 
The actual act of enforcing the law is no exception. Trivial regulations and statutes 
rooted in regulatory compliance, statutory social regulations, and tax revenue–related 
offenses are at the minimum subject to review based on the feedback society provides about 
their enforcement by police. In most states, the powers of arrest are limited only by 
compliance. Police powers are replete with language that demonstrates the “minimum 
amount of force necessary to effect an arrest” as the only limitation to a police officer’s 
ability arrest someone, leaving every arrest situation open to the possibility of a fatal 
encounter.365 The incidents involving Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and George Floyd 
demonstrate that enforcing even trivial laws on non-compliant subjects can result in fatal 
encounters with disastrous societal outcomes. With stakes so high and so little for society 
to gain—especially considering the aftermath of the Floyd death, even accounting for the 
officers’ potential misconduct—it is difficult to justify continuing to enforce trivial laws.  
Police are capable of making sense of the law. Even beyond the freedom to make 
sense of enforcement granted by the law, during the COVID-19 pandemic, many law 
enforcement agencies, both sheriffs and municipal police, openly and vocally refused to 
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enforce stay-at-home orders, mask mandates, and business closures. They argued that 
doing so was unconstitutional, and instead of enforcement, many offered to educate 
citizens rather than arrest them.366 This sort of sense-making about the law may be the 
way forward for police agencies in the United States but on a broader, albeit judicious, 
scale. Rather than risking national disasters by potentially taking a human life to enforce 
almost meaningless statutes, police agencies could begin to evaluate other laws with the 
same lens.367 They could learn to educate citizens about the perils of regulatory violations 
that may befall them should they continue to disobey the law. Police departments can 
provide resources to prevent future non-compliance while simultaneously educating 
lawmakers, the media, and society about the laws police will and will not enforce. 
Policing can become a mechanism that draws attention to laws that 
disproportionately affect minorities through education, information, supporting 
documentation, and research. It would then fall on police administrators, as advocates for 
social change, to condemn laws publicly and honestly or refuse to enforce them openly 
when they disproportionately affect minorities and the poor.368 Doing so may not only 
create a series of empathetic feedback mechanisms for society and policing, but it may 
encourage the building of relationships and partnerships with those most affected by 
disparate lawmaking and enforcement. Potentially, policing could become a voice for those 
who traditionally find the police their only access point to a seemingly inaccessible broader 
government.  
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The efforts of Stockton Police Chief Eric Jones and the Stockton Police Department 
demonstrate how engaging with the truth of policing in a community can help restore 
partnerships and open pathways for communications. Given the department’s history of 
disparate, zero-tolerance policing and a historically aggressive approach to fighting crime, 
Chief Jones recognized that Stockton’s trust gap was significant. Chief Jones and his 
department, bolstered by a $5.75 million grant from the DOJ, engaged in a program of 
“reconciliation” to address its trust gap through “truth telling,” “racial reckoning,” and 
community listening sessions. The initiative demonstrated that Stockton’s relationship with 
its citizens was higher than at any point since before 2015.369 Stockton’s police and its 
community have created communication pathways that engage its history and current 
policing environment, the department’s strategy and tactics, and the national policing 
narrative. Most important, the Stockton Police Department created consistent, reliable, and 
relevant resources for its organization’s feedback and performance.  
If policing is to be judged by the currency of trust, it has a responsibility to be 
truthful and transparent in keeping with the definition of trust in a social science context.370 
Policing must learn to tell the truth not only about itself but about how it fits in the world. 
From a systems perspective, honest social dialogue between citizens and the officials who 
enforce and dictate society’s laws is necessary feedback. It creates expanded pathways for 
feedback within several separate interconnected social systems and the bridge to a different 
way of thinking about the shared responsibility in closing the trust gap and preventing 
bounded rationality. 
2. Engaging Education 
One of Worden and McClean’s central arguments in Mirage of Police Reform is 
that by the time children, who typically feel good about police at younger ages, reach the 
age of 14, their opinions reverse.371 As they grow, children’s beliefs about the world 
 
369 Michael Friedrich, “A Police Department’s Difficult Assignment: Atonement,” Bloomberg 
CityLab, October 23, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-23/what-police-
community-reconciliation-can-look-like.  
370 Jackson and Gau, “Carving Up Concepts?” 
371 Worden and McLean, Mirage of Police Reform, 42–48. 
120 
around them are formed, in part, by their own experiences but also by those of their friends, 
families, and social peers. In the case of sentiment toward police in their communities, it 
has changed for the worse, and any future negative interactions affirm the distrust. They 
argue that trust-building as adults is difficult because of this ingrained social context that 
bombards children until it eventually overwhelms them.372 
Additionally, research shows that Americans are woefully undereducated regarding 
their rights and responsibilities as citizens. Only nine states require one year of government 
or civics education in K–12 education, thirty require at least half a year, and eleven require 
no civics education of any kind.373 Civics education “means all the processes that affect 
people’s beliefs, commitments, capabilities, and actions as members or prospective 
members of communities.”374 Children of color and impoverished communities receive 
less education and lower-quality education than their white and wealthy peers.375  
There are already several police applications in schools. School resource officers, 
education, and mentorship programs abound as features of many police and education 
partnerships, not to mention police officers assigned to schools for safety and security 
purposes.376 These varied relationships represent the coupling between policing as a 
system and public education as a system that exists already. Instead, in this application is 
the idea that the education system makes a deliberate effort to reintroduce civics education, 
partnering with police organizations to engage with students about policing and being 
policed in the educational system to improve policing and its outcomes for America’s 
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students, society, and police. Policing is a cultural norm in the United States—so, too, 
should citizens understand their rights and responsibilities when it comes to the police. 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill hosts a program called Carolina 
K–12 through its Humanities for the Public Good Initiative, which provides current, 
relevant, socially aware curriculum to teachers for use in the state’s education system. One 
of the courses is titled “Police Officer’s 101.” It is an eighth-grade curriculum designed to 
engage students in the realities of policing. The course includes an officer 
question-and-answer period, role-playing, blocks on democratic ideals, the rights and 
freedoms of the Constitution, and the ardors of policing in American society.377 The course 
description reads as follows:  
Students will learn about the responsibilities of police officers and consider 
what characteristics are required to be an effective police officer by 
participating in role plays and interacting with a visiting officer of the law. 
This activity will enable students to explore and dispel stereotypes about 
police, as well as learn appropriate ways to deal with conflict, advocate for 
their rights, and be responsible citizens.378 
Policing is a nuanced trade. The laws that govern police action, arrest, use of force, 
and other policing functions are subtle, with complex variations. The same is true about 
the relationship citizens have with the police. There is a lack of human-to-human, 
actor-to-actor relationships, and a lack of understanding about one another.379 Engaging 
people on this level as an investment in building relationships and partnerships, and 
humanizing both actors as part of the system, is the lowest denominator of feedback that 
both reinforcing and balancing the system can create. Donella Meadows posits that a 
system with more feedback is more resilient than one with less feedback. In order to have 
any value, that feedback must be reliable, consistent, and relevant.380 Advocating for and 
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aiding education of this type consistently throughout K–12 education provides an 
opportunity to create informed, prepared, and educated citizens capable of the meaningful 
feedback processes required to balance law enforcement and its coupling with society 
moving forward.  
At the very minimum, advocating for increased civics education gives a policing 
system the ability to create defensible arguments about society at large and its relationship 
to it. Leveling the playing field through partnering with the education system and activists 
by opening its boundaries and creating pathways for interaction as a more transparent entity 
might improve community relationships. It could also serve to create a sort of expected-
behavior baseline. If trust is the setting and meeting of expectations, the policing system 
can help establish and manage expectations. In this effort, it can attempt to improve social 
trust in the long term by meeting young people where they are while empowering them to 
interact with the system with informed, realistic expectations and the ability to relate to it 
intelligently.  
3. Partnering with Communities 
A key feature of police reform centers on partnering with communities in 
meaningful ways.381 Critics of police departments argue that white police officers 
predominately police neighborhoods of color and ethnic enclaves.382 They argue that 
system agents do not understand the cultural history or nuances of their social groups. 
While there have been drives to improve police hiring in some areas, particularly black and 
Latino recruits, the divide remains. Recruiting among minorities remains a struggle for 
many reasons, including difficulties with testing and background checks.383 As a result, 
the problem of coupling with communities as partners in policing still exists. Implementing 
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community patrols may be a way policing and people can meaningfully unite, increase 
shared feedback, and improve coupling. 
In Australia, there has been a long-standing struggle to integrate aboriginal 
Australians into modern society successfully. A people historically plagued with poverty, 
crime, and substance abuse, among many other social problems, aboriginal Australians had 
been policed aggressively.384 A 1991 report by the Australian federal government detailing 
abuses against aboriginal Australians, including questionable deaths, opened the door to a 
national conversation that produced a series of forward-thinking reforms, including 
“community patrols.”385 Community patrols are self-organized teams of aboriginal 
citizens who police their communities in conjunction with professional police. The 
community patrols mainly serve the traditional Western construction of community 
policing but do so from a framework of community trust, social intervention, education, 
and prevention.  
Tasked with policing quality-of-life issues, minor crimes, substance abuse, and 
other minor offenses within their communities, community patrols lend a positive presence 
of order and avoid enmeshing natives unnecessarily into traditional criminal justice 
structures.386 Community patrol programs have been successful in Australia, and they are 
now supported by funding, training, and materiel support from the Australian Department 
of Health, which has codified their official role.387 Known benefits include a 
self-determinative factor for the native people in their interactions with the government, 
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increased policing effectiveness, lower recidivism rates, cost-effectiveness, and 
community ownership and buy-in.388 
Community patrols are not foreign to the United States. New York City is home to 
two examples. The ultra-orthodox Jewish community in Brooklyn privately funds its 
community patrol called the Shomrim, Hebrew for “guardian.” The Shomrim is part police 
liaison and part community patrol. In many ways, it polices its enclaves independently of 
the legitimate government policing agencies.389 The Muslim Community Patrol, also in 
New York City and similar to the Shomrim, is a private community patrol–liaison hybrid 
in the predominately ethnic Muslim enclaves of Brooklyn.390 Both organizations’ critics 
make accusations of corruption, violence, brutality, racial and cultural bias, and thuggery, 
citing a lack of regulation and political complexities as a primary cause.391  
Government-backed, funded, and trained community patrols organized, led, 
recruited, and managed based on community priorities may accomplish what “traditional” 
strategies have failed to do. They provide citizens with the ability to positively access the 
policing system while also creating pathways for feedback and interaction as both policing 
and social groups improve perspectives on either end of the system. Most important, it 
provides a way to couple policing with community leaders and allows the conversation 
about policing, how it occurs both strategically and tactically, to occur collaboratively.  
G. CONCLUSION 
Systems thinking requires, to an extent, the abandonment of linear causal thinking, 
which is the basic concept of cause and effect. Instead, in complex systems, causal 
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relationships exist in loops of “feedback processes.”392 Feedback processes are the circular 
or cyclical relationships in which problem-set variables work with or against one another 
to create a desirable or undesirable outcome in the system. Affecting any single variable 
changes the behavior of the entire set of variables. These feedback processes include the 
system’s behavior and its agents, managers, and clients. In turn, this behavior changes the 
feedback, and the process starts anew, without end. Senge argues that this awareness of 
both affecting and being affected by system behavior also reframes the concept of 
responsibility for a system’s behavior. He argues that everyone shares responsibility for 
the problems generated by a system.393  
To improve the way it couples with the people it polices and the systems it shares 
space with, policing can seek to cultivate feedback processes that include people, social 
groups, and communities. Externally focused and inclusive feedback processes, if 
successfully implemented, have balancing and reinforcing benefits for all of the systems 
policing interacts with depending on perspective and system goals. Better coupling can 
create a means by which systems can become more responsive to become more resilient. 
The trust gap that separates people from police and the bounded rationality that perpetuates 
it exist mostly because reforms focus on internal mechanisms rather than external needs, 
which can only be discerned clearly through engaging, consistent, and sought-after 
feedback.  
Implementing approaches that engage systems of people that police systems engage 
with regularly in ways that create cooperative feedback processes can improve all aspects 
of policing. Serving as advocates for those without a voice, engaging with the education 
system, and partnering with communities to police themselves may well serve to create a 
whole open-boundary system and interactive feedback processes that bridge the trust gap. 
As demonstrated in both Stockton, California, examples, bridging the trust gap is key to 
better system operability. Trust and the feedback it yields are essential in creating 
consistent social resiliency between people and their police forces.  
 
392 Senge, The Fifth Discipline, 74. 
393 Senge, 73–79. 
126 
The next chapter synthesizes the research in this thesis. It discusses the findings of 
the research in each chapter and the impact of the combined findings. Additionally, it 
makes conclusions about what the research means for policing in the long term. Finally, it 
suggests recommendations to bridge the gap between the current problems affecting 
policing and achieve better outcomes in the future. It also suggests future research of police 
systems as systems, system thinking, and complexity. 
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VII. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis sought to research whether applying systems theory principles would 
improve police organizations’ performance and resiliency over the currently employed 
traditional reform strategy. The question was rooted in three substantial footings at the 
outset. First, police reform’s fundamental purpose is to improve police organizations and 
the way they perform their duties, particularly in how they relate to people and 
communities.394 Reforms of the 20th and 21st centuries introduced standardization of 
police performance, accountability, oversight, and transparency to policing.395  
The second footing is the acknowledgment that traditional reform struggles to 
improve police departments. Many scholars agree that police departments and policing on 
the whole find reform challenging to sustain over time.396 While they disagree, to an 
extent, as to why reforms are difficult to sustain, both camps generally agree that police 
organizations’ management and confusing feedback on performance are among the leading 
causes of police agencies’ failure to reform.397 Unsuccessful reform efforts and inadequate 
policing practices allow an environment in which policing finds itself at odds with 
communities, particularly those dominated by low-income families and people of color.398 
In 2020, 91 percent of Americans, based on a Gallup poll, felt America’s police needed 
significant reform.399 
The final footing is that police departments are complex adaptive systems and are, 
therefore, subject to systems theory principles. Dietz and Mink describe the characteristics 
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that identify police organizations as complex systems. As part of their conclusions, they 
suggest future research needs to apply systems theory to police systems and analyze how 
such a strategy might prepare them to “make sense of today’s policing challenges.”400 
A. OPTIMIZING POLICE SYSTEMS FROM A SYSTEMS ORIENTATION 
A systems-based approach might prove more useful in resolving many of the 
recurring issues that hamper policing in the United States than traditional police reform. 
Much of reform focuses on creating high reliability in police systems without addressing 
the systemic issues that create the problems in the first place, and many of the fixes put in 
place constrain the system even further.401  
As living systems, police systems will always exist in a state of change. The role 
that humans play and the various other systems the police interact with that also involve 
human beings as their primary agents all but guarantee that police systems will always have 
some volatility, uncertainty, and ambiguity as part of their natural state.402  
System optimization is a way of thinking about how to eliminate system constraints 
while encouraging innovations that create ideal system behavior. System optimization is 
priority setting within a system to drive continuous improvement.403 Much of the work in 
optimizing systems is based on Deming’s theory of profound knowledge, which involves 
four aspects:  
• Intentionally managing systems 
• Embracing the nature of systems and their variable characteristics 
• Accepting as true only that which can be proven 
• In living systems, the psychology of agents plays a significant role.404 
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Deming’s work led to his creating a system management framework called total 
quality management (TQM), which embodies the theory of profound knowledge in that it 
is a deliberate system designed to improve (or grow) system capacity.405 TQM recognizes 
that leverage exists in system volatility, that change is inherent in systems, and that 
systemic change is a manageable property. One of the primary principles of TQM is that 
in order to manage a system, measurable metrics or feedback must be elicited from it.406 
TQM is as much a philosophical framework for managing systems as it is a system of 
managing systems. Systems remain under a constant monitoring state and have a robust 
ability to receive, read, and interpret feedback. System adaptations occur based on that 
feedback. In TQM, everyone is responsible for one’s system and problem space. TQM is a 
collaborative strategy for flattening system structures and improving the speed and quality 
of decision-making.  
For law enforcement agencies, system management that encompasses these 
characteristics is almost non-existent in this form. There are some applications of a 
TQM-style approach in the Canadian police services and some similar constructions in the 
United States. These structures mainly serve as internally focused accountability 
mechanisms; however, the Bakersfield Police Department’s Quality Assurance Unit 
demonstrates a whole-system approach that, in many ways, captures the essence of 
Deming’s theory of profound knowledge. The research demonstrated a systems approach 
that incorporates a philosophical TQM framework could improve police performance by 
creating monitoring structures that capture and measure feedback from inside and outside 
the system. Feedback and system management give it the ability to quickly respond to 
changes and unwanted system behaviors, limit system failures, mitigate the scope of those 
failures, and provide opportunities to leverage positive behavior to the system’s benefit.  
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B. BUILDING AGENT COMPETENCY TO IMPROVE SYSTEM 
PERFORMANCE 
One of the core tenets of traditional police reform is the training and education of 
police officers.407 Yet, the approach to improving performance through training and 
education is short-sighted and inadequate to improve the system. Training in the reform 
construction focuses primarily on reactive responses to events that occur instead of 
teaching agents to think at a higher level and reflect on how their actions can positively 
and negatively affect their policing systems.  
Reform scholars struggle to understand the inconsistency of police officer behavior 
and how to capture and replicate positive behaviors while eradicating undesirable 
behaviors.408 From a systems perspective, the answer may lie in the ability to process 
information cognitively. Dietz and Mink observed that system agents who apply their tacit 
knowledge in solving problems benefit their systems. Tacit knowledge is gained through 
experience and implicit reflection on what has been learned as a result.409  
Senge notes that system behavior is the product of a system’s structure. Instead of 
focusing exclusively on system behavior, which is short-sighted, systems thinking should 
concentrate on the deep-learning cycle: “beliefs and assumptions, established practices, 
skills and capabilities, networks of relationships, and awareness and sensibilities.”410 In 
other words, Senge argues that problem-solving in systems is not reactive but generative. 
Donald Schön calls this process “reflection in action.” He argues that most influential 
practitioners assess and evaluate in the process of doing and make iterative adjustments to 
action.411 They can learn from their experiences while also experiencing them while also 
creating an almost predictive ability based on past experiences and reflections. What is 
more, deep learning and reflection in action are processes that can be emphasized culturally 
to improve system performance.  
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The growth of the Singapore Police Force under Commander Khoo is an example 
of how reflective practice and leadership that emphasizes systemic performance and shared 
responsibility for improved performance grow learning organizations. Creating cultures 
that emphasize the ability of agents to approach the organization’s problem and systems 
spaces with a focus on continuous improvement relies on a shared vision, values, and 
mission focus.412  
The ability to think generatively is directly proportional to the ability to learn. 
Education, formal education specifically, is not a central focus in the qualification of police 
officers. Training is programmatic and job specific. In 2020, the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police began to recommend formal education for police officers to improve 
outcomes. Formal education may improve police outcomes because it increases the number 
of tools available to the system’s agents. Rather than the knowledge gained by education, 
it may be much more critical that people with formal educations have better learned how 
to learn.  
Building the learning capacity of system agents improves the agents’ response to 
the events and behaviors that occur within the system. Generative learning, the deep-
learning cycle, reflection in action, or tacit knowledge improves system performance. 
Foundational to each of these descriptions of the same essential processes are learning and 
analyzing what is learned from past experiences and synthesizing that learning with future 
behavior. An organization’s ability to assess its problem and system spaces, capabilities, 
strengths, and weaknesses is central to its ability to adapt or change to best suit its 
environment’s complexity or volatility.  
C. UNDERSTANDING SYSTEM CONTEXT AND GOAL-SETTING FOR 
SUCCESS 
A system’s context, that is, its environment, can confuse the system’s goals and 
prevent them from functioning as designed. Better goal-setting and an awareness of the 
constraints environments can improve system performance. Police organizations’ 
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executives and leadership, aware of their environments, can improve performance and set 
achievable goals.  
The City of Seattle and its police department are good examples of how context 
constrains police system performance. From a reformed perspective, the Seattle Police 
Department is one of the most progressive police agencies in the United States. Seattle’s 
reforms center on creating legitimacy and procedural justice outcomes. Moreover, Seattle’s 
police department created an environment, mainly through the micro-community model, 
in which systems management should be possible and relatively practical. 
The contexts of policing in the macrosystem and microsystems that make up 
policing in the United States make legitimacy a problematic proposition. Confidence 
eroded over the idea of policing in the macrosystem often overrides or undermines social 
capital built in the microsystems—the local police organization, precinct, neighborhood, 
and beat. What is more, Seattle and its reaction as a city and police organization to the 
CHOP situation created on some level a question about its institutional legitimacy in 
fleeing its police precinct and leaving its citizens unprotected.  
As a police system exists within a social system, Seattle exemplifies a police 
organization constrained by its greater social system. The Seattle Police Department’s 
goals and local political environment, including its consent decree management, and the 
local population’s surveyed expectations do not generally align. Seattle’s police find 
themselves pulled in many different directions. 
A way forward for Seattle, and policing in general, is to divest from sociological 
problems while acknowledging their impact on several systems. Policing could maintain 
“tactical agency” over the act of policing while developing a “strategic voice” to serve as 
its influence among the many competing influences with which it finds itself often 
engaged.413 This dual role of policing can help it understand its strategic role better while 
engaging with sociological problems from a proactive rather than reactive position. 
 
413 Bayley, Davis, and Davis, “Race and Policing.” 
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Considering goals of policing from a macrosystem perspective might help police 
organizations better navigate the contexts they have to contend with in their many different 
microsystems. A goal that captures American law enforcement’s essential purpose, nothing 
less and nothing more, might help establish a standard to measure police conduct across 
the board and standardize expectations of America’s police. Stabilization of this sort might 
help rewrite the police’s role in balancing the variability of competing social goals and 
creating a framework by which police systems and the social systems that interact with 
them can be compared and judged. Police systems may find legitimacy from both an 
institutional and social perspective more manageable to obtain in this setting. 
D. SEEKING FEEDBACK AND FINDING RESILIENCE 
In most ways, America’s police fail to couple well with communities, social groups, 
and people, limiting their resilience. Coupling is the idea of connecting to two things. For 
systems, coupling has two meanings. First, it connects two system components, like 
connecting wheels to a car. Second, it connects two systems, like connecting a car to a 
trailer. Both exist as systems, but each affects the other and becomes a more extensive, 
complex system. Boundaries are the space where two systems connect.  
Policing struggles to connect with people for two reasons: trust gaps and bounded 
rationality. Complexity amplifies the effects of both of these. There is a trust gap between 
the differing expectations of policing and the way it interacts with people. The trust gap 
largely exists because the actions and the expectations of police do not always align. 
Historically, policing reflects society’s struggles to relate to the poor and people of color, 
creating a long-standing mistrust between people in those categories and police officers. 
Police performance suffers as a result.  
Decisions about a system’s behavior made without all of the information about the 
system is called bounded rationality. Often caused by unavailable feedback or system 
information distant from the decision maker, bounded rationality can cause many 
problems, including undesirable system behavior, bad decisions, and a reliance on the 
wrong kind of feedback. Sometimes important feedback goes ignored or unrecognized by 
a system’s decision-makers.  
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Traditional reforms focus on the internal operations of police organizations. As a 
result, police organizations under-develop external sources of feedback about police 
system performance. Feedback is vital to systems, and through feedback, systems learn 
about themselves. The more feedback a system has access to, the more it can learn. 
Feedback mechanisms are like sensors telling the system about its various components and 
its overall performance and efficiency. Feedback comes in all forms. For police systems, 
data and people make up the most critical sources of feedback.  
One way to increase feedback response is opening system boundaries and 
partnering with feedback from other systems. Another way is to elicit feedback 
programmatically by engaging with more communities, social groups, and people about 
the system’s performance. Feedback is the key to creating resiliency. Police organizations 
can create better feedback by engaging deliberately with society, partnering with the 
education system, and empowering communities to participate in policing their 
neighborhoods.  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
To reformers, politicians, and police leaders, uncertainty does and should create 
anxiety. It means that in understanding and administering policing to achieve the ideal 
state, oversight, accountability, supervision, and transparency must exist as policing 
priorities.414 They are the key to preventing as many negative consequences as possible. 
That said, fear should not prevent them from thinking differently about policing. The 
sooner those who make decisions about these systems start to understand their 
characteristics and interact with them, the sooner they can begin to work with them 
effectively—thinking about systems as systems helps to create characteristics that ensure 
more resilient and desirable outcomes. The better they understand systems and 
complexity—and the potential chaos or opportunities they present—the more effectively 
the system can learn about itself and be changed to match the desired outputs.415  
 
414 Shrivastava, Sonpar, and Pazzaglia, “Normal Accident Theory.” 
415 Senge, The Fifth Discipline, 69–72. 
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Each chapter of this thesis sought to understand why American policing performs 
as it does and how understanding systems’ behavior, especially in complex systems, might 
help explain why policing as a system often struggles to do what it intends. More than that, 
it attempted to identify points of leverage to improve policing not only in the abstract but 
in ways that police organizations can use to improve themselves. This in itself—the idea 
that an abstract system involving all police organizations, comprising many thousands of 
authentic, brick-and-mortar police institutions across the United States and each affecting 
the others, impacts the very existence of each—is a lesson that systems thinking has to 
teach.  
Police organizations, no matter the size, are inherently connected as a system. Each 
bears an intrinsic responsibility to the others to learn to perform in a way that benefits the 
system as a whole. One need look no further than the George Floyd incident to see that a 
single call for service can affect every single police organization in the United States for 
years to come. The Floyd disaster will long be characterized as a tragedy for law 
enforcement agencies. Those who understand systems recognize where disaster occurs, but 
also where opportunity lies. Police organizations worldwide are being forced to reimagine 
the way they think about policing, managing police organizations, and policing outcomes. 
“Metanoia” is the title of a chapter in Peter Senge’s Fifth Discipline, in which he introduces 
the reader to systems and thinking about systems. Metanoia is a theological term meaning 
“a transformative change of heart.”416 Senge is as enthusiastic as Meadows, who at the 
outset of her book Thinking in Systems, calls systems thinking “a way of thinking that gives 
us the freedom to identify root causes of problems and see new opportunities.”417 Perhaps 
the post–George Floyd age of policing will usher in an era of metanoia for America’s police 
agencies. 
 
416 Merriam-Webster, s.v. metanoia, accessed February 14, 2021 https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/metanoia. 
417 Meadows, Thinking in Systems, 2. 
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1. Create a Platform 
There are four significant conclusions drawn from the research in this thesis. First, 
creating a platform for managing and sustaining the flow of information within and about 
police systems to connect executives and agents with information about the system could 
improve all aspects of policing. Such a mechanism serves as a sort of perpetual system 
monitor. It reminds a police agency’s executives about the nature of the system and the 
benefits of monitoring to maintain it. A system management framework also helps all 
system agents recognize systemic leverage points to steer the system toward its goals. As 
evidenced in Bakersfield, system management creates action within the system and 
manages feedback mechanisms, thereby improving performance and resilience.  
Effective systems also require constant care and monitoring—they need nurturing. 
Thinking about systems is one thing; enabling them to maneuver is another. Effective, 
emergent systems recognize themselves as systems. They recognize their ideal and current 
states and adjust to move in the right direction. Within that ability to move, adjust, and 
maneuver based on the system’s needs in the world around it is the very essence of the 
power of systems. 
The reflexive ability to understand behaviors and change them by building system 
management structures in police organizations will improve resiliency and organically 
create legitimacy where traditional reforms do not. This proactive approach to 
improvement is adaptable to any number of problem sets whereas traditional reform 
structures as they currently exist are necessarily reactive and inflexible. System structure 
sets the stage for system behavior, establishes a mechanism that focuses on a whole-system 
approach, and embraces the strategic philosophy of management found in TQM or its 
underlying principles found in the theory of profound knowledge. This approach 
effectively seeks to measure, perpetually, everything about the system, trusting only that 
which is captured, and seeks to elicit feedback from every internal and external relevant, 
accessible source.  
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2. Improve Agent Competency 
The second important conclusion is that improving agents’ competency within a 
police system will improve the system’s behavior and bolster its structure. Agent capacity 
will make the system more resilient and perform better. Agent capacity can be encouraged 
programmatically, teaching police officers how to learn. Education derived from 
experience, traditional or non-traditional education, and an understanding of how to 
leverage learning while doing, to become genuinely reflective practitioners, has 
immeasurable value for the future of police systems. Police organizations that learn to 
cultivate a collective culture with a shared vision that values experience and the virtue of 
learning and empowers systems thinking can create healthy, robust learning environments. 
American police agencies should increase their agent capacities to become 
generative thinkers, which will improve their systems’ performance. Generatively thinking 
about police systems and their problems will develop police departments into learning 
organizations and their agents’ abilities to learn more and in different ways. Additionally, 
practicing generative thinking can improve performance and resiliency and develop both 
collective and individual leadership abilities. Investing in police officers’ skills and 
abilities through a shared vision and teaching police officers how to learn will create high-
performing cultures, higher-order thinking, real problem-solving police officers, and 
administrators attuned to their systems and roles within them. Last, strategically investing 
in agent capacity has a mitigating effect. Better decision-making and leadership will help 
eliminate the “bad agent” behaviors that create divides between police and their 
communities in ways reforms never successfully have. 
3. Understand System Context  
Third, police must gain an awareness of how system context impacts police systems 
and how policing affects its environments, while understanding how both sets of goals 
affect policing in the United States. Seattle is a microcosm of circumstances facing police 
organizations across the United States. Policing often finds itself awash in contextual 
effects on police systems. Because they all exist as part of the macrosystem of America’s 
police, how they deal with the problem spaces of context is essential—each can affect the 
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other. Each helps to form both its microsystem context and the macrosystem context. As a 
result, it stands to reason that police systems must set their goals based on a macrosystem 
ideal of policing, just as reforms do, but understand the contextual obligations and obstacles 
in carrying out those goals.  
Where the context—the surrounding system environments—challenge the police 
systems’ ability to reach their goals, they must learn to challenge that context to the degree 
to which they can pursue their goals to be effective systems. It essentially becomes a matter 
of constraint management. The environment becomes the constraint, at which point the 
system must learn, for its own sake and those around it, to eliminate or strategically 
outflank that obstacle. At the same time, each police system must learn to be accountable 
to all of its microsystem contexts. When a history of policing abuses bound trust-building 
or politically motivated, counterproductive contextual environments, police system 
executives must learn to answer for both.  
4. Recognize the Value of Feedback 
Fourth, as systems, police organizations must learn to recognize the value of 
feedback in creating resiliency and effectively managing their microsystems. Police 
organizations can proactively engage feedback to create social resilience and connect with 
social groups, communities, and people to stabilize and reinforce police systems.  
Better coupling with systems of people, such as communities and social groups, to 
assimilate them as part of the law enforcement process can transform the behavior of 
policing as a complex system and the systems with which it interacts. Improved system 
coupling creates broad pathways to improve feedback. Better, more reliable feedback 
builds relationships, trust, and, most important, shared responsibility that leads to a social 
resiliency that traditional reforms fail to deliver. To put it simply, connecting with people 
in meaningful, lasting dialogue and fostering partnerships that create communication 
pathways outside the police organization’s internal systems may help police organizations 
better understand how to serve people and help society better understand its police. Quality, 
lasting relationships between people and their police may lead to less volatility in policing 
outcomes. 
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Police organizations should find creative ways to engage people, especially in 
communities traditionally marginalized by society. Seeking feedback, like intelligence-
gathering, can have any number of reliable sources. Opening boundaries in distinct areas 
with which system policing overlaps could provide long-term reliable feedback sources, 
cultivated over time, and untainted by historical abuses. Acting as a voice of the 
marginalized and partnering with people for the greater good of society could have a lasting 
effect on changing people’s minds about who their police are and open communication 
lines that did not previously exist.  
Also, there is a real benefit to collaboratively educating as separate-but-coupled 
systems, empowering, and informing students about their responsibilities as citizens, their 
rights when contacted by police, the reason police officers take certain precautions, and 
procedures for reporting a crime and seeking redress against perceived police impropriety. 
There is a place in these discussions for a social conversation about perceived police abuses 
and local community-policing problems—and how policing is done and perceived in these 
communities.  
Community patrols represent another opportunity to improve feedback and restore 
relationships while eliminating some dangerous and trivial conflicts between police and 
citizens. Also, partnerships between officers and community members help create a lasting 
communication line and ensure equity. All three of these examples of open-boundary 
feedback opportunities also represent a new recruiting ground for police officers outside 
the normal streams, particularly in areas where police officers’ recruiting has been difficult 
in the past.  
F. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the research and conclusions of this thesis, I recommend the 
implementation of a systems approach to police organization management. There is 
significant value in creating structures to manage police systems by gathering and 
interpreting internal and external feedback. By measuring the system’s behavior against 
the expected outcomes, police organizations can seek opportunities to improve 
performance throughout the system perpetually. This management framework also 
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demonstrates a commitment to systemic oversight and accountability through inspection, 
audit, and programmatic review of patterns and practices. 
Police administrators and executives, along with those who guide police 
departments, such as professional standards organizations and industry think-tanks, should 
explore opportunities to expand agent capacity through systems thinking and systems 
management training at every practitioner and executive level for all police officers in 
America. 
There is also a place for police organizations to learn to become more thoughtful in 
approaching their environments, both those it creates and those with which it is forced to 
interact. There is value in challenging the status quo of policing both in the narratives 
surrounding it and its engagement with society. There is an opportunity for policing to 
change the conversation about it. Police organizations can become an active voice in 
changing the narrative in the sense of what is said about policing but also in people’s hearts, 
many of whom rightly distrust America’s police.  
Finally, some of the system observations and conclusions in this thesis will improve 
a police organization’s performance in ways traditional reforms have not. The real power 
of the findings of this research is in the nature of systems themselves. The whole is more 
powerful than the sum of its parts. Combining these ideas to create robust police systems 
provides them with the reflexive ability to function as a part of the world rather than apart 
from it. A police system attuned to its performance, managed by skilled thinkers, operated 
by reflective agents, in which both the system and its agents understand its goals and 
context, will be a powerful, successful system. By adding to those characteristics 
wide-reaching internal and external sensors touching every aspect of the system’s 
performance and a mindset of continuous monitoring for improvement opportunities, 
however slight they might be, the system becomes more than merely high-functioning or 
efficient. It becomes a resilient, reflexive system.  
G. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The combined approach of this thesis is the synthesis of different practices 
throughout policing to leverage a systems framework for police organizations’ benefit. The 
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synthesis is mainly theoretical as of this writing. Future research might study the 
implementation of these approaches in municipal police organizations to determine 
whether the findings bear fruit in practice. Additionally, future research might include ways 
to introduce a system approach operationally to police organizational performance to 
improve the physical act of policing as well. For example, a reflexive system’s 
management strategy expanded to focus on operational policing activities, especially in 
environments optimized for system performance like Seattle’s micro-community strategy, 
in the hands of reflective systems-thinking practitioners, represents an exciting research 
opportunity. Additionally, there is an opportunity for future research to explore what 
system structures lend themselves to better policing outcomes.  
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